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ARTICLES 
A DEFAULT RULE OF OMNIPOTENCE: IMPLIED 
JURISDICTION AND EXAGGERATED REMEDIES IN 
EQUITY FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES1
George P. Roach2
 1. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 
308, 322 (1999) (“To accord a type of relief that has never been available before—and 
especially (as here) a type of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by 
longstanding judicial precedent—is to invoke a ‘default rule,’ . . . not of flexibility but 
of omnipotence.”). 
 2. George P. Roach is the founder of a Dallas litigation consulting and valuation 
practice, Multi Discipline Consultants, and is a Senior Advisor to the litigation 
consulting firm of Freeman & Mills, Inc. in Los Angeles.  His background includes an 
M.B.A., J.D. and an A.B. in Economics.  See www.multidisciplineconsultants.com for 
more information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“In the mental map of most lawyers, restitution consists largely of 
blank spaces with undefined borders and only scattered patches of 
familiar ground.”3
 
Most authorities describe restitution as either a misunderstood, 
ignored or unknown area of the law.  Those few professors who teach it 
find it difficult to overcome restitution’s unappealing image in today’s 
law schools.4  Contrary to this image of a fading discipline, restitution 
case law has actually been growing rapidly in the federal courts.  The 
two most important sources of this growth have been in intellectual 
property and claims for equitable monetary relief by federal agencies 
(“agencies”).  Undeterred by the cobwebs and uncertainty, agencies are 
winning a large number of sizable claims for unjust enrichment that total 
in the billions of dollars per year for the U.S. Treasury.5  The 
uncertainty and confusion said to be so prevalent among lawyers and 
 3. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
1277, 1277 (1989). 
 4. See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96 
(1995), stating: 
Confusion over the content of restitution carries significant adverse consequences.  To 
put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not 
know what restitution is.  The subject is no longer taught in law schools, and the 
lawyer who lacks an introduction to its basic principles is unlikely to recognize them 
in practice.  The technical competence of published opinions in straightforward 
restitution cases has noticeably declined; judges and lawyers sometimes fail to grasp 
the rudiments of the doctrine even when they know where to find it. 
Id.; See also Elaine Shoben, Forum: Spinning Restitution: From Cauliflower to 
Coconut, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1027 (2003). 
 5. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (It is not presently known what percentage of the money 
deposited into the U.S. Treasury is ever paid out to consumers.  At present, most of the 
money deposited is collected in escrow for the benefit of the consumers except, for 
example, for recent settlement agreements between the FDA and various 
pharmaceutical companies relating to violations of the FDA’s standards for good 
manufacturing practices.  The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires agencies to deposit 
into the Treasury monies that otherwise come into their possession during the normal 
course of operation.); 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (The Anti-Deficiency Act precludes a federal 
agency from spending any money that might otherwise come into its possession without 
the express authorization of Congress.  The agency can hold the proceeds in escrow but 
cannot spend it for itself.). 
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courts6 may entreat rather than discourage the agencies as their repeated 
claims and strained interpretations of the law in equity prevail for want 
of informed resistance or significant counter-pressure. 
This article is an outgrowth of the author’s ongoing survey of the 
consistency of the definition and measurement of restitutionary 
monetary remedies in all areas of commercial litigation.  It became 
apparent early in the survey that the measurement of agencies’ remedies 
under the doctrine of implied jurisdiction differs substantially both 
between the different agencies and in comparison to other areas of the 
law that measure restitution.  Based on the same equitable tradition, 
jurisdiction and claim, agencies are securing uniquely large measures of 
unjust enrichment. 
The Supreme Court has held that Congress intentionally implies 
jurisdiction in equity when an agency’s enabling statutes fail to clearly 
preclude such jurisdiction.  In effect, agencies are making claims for 
unjust enrichment in which federal statutes provide the basis for 
establishing the unjust nature of the defendant’s actions.  The result is 
presumptive jurisdiction in which agencies substitute civil litigation for 
administrative law,7 and the agencies enjoy greater freedom to file a 
broad range of claims in equity without having to comply with specific 
statutory authority. 
As further demonstrated in the chart in Appendix A, the average 
number of case opinions per year from federal courts relating to the 
defendant’s profits has increased approximately 700% in the last 40 
 6. United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26821, at *19 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2005) (quoting Dobbs, Law of Remedies, Damages, Equity, 
Restitution § 4.1(1), at 369 n. 28) (2d ED. 1993); see also id. § 1.1, at 5 (“Judges 
frequently speak of ‘damages’ when they mean restitution; the reader of restitutionary 
material is always challenged by . . . loose usage to analyze cases by their content rather 
than their terms.”); Kull, supra note 4, at 1191 (“Few American lawyers, judges, or law 
professors are familiar with even the standard propositions of the doctrine, and the few 
who are continue to disagree about elementary issues of definition.”). 
 7. Sections 13(b), providing for general jurisdiction in equity, and 19 (15 U.S.C.S. 
§ 57b (2005)), providing for specific jurisdiction and specific remedies subject to 
certain administrative limitations, respectively, were enacted for the FTC at roughly the 
same time.  Despite the specific applicability of Section 19, the FTC has generally 
chosen to file its claims under Section 13(b) for implied jurisdiction, thereby avoiding 
Section 19’s statute of limitations and other administrative prerequisites.  See Peter C. 
Ward, Restitution For Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good 
Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139 (1992). 
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years.8  From 1965 to 2005, the federal share of federal and state case 
opinions increased from 50% to 80%.  Given (1) the state of neglect 
attributed to practice in equity, (2) the increase in federal opinions and, 
most importantly, (3) that a handful of agencies file a disproportionately 
large share of the claims for implied jurisdiction, there is significant 
potential for this agency litigation to change the interpretation of unjust 
enrichment. 
The traditional role of courts in equity and especially the 
Chancellor’s Court in England was to provide a safety net to ensure 
justice for cases that would otherwise slip through the cracks of the 
system of courts at law.9  Judges in those courts generally enjoyed 
greater discretion and authority to “do justice” on an exceptional basis 
 8. A simple survey was made on the basis of querying the LEXIS database for a 
listing of all case opinions that included the term “defendant profit.”  This listing was 
sorted by state civil, state criminal, federal civil and federal criminal cases.  The 
comparison between state and federal civil cases is listed in the table below and the 
graph in Appendix A.  The results confirm general observed trends and the magnitude 
of the recent increase appears significant, however inexact. 
 
STATE AND FEDERAL OPINIONS CONTAINING ‘DEFENDANT PROFIT’ 
ANNUAL AVERAGE 
Year 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900
State 4.0 6.0 6.0 3.5 3.5 5.2 5.2 
Federal 1.1 2.9 2.9 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.9 
        
Year 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935
State 8.8 11.4 11.2 12.6 14.2 13.2 11.6 
Federal 4.4 4.4 6.3 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.0 
        
Year 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
State 11.4 9.2 9.6 8.9 8.9 9.6 9.6 
Federal 6.0 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.6 10.3 10.3 
        
Year 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
State 9.8 14.4 12.2 16.2 12 24.8 22.4 
Federal 17.2 22.0 34.6 52.0 67.6 73.6 81.2 
 
 9. Henry Lacey McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity § 24, at 53 (2d 
ED. 1948) (“[E]quity is a system for the correction of the defects in the law.”). 
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and frequently with the benefit of a view of the legal system that today 
would be characterized as “outside the box.”  Conscripting a court in 
equity as the “work horse” for the administrative claims of federal 
agencies is at odds with such history and tradition. 
Overall, this article will explore the justification for implied 
jurisdiction and compare how restitution is measured differently by 
different agencies.  There will be specific focus on claims by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission  (“CFTC”), Department of Energy (“DOE”), 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”).  Some of the larger inconsistencies are analyzed and traced 
back to the widespread confusion about the meanings of specific terms 
pertaining to either remedies in equity, at law, or both. 
II. CLARIFYING RESTITUTION10
“[G]ive a dog a bad name and hang him.”11
 
In a recent ERISA opinion, the district court of Connecticut 
observed that one of the most important lessons in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson12 is that 
labels for remedies in restitution and unjust enrichment should not be 
taken at face value: “[I]n Great-West . . . the Supreme Court made it 
clear that an individual cannot evade this restriction on damage claims 
by characterizing one’s request for monetary relief as ‘restitution.’”13
The differences between specific restitution, unjust enrichment14 
 10. In addition to the specific cites in the article, the author wishes to acknowledge 
the reference resource provided by Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary 
Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577 (2002). 
 11. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 12. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
 13. Coan v. Kaufman, 333 F. Supp. 2d 14, 25 (D. Conn. 2004); See also Scholastic 
Corp. v. Kassem, 389 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 (D. Conn. 2005) (“Of course, as the insurer 
in Great West learned to its chagrin, mere labels do not govern the Court’s analysis.  
Instead, ‘in determining the propriety of a remedy, [a court] must look to the real nature 
of the relief sought, not its label.’” (quoting Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., 329 F.3d 317, 321 
(2d Cir. 2003))); Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29261, at *36 (D. 
N.J. 2005) (“Third, the plaintiffs’ efforts to cloak their damages in the garb of an 
‘equitable decree’ does not advance their argument.”). 
 14. As suggested by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 1, cmt. c (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000), the practical differences 
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and especially criminal restitution cause a great deal of the 
misunderstanding in this body of case law.15  The confusion is 
compounded by the fact that some of the key cases for implied 
jurisdiction use and abuse the term restitution for the purposes of 
justifying the appropriateness of a proposed remedy.16  Frequently, the 
FTC or FDA claim restitution of revenues but justify their proposed 
measurement of restitution with cases that advocate restitution as 
measured by profits.17
The law of restitution/unjust enrichment is based on two 
overlapping theories of recovery: specific restitution18 and restitution 
based on unjust enrichment.  According to Professor Laycock, no 
complete definition can exclude either form of restitution.19  He 
emphasizes that the two forms of restitution are not distinct and one can 
enhance or extend the other.  For example: 
Specific restitution of misappropriated property both restores the 
property to the rightful owner and deprives the misappropriator of 
his unjust gain.  But such explanations are often indirect and 
between restitution and unjust enrichment are not sufficiently significant to warrant 
distinct terms for restitution and unjust enrichment for the purposes of this article.  The 
two terms, unless qualified, are to be considered indistinguishable. 
 15. United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26821, at *19 
n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2005) (“Another source of confusion is the fact that courts also 
give the term ‘restitution’ various meanings.  See, e.g., Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 
§ 4.1(2), at 371 (‘some major ways of talking about restitution should be understood’ 
‘because confusion has sometimes run very deep’)). 
 16. See Dobbs, supra note 6, § 1.1, at 5. 
The law of restitution can be difficult and confusing because restitution may be 
identified by terms that refer to some particular form of restitution or some particular 
piece of remedial history.  For example, some particular restitution claims may be 
identified as quasi-contract claims or as claims in assumpsit or quantum meruit.  
Claims for a constructive trust, for an equitable lien, or for subrogation are all 
restitutionary claims.  The list goes on.  So restitution today is a general term for 
diverse kinds of recoveries aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of the defendant 
and measured by the defendant’s gains, but it has many specific forms, each of which 
must be addressed separately. 
Id. 
 17. Among other opinions, the Courts’ opinions in FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530 (7th 
Cir. 1997) and Gem Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 
1996) in effect use this approach, consciously or not.  See the discussion in Part VII, D 
below for further analysis of these cases. 
 18. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 4 cmts. c, d (1937); id. § 128.  The same 
usage appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372 (1981). 
 19. Laycock, supra note 3, at 1279. 
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sometimes ill-fitting in more complex situations.  The 
misappropriator is unjustly enriched whether or not the rightful 
owner can trace the specific property taken.  Yet a plaintiff who can 
trace the specific property gets a far more powerful remedy than one 
who cannot.  The conceptual basis for this remedy is plaintiff’s claim 
to restoration of property that is still identifiable as his.  Elaborate 
tracing rules separate the property still identifiable as plaintiff’s from 
property that has passed into the misappropriator’s general assets.20
As such, both sources are distinguished from compensating 
damages or criminal restitution, which Professor Laycock explains is 
mistakenly equated with restitution/unjust enrichment: 
‘Restitution’ is sometimes used in a third sense—to restore the value 
of what plaintiff lost.  The Restatement employs the term this way at 
least occasionally, and the usage is common in the statutes requiring 
criminals to make restitution to their victims.  But restitution of the 
value of what plaintiff lost is simply compensatory damages.  Used 
in this sense, ‘restitution’ loses all utility as a means of 
distinguishing one body of law from another.  Restitution must be 
distinguished from compensation, either by its focus on restoration 
of the loss in kind or by its focus on defendant’s gain as the measure 
of recovery.21
Confusion or juxtaposition of civil restitution and criminal restitution is 
so widespread among the opinions of federal district and appellate courts 
that comments from equally authoritative sources are provided to 
emphasize the point.22  The March 31, 2000 discussion draft of the 
Restatement (Third) states: “Law that establishes (by statute or 
otherwise) the terms on which a convicted criminal may be ordered to 
make restitution to crime victims is not part of the law of restitution as 
 20. Id. at 1280. 
 21. Id. at 1282-83.  See also Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 169 
(Ct. App. Md. 2005) (“‘The damages recovery is to compensate the plaintiff and it pays 
him, theoretically, his losses.  The restitution claim, on the other hand, is not aimed at 
compensating the plaintiff but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits it would be 
unjust for him to keep . . . .’” (quoting Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1 (1973) as quoted 
in Consumer Protection Div. Office of Attorney Gen. v. Consumer Pub. Co., 874 A.2d 
919 (Md. 2005))). 
 22. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (“Rarely 
will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry,’ (quoting Great-West Life & 
Annuity, 534 U.S. at 233-34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)), than consulting, as we have 
done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, 
which make the answer clear.” (internal citation edited)). 
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defined by this Restatement.”23  Professor Andrew Kull, the Reporter for 
the Restatement (Third), lends further support: 
For many lawyers the immediate connotation of the word 
‘restitution’ will be something else entirely: criminal sanctions 
requiring wrongdoers to make restitution to their victims, a topic 
having almost nothing to do with the subject at hand.  The linguistic 
confusion that bedevils the law of restitution—necessitating 
laborious definitions before anyone can understand what you are 
talking about—affords an early indication that the common name of 
this neglected body of law was singularly ill-chosen.24
A simple example of the potential confusion lies in the Fifth Circuit 
opinion in SEC v. Huffman in which the court defined restitution as 
compensating damages or criminal restitution but labeled the remedy of 
unjust enrichment of profits as disgorgement, holding that 
“disgorgement” is different from “restitution.”25  While it is certainly 
accurate to distinguish restitution of profits from compensating 
damages, the Fifth Circuit has created further confusion by the use of 
generic terms for restricted meanings.26
One appropriate contrast between compensating damages and 
unjust enrichment is that the former aims to restore the plaintiff to her ex 
ante position while the latter aims to restore the defendant to her ex ante 
position.27  Only equitable rescission attempts to restore both the 
 23. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 1 cmt. h (Discussion Draft, March 31, 2000). 
 24. Kull, supra note 4, at 1191-92. 
 25. SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 26. Id. 
Despite some casual references in our caselaw to the contrary, see, for example, SEC 
v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (describing disgorgement order in one 
isolated phrase as ‘this restitution’), disgorgement is not precisely restitution.  
Disgorgement wrests ill-gotten gains from the hands of a wrongdoer. Commodities 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1335.  It is an equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer 
from enriching himself by his wrongs.  Disgorgement does not aim to compensate the 
victims of the wrongful acts, as restitution does. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., 
Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978).  Thus, a disgorgement order might be for an 
amount more or less than that required to make the victims whole.  It is not restitution. 
Id. (internal citation edited). 
 27. See Colleen Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 
1577, 1625 n. 265 (2002) (quoting David Schoenbrod et al., Remedies: Public and 
Private 727 (3d ED. 2002) (“Restitution aims at the defendant’s [rightful position].  
Disgorgement is the key concept.  By making the defendant disgorge the benefits he 
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plaintiff and defendant to their ex ante positions.28  However, restoration 
is a questionable goal for restitution/unjust enrichment because 
restoration for the plaintiff generally relates to compensating damages, a 
remedy at law.29
III. MEASURING THE DEFENDANT’S BENEFIT 
“[T]his is equity, not rocket science.”30
 
Companies typically sell directly to their customers at a retail price 
or they sell to a wholesaler or a retailer at a wholesale price which is 
then marked up to a retail price.  Assume that the company, Unjustly 
Enriched Inc. (“UEI”), sells its product for $50 and nets $10 per unit 
after paying for all direct or variable costs.  After the product leaves 
UEI, it gets marked up 100% to $100 per unit for sale at the retail level.  
Therefore, the UEI’s revenue per unit would be $50, its benefit or profit 
would be $10 per unit and assuming that the product or service provided 
no benefits to the customer and has no remaining asset value, the 
customer’s loss would be $100 per unit. 
Absent consideration of indirect and fixed costs, most jurisdictions 
would measure the UEI’s unjust enrichment as $10 per unit.  Unjust 
enrichment ignores the customer and only focuses on depriving UEI of 
any benefit or profit.  The customer’s compensating damage would be 
cannot justly retain, the law of restitution returns the defendant to the position he 
should, ‘in equity and good conscience,’ have occupied.”). 
 28. Schoenbrod et al., supra note 27, at 727.  Under some circumstances, specific 
restoration can also restore the defendant or even both parties to their ex ante positions, 
especially when neither party has incurred any losses or additional expenses relating to 
the asset before the restitution. 
 29. Murphy, supra note 27, at 1592 n. 78.  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Modern 
American Remedies: Cases and Materials 15-16, at 15 (2d ED. 1994) (writing that “‘the 
essence of compensatory damages’ is ‘to restore the injured party as nearly as possible 
to the position he would have been in but for the wrong’”); see also McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995) (stating in an employment 
discrimination case that “‘the object of compensation is to restore the employee to the 
position he or she would have been in absent the discrimination’”); In re Acushnet 
River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D. Mass. 1989) (“‘Were the 
Court to accept the argument that a monetary award is restitutionary simply because it 
returns a party to pre-injury status, little would be left in the realm of compensatory 
damages.’”). 
 30. In re Alpha Telecom, Inc., No. CV 01-1283-PA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, 
at *29 (D. Or. August 18, 2004). 
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$100 and, depending on the jurisdiction and nature of the claim, the 
applicable customer loss for the purposes of consumer redress or 
criminal restitution would be either $50 or $100 per unit.31
The remedy of unjust enrichment may not be well suited for a 
consumer plaintiff.  If the case relates to a company selling a worthless 
product to a consumer, civil restitution will always be less than 
compensating damages.  Normally the consumer would claim damages 
of $100 per unit compared to restitution of $10 per unit but the agencies 
assert the remedy of restitution in equity for the implied jurisdiction and 
then work to convince the court that compensating damages should be 
awarded as a form of equitable restitution.  The consequences for 
consumers of choosing a remedy in equity over a remedy at law are 
ignored.  Instead, courts often ask rhetorically why the measure of 
restitution requires the consumer to pay for the direct expenses of the 
fraudulent tortfeasor.32  They forget that restitution focuses on the 
defendant’s gain, not the plaintiff’s loss.  They also overlook that the 
unsuitability for consumers of the remedy elected by an agency is not 
the responsibility of the defendant nor is it sufficient reason to modify 
the standard measure of restitution from profit to revenue or consumer 
loss.  A true damages measure can only be supported by an alternative 
claim at law for which there may be no implied jurisdiction. 
For a company with a single product line or those companies in 
which the offending operation is a significant percentage of their total 
operations, the remedy of refunding the total amount paid by all 
customers ($100 per unit) is the corporate equivalent of capital 
punishment with prejudice.  Net profit margins of ten to twenty percent 
are considered high in today’s economy but even for such profitable 
companies, the remedy of disgorging revenues would amount to five to 
 31. FTC v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Figgie also objects that the district court’s order forces Figgie to pay for losses beyond 
its gains.  Figgie does not contest the award of prejudgment interest and bases its 
argument instead on the role of the distributor in its marketing system.  Figgie sells 
heat detectors for cash to distributors, who apparently have complete discretion to set 
their own mark-ups.  Many consumer dollars therefore go into the distributors’ 
pockets, not Figgie’s.  This objection may be met several ways.  First, Section 19(b) 
[Federal Trade Commission Act § 18, 15 USC § 57b] does not limit its remedies to 
the amount of the unjust enrichment.  Statutory remedies include “the payment of 
damages.” 
Id. 
 32. See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 763 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
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ten times its net profits.  Disgorging five to ten times the company’s 
cumulative profits will force the company to file for liquidation as the 
remedy is also likely to be non-dischargeable.33  The ‘prejudice’ of the 
remedy lies in the personal liability that is frequently assessed against 
one or more individual defendants who may not be able to discharge the 
liability in bankruptcy or even upon death.34  The defendants may 
deserve severe remedies but the refund measure of customer redress, i.e., 
revenue disgorgement, seems unsuited for the nature of the implied 
jurisdiction process and stands apart from traditional remedies in equity.  
Such a severe remedy would normally require a jury trial as the large 
punitive component of revenue disgorgement should exclude it for 
consideration as a traditional remedy in equity. 
Furthermore, unless the unjust activity is a very minor part of a 
bigger operation, it seems unlikely that an agency will actually succeed 
in collecting the defendant’s past revenues.  Whether or not the 
defendant’s costs of production and administration are legitimate offsets, 
they represent the vast majority of a defendant’s use of her revenue.  
Most businesses don’t accumulate enough reserves to disgorge even two 
years of profits.  The end result of a successful claim by the FDA and 
FTC is likely to include the extinction of the defendant business 
operation, whether intentional or not. 
A. Rescission and Counter Restitution 
Rescission is an alternative monetary remedy which can be claimed 
as rescission at law or in equity.  Rescission in equity is a combination 
of specific restitution and unjust enrichment and it aims to restore both 
the defendant and the plaintiff to their ex ante positions.  First, a contract 
or transaction is rescinded by both parties returning their consideration 
in kind.  Second, both parties are obligated to make counter-restitution 
to each other by disgorging any benefits derived from their temporary 
holding of the other party’s consideration.35  This is meant to include 
 
 33. See FTC v. Porcelli (In re Porcelli), 325 B.R. 868, 871-74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2005). 
 34. FTC v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004).  See infra 
text accompanying notes 170-71. 
 35. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 13 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 1, April 6, 2001). 
Where an exchange transaction has been at least partially performed on both sides, the 
party seeking rescission as a transferor is also a transferee.  By the reasoning set forth 
in the preceding paragraph, a rescinding plaintiff becomes subject to a duty of 
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interest, rent, profits, usage value and any other consequential benefits.  
Counter-restitution therefore tries to assure that both parties are restored 
to their ex ante positions, devoid of any consequential benefits to the 
transaction or contract for either party.36  To get equity, both parties 
must do equity. 37
While rescission has been described as a second-choice remedy for 
securities claims,38 it is appropriate for claims by the FTC and FDA 
counter-restitution with respect to any benefits received in the nullified transaction.  
The plaintiff’s restitutionary obligation is commonly expressed through the judicial 
formula that a party seeking rescission must, as a condition of relief, offer to restore 
anything of value received in the transaction that is being repudiated.  The obligation 
of counter-restitution is not enforced equally on all rescinding parties, and a claimant 
who is a fraud victim may be excused from a duty of restitution that would be strictly 
enforced were the claimant seeking to rescind a transaction in which the other party 
was not at fault. See § 54, cmt ___. 
Id.  See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 37 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 3, March 22, 2004) (“Rescission is 
mutual: a plaintiff seeking to be restored to the status quo ante must likewise restore to 
the defendant whatever the plaintiff has received in the transaction. See § 51.”). 
 36. Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 4.3 at 254 (West 1973). 
 37. E.g. Cardiac Thoracic & Vascular Surgery, P.A. Profit Sharing Trust v. Bond, 
840 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Ark. 1992). 
The equitable objective of a return to the status quo as the result of a rescission is 
consistent with the equitable maxim ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’  The 
practical meaning of this maxim is that whatever the nature of the remedy sought, the 
court will not give equitable relief to one seeking it unless he will admit and provide 
for all of the equitable rights, claims and demands of his adversary growing out of, or 
necessarily involved in, the subject matter of the controversy. 
Id.  See also Sample v. Sample, 466 S.W.2d 935 (Ark. 1971); Metcalfe v. Talarski, 567 
A.2d 1148, 1152 (Conn. 1989) citing Ankeny v. Clark, 148 U.S. 345, 359 (1892); 
Harral v. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46, 51 (1882); Little v. Pearson, 24 Mass. 301, 302-03 
(1828); Kavarco v. T.J.E., Inc., 478 A.2d 257, 261 (Conn. App. 1984). 
The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that what has been parted with shall be 
restored on both sides, and hence the general rule, which is to be reasonably applied 
. . . is that a party who wishes to rescind a contract must place the opposite party in 
status quo. 17 Am. Jur. 2d., Contracts § 512, p. 994. 
Id.  Rice v. Hilty, 559 P.2d 725, 726 (Colo. 1976). 
In suits involving rescission, the parties must be placed in status quo.  Bankers Trust 
Co. v. Hall, 183 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1947).  Since the Rices have already surrendered the 
possession of the motel to the Hiltys, the Hiltys must now return whatever 
consideration they received under the contract.  Therefore, in addition to the $19,000 
awarded by the trial court, the Rices are entitled to a return of their payments on the 
promissory note, and to interest on each payment from the date thereof. 
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 66 and 156; see 66 AM. JUR. 2d 
RESTITUTION & IMPLIED CONTRACTS § 166). 
 38. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986). 
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relating to products or services that are fraudulent, worthless, or both.  
Section 19 of the FTCA specifically provides for this remedy under that 
independent jurisdiction.39  While the typical case for rescission expects 
both parties to return what they received and gained in the contract or 
transaction, the requirement for specific restoration is subject to a 
flexible standard.40
B. Unjust Enrichment Not Refund 
On the other hand, the FTC and FDA have avoided the requirement 
in rescission for the plaintiff to compensate the defendant for the value 
of any assets or services received by the plaintiff.41  When the defendant 
to an FTC claim raises the issue of the uncompensated asset value of the 
product which the consumer gets to keep under the agency’s remedy for 
consumer redress, some courts have adopted an enigmatic response, 
citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Figgie International:42
This measure of restitution applies even if the product purchased by 
consumers has some value.  See Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d at 606 (noting 
that “courts have previously rejected the contention ‘that restitution 
is available only when the goods purchased are essentially 
worthless.’”)43
The clear implication of this statement is that a defendant whose 
product has some asset value does not need to be compensated or 
credited for that value in the refund approach.  The reference to Figgie is 
questionable because that case concerned an FTC claim under Section 
19, which has statutory authority for remedies that “may include, but 
shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund 
of money or return of property, the payment of damages.”44  An opinion 
on appropriate remedies under Section 19 is largely irrelevant because 
claims under that section have explicit statutory jurisdiction separate 
from Section 13(b)’s implied jurisdiction.  The Figgie opinion provides: 
 
 39. 15 USCS § 57b (2006). 
 40. Griggs v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 448 (4th Cir. 2004). 
See also Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 223 A.2d 168, 173-74 (Md. 1966). 
 41. See FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Ind. 
2000). 
 42. FTC v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 43. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. 
 44. 15 USCS § 57b (2005). 
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The district court ordered that consumers be allowed to receive full 
refunds for their Vanguard heat detectors, whose value, “given the 
misrepresentations recommended by Figgie and made by distributors 
to consumers, is de minimis.”  Figgie protests that the “de minimis” 
finding and the resulting full refund are inappropriate in light of the 
Commission’s conclusive finding that heat detectors have some 
value.  Although we agree with Figgie that the district court is not 
free to make this finding, we find the error harmless.  Courts have 
previously rejected the contention “that restitution is available only 
when the goods purchased are essentially worthless.” FTC v. 
International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cases Par. 65,506, 
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (“Diamond I”).45
International Diamond was a case under Section 13(b), based on 
traditional remedies in equity.  In a subsection labeled “Appropriateness 
of Rescission and Restitution When the Goods Are Not Essentially 
Worthless” the Northern District of California stated: 
Defendants’ final contention—that restitution is available only when 
the goods purchased are essentially worthless—rests upon 
administrative cases which were decided prior to Heater v. FTC, 
supra.  Those decisions reflect self-imposed restraints by the 
Commission in its efforts to develop standards under Section 5 in 
order to justify administratively ordered redress.  The Ninth Circuit 
in Heater held that the Commission lacked authority to order 
administrative redress, which rendered the Commission’s self-
imposed [sic] standards nugatory.46
Restitution of revenues without offsets or counter-restitution may 
approximate the effect of rescission when the goods purchased are 
worthless so the original FTC administrative policy roughly complied 
with traditional equity.  The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Heater adds an 
interesting background note about the original source of the ‘recall’ 
remedy: 
This refund provision is based upon and reflects a far-reaching 
construction of the clause in Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), which empowers the 
Commission to order a person using any unfair method or deceptive 
act or practice in commerce to ‘cease and desist from using such 
 45. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d at 595. 
 46. FTC. v. Int’l Diamond Corp./Full Service Import Brokers, Inc., 1983-2 Trade 
Cases Par. 65,506 P *13-14 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
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method of competition or such act or practice.’47
Therefore, the FTC developed its own administrative interpretation of 
restitution and instituted an internal rule that full refunds should not be 
applied unless the product in question was deemed worthless.  The main 
import of the opinion is that the FTC was not empowered to issue refund 
orders and that whatever standards it applied previously were irrelevant 
as a standard for the defendant to assert in civil litigation.  The case does 
not represent the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the refund measure of 
restitution (especially when the purchased good is not worthless), a 
remedy originated within the FTC in the twentieth century not courts in 
equity in the eighteenth century. 
Finally it is important to note that the remedy of ordering a 
defendant to provide a full refund to a consumer for the retail price has 
been transformed in the hands of the agencies and, eventually, in the 
opinions that discuss their claims.  Originally, the remedy was identified 
as administrative redress,48 then it developed into the refund measure of 
restitution,49 and now you can find a number of opinions regarding 
claims by the FTC and FDA in which the remedy is called 
‘restitution.’50  Semantic juxtaposition becomes court opinion as soon as 
the court recites the misleading ‘truism’ that ‘restitution is an equitable 
remedy.’51  Unfortunately, this sort of quasi-logic is not uncommon in 
case law relating to remedies in equity.  Further lost in the process is any 
meaningful discussion of how a court should choose the appropriate 
remedy. 
IV. EQUITABLE REMEDIES ARE BASED ON A NET CONCEPT 
Most remedies included as restitution or unjust enrichment are 
 47. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 322 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 48. Int’l Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cases Par. 65,506, *13-14 (N.D. Cal. 
1983). 
 49. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d at 606-07. 
 50. FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d. 1013, 1020 (N.D. Ind. 
2000) 
 51. The following cases represent recent opinions of circuit courts that have stated 
or held that “restitution is an equitable remedy.”  See Larocca v. Borden, Inc., 276 F.3d 
22, 28 (1st Cir. 2002); Ellett Bros. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 
(4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2001); First 
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1992); 
Houston Oil & Ref., Inc. v. U.S. F.E.R.C., 95 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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based on the parties’ net advantage or net benefit, generally represented 
by profit before or after income tax.  While there are variations in both 
the types of expenses or expenditures that can be offset against a party’s 
gross benefit, and the circumstances in which a party can make such 
offsets or present claims for counter-restitution, the overwhelming 
tradition for such remedies at law or in equity is to assess unjust 
enrichment or restitution on a net basis.52
 52. According to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 
189 (1881), the following opinions on patent claims were all based on the 
plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief and an accounting.  Reflecting our courts’ 
earliest implementation of remedies in equity, they all relate to the determination of 
the defendant’s profits: Dean v. Mason, 61 U.S. 198 (1858); Fenn v. Holme, 62 
U.S. 481 (1859); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 803-04 (1869) (“In 
estimating the cost, the elements of price of materials, interest, expenses of 
manufacture and sale, and other necessary expenditures, if there be any, and bad 
debts, are to be taken into the account, and usually nothing else.”); Mowry v. 
Whitney, 81 U.S. 620 (1872); Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. 716 (1876); Elizabeth v. 
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 138-39 (1877) citing Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434 
(“But one thing may be affirmed with reasonable confidence, that, if an infringer of 
a patent has realized no profit from the use of the invention, he cannot be called 
upon to respond for profits; the patentee, in such case, is left to his remedy for 
damages.”); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 138-39 (1877) citing Rubber 
Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788; See also Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146 
(1888). 
The infringer is liable for actual, not for possible gains.  The profits, therefore, which 
he must account for, are not those which he might reasonably have made, but those 
which he did make, by the use of the plaintiff’s invention; or, in other words, the fruits 
of the advantage which he derived from the use of that invention, over what he would 
have had in using other means then open to the public and adequate to enable him to 
obtain an equally beneficial result.  If there was no such advantage in his use of the 
plaintiff’s invention, there can be no decree for profits, and the plaintiff’s only remedy 
is by an action at law for damages. 
Id.  Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 
621-22 (1912); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 
(1940) (“Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909, there had been no statutory provision 
for the recovery of profits, but that recovery had been allowed in equity both in 
copyright and patent cases as appropriate equitable relief incident to a decree for an 
injunction.”); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (citing Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946)). 
The Government contends, however, that a suit enforcing civil penalties under the 
Clean Water Act is similar to an action for disgorgement of improper profits, 
traditionally considered an equitable remedy.  It bases this characterization upon 
evidence that the District Court determined the amount of the penalties by multiplying 
the number of lots sold by petitioner by the profit earned per lot. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.  
An action for disgorgement of improper profits is, however, a poor analogy. Such an 
action is a remedy only for restitution a more limited form of penalty than a civil fine.  
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The norm in remedies for restitution/unjust enrichment is to seek 
profits but not proceeds, as the defendant disgorges a net amount rather 
than a gross amount.53  Defendants under claims from the SEC, CFTC 
and DOE are all allowed to deduct the cost of their securities, 
commodities or energy supplies before they make restitution.  In most 
cases, they are also generally allowed to offset a few additional 
operating or administrative expenses.  There are only three areas of 
substantive law that may not require the plaintiff to make counter-
restitution to the willful defendant: (1) intentional trespass to minerals, 
(2) the recovery of stolen goods, and (3) mistaken improvements.54  
These cases both relate to the legal traditions for the misappropriation or 
trespass of tangible property which is unique. 
Although the tradition is sometimes overridden by statutes 
regarding misappropriation or misuse of intellectual property, it is 
nevertheless true that the defendant’s profits are only awarded to a 
plaintiff when the plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted with 
knowledge.55  While Laycock has shown that a defendant’s culpability 
and ‘directness’ can influence a court’s determination of how much of 
the defendant’s profits should be disgorged, if any, his important point 
does not apply to the difference between restitution of profits and 
Restitution is limited to “restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which 
rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant. 
Id. 
 53. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 
F.2d 71, 77 n. 10 (“Appellant argues that the measure of disgorgement should be 
unlawful ‘profits.’  Appellees argue that the measure should be unlawful ‘proceeds.’  
The term most frequently used in reported decisions appears to be ‘profits.’”). 
 54. See further discussion in Part VII.  The net effect of the remedy can also 
resemble revenue restitution due to procedural issues such as the denial of offsets for a 
defendant that fails to substantiate the offsets or even the denial of jurisdiction to the 
defendant whose actions reveal unclean hands or other facts not worthy of a remedy in 
equity.  See Andrew Kull, Private Law, Punishment, and Disgorgement: Restitution’s 
Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17 (2003). 
 55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 1, 
cmt. c (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000); 2 cmt. d (“Restitution in a proper case may 
strip a defendant of all profits gained in a transaction with the plaintiff . . . .  Such a 
result is permissible only against a defendant whom the law treats as a conscious 
wrongdoer.”); id. 3 cmt. c (“Liability to disgorge profits is ordinarily limited to 
instances of conscious wrongdoing . . . . As an exception to this general rule, trustees 
and other fiduciaries may be made liable for profits realized even as the result of an 
unintentional breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
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restitution of revenues.56
The Supreme Court has held that awards of unjust enrichment 
against willful defendants face the limit of actual profits: 
Petitioners stress the point that respondents have been found guilty 
of deliberate plagiarism, but we perceive no ground for saying that in 
awarding profits to the copyright proprietor as a means of 
compensation, the court may make an award of profits which have 
been shown not to be due to the infringement.  That would be not to 
do equity but to inflict an unauthorized penalty.57
Consider the opinion in Farnum v. Silvano, in which a 90 year old 
woman, suffering from a brain disease, was fraudulently induced by a 
close friend into selling her home for half of its value.  Within six 
months of the transaction, the woman was also diagnosed as suffering 
from dementia and was committed to a nursing home.  Eventually, the 
court ordered the sale of the house to be rescinded but not without the 
victim making restitution to the defendant for any real estate taxes paid 
or necessary repairs made.  A remedy in equity is expected to be 
conducted in manner to achieve complete equity.58
The assessment of penalties or the application of punitive statutory 
provisions are not remedies in equity but rather remedies at law.59  Judge 
Posner argues in Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co. that the plaintiff’s claim for 
reimbursement rather than the defendant’s profit is evidence of the fact 
that the claim is actually a claim at law, not in equity:  
 
 56. Laycock, supra note 3 at 1289. 
Courts sometimes award plaintiff all the profits produced by defendant’s use of the 
property, but sometimes they award only the market value.  The Restatement and 
Professor Palmer explain such distinctions partly in terms of culpability and partly in 
terms of directness.  The more culpable defendant’s behavior, and the more direct the 
connection between the profits and the wrongdoing, the more likely that plaintiff can 
recover all defendants’ profits. 
Id. 
 57. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940). 
 58. Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E. 2d 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). 
 59. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987), citing Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1946). (“First, while a court in equity may award 
monetary restitution as an adjunct to injunctive relief, it may not enforce civil 
penalties.”); SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2002) (“SEC v. Clark assumed, 
but without discussion, and we think erroneously, that civil penalties in SEC cases are 
not a form of legal relief.”). 
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But was the Department of Labor seeking restitution?  It was seeking 
not a profit, but merely a receipt, an insurance premium, net of some 
expenses; to call this a ‘profit,’ it could be argued, would convert 
every suit for the price of a contract into a suit for restitution, 
contrary to the law.60
It would be an overstatement to conclude that all restitutionary remedies 
that seek the defendant’s revenue (as opposed to the defendant’s profit) 
are remedies at law, but it does seem reasonable to conclude that 
remedies for revenue are suspect as remedies in equity. 
V. AN ANALYSIS OF IMPLIED JURISDICTION IN EQUITY 
A. Conceptual Outline 
As a simplified overview, a federal agency’s complaint that 
normally enjoys implied jurisdiction includes a claim for injunctive 
relief and an ancillary monetary remedy.  Asserted by itself, however, 
either the relief or remedy can be sufficient. 
Implied jurisdiction is available as long as the court does not 
conclude: 
(1) That the equitable claim or relief would be adverse to the 
legislative purpose of the agency’s statutory scheme;61
(2) That the agency’s statutory scheme is sufficiently specific to 
exclude the  equitable relief claimed;62 or 
(3) That the language of the statute specifically precludes the 
claimed relief.63
 
 60. Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756  (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 1 Dobbs, 
supra, § 4.1(2), p. 559). 
 61. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) holding only 
[t]hat in a renegotiation case the contractor is obliged to pursue its administrative 
remedy and, when it fails to do so, may not attain its ends through the route of judicial 
interference.  The nature of the renegotiation process mandates this result, and, were it 
otherwise, the effect would be that renegotiation, and its aims, would be supplanted 
and defeated by an FOIA suit. 
Id. 
 62. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (“That RCRA’s citizen suit 
provision was not intended to provide a remedy for past cleanup costs is further 
apparent from the harm at which it is directed.”). 
 63. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) Relying 
on Mertens, the Supreme Court noted that Great-West’s claim could be brought under 
ERISA only if the relief it was seeking fell within those categories of relief that were 
typically available in equity. 
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Assuming that implied jurisdiction is available, the specific 
complaint is entitled to implied jurisdiction in any one of the following 
three cases: 
(1) In the absence of a claim for injunctive relief,64 the agency’s 
claim is determined to be compatible with traditional claims 
in equity,65 or 
(2) The injunctive relief and claims for monetary remedies are 
both compatible with traditional equitable relief66;67or 
 64. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 
(1990). 
In this case, the only remedy sought is a request for compensatory damages 
representing backpay and benefits.  Generally, an action for money damages was ‘the 
traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.’ Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 
196 (1974).  This Court has not, however, held that ‘any award of monetary relief 
must necessarily be legal relief.’ 
Id. (Emphasis added).  See also Granfinanciera, supra, at 86, n. 9 (White, J., 
dissenting). (“Nonetheless, because we conclude that the remedy respondents seek 
has none of the attributes that must be present before we will find an exception to 
the general rule and characterize damages as equitable, we find that the remedy 
sought by respondents is legal.”). 
 65. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212. The Court stated that, 
[s]econd, petitioners argue that their suit is authorized by § 502(a)(3)(B) because they 
seek restitution, which they characterize as a form of equitable relief.  However, not 
all relief falling under the rubric of restitution is available in equity.  In the days of the 
divided bench, restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain others in 
equity. 
Id. 
 66. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,  527 U.S. 308, 
318 (1999) (“Substantially, then, the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the 
jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act, 1789, 1 
Stat. 73 (1789).” A. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 660 
(1928);  “The substantive prerequisites for obtaining an equitable remedy as well as the 
general availability of injunctive relief are not altered by [Rule 65] and depend on 
traditional principles of equity jurisdiction.” 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2941 at 31 (2d ED. 1995).  We must ask, therefore, 
whether the relief respondents requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of 
equity.”); see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975): 
We turn, therefore, to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that respondent’s claim was 
not to be judged according to traditional equitable principles, and that the bare fact 
that petitioner violated the Williams Act justified entry of an injunction against him.  
This position would seem to be foreclosed by Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 
(1944). 
Id. 
 67. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210 (“Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose 
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(3) The injunctive relief is compatible with traditional equitable 
relief; the claims for monetary remedies are more 
compatible with traditional claims at law; but the nature of 
the injunctive68 and monetary relief are such that the ‘clean-
up’ doctrine69 would allow such ancillary remedies at law.70
In most cases the second set of conditions collapses into two 
considerations: is the monetary remedy compatible with traditional 
equitable remedies or is the injunctive relief sufficiently significant to 
warrant the ‘clean up’ doctrine that permits ancillary remedies at law? 
Implied jurisdiction is based on the assumption that if Congress 
intended to preclude a district court’s jurisdiction in equity relating to a 
specific statutory scheme, Congress would have done so with specific 
language.  A lesser known corollary to this analysis is that if Congress 
wanted a court’s jurisdiction in equity to vary from traditional 
jurisdiction in equity, it would have said so in the statute.71  In the last 
ten years the Supreme Court has emphasized traditional remedies in 
personal liability on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money -- relief 
that was not typically available in equity.  A claim for money due and owing under 
a contract is ‘quintessentially an action at law.’”). 
 68. Id. at 210-11. 
First, petitioners argue that they are entitled to relief under § 502(a)(3)(A) because 
they seek ‘to enjoin an act or practice’—respondents’ failure to reimburse the Plan—
‘which violates . . . the terms of the plan.’  But an injunction to compel the payment of 
money past due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due monetary 
obligation, was not typically available in equity. 
Id.  See also, e.g., 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1979). 
 69. Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 725 F.2d 440, 442-43 (7th Cir. 1984). 
There are, however, two relevant limitations to the equity clean-up doctrine.  The first, 
which is absolute, is that the plaintiff must have a good case in equity if he wants the 
equity court to award him legal relief as well; otherwise a plaintiff could bypass the 
law court and litigate a purely legal claim in equity. See 1 Pomeroy’s Equity 
Jurisprudence § 237d n. 5 (Spencer W. Symons, ed., 5th ED. 1941) (1881).  In other 
words, the invocation of equity jurisprudence must not be frivolous.  But there is no 
indication of that here.  The second limitation, discretionary rather than absolute, is 
more problematic in this case.  If the equitable relief sought was merely incidental to 
the legal relief sought, the equity court might refuse to entertain the suit and the 
plaintiff would then have to bring his suit in the law court and abandon his incidental 
equity claim.”) 
Id. (internal citations altered). 
 70. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987) (“First, while a court in 
equity may award monetary restitution as an adjunct to injunctive relief, it may not 
enforce civil penalties.” See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 
(1946)). 
 71. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944). 
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equity as a limit to current court remedies awarded in implied 
jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.72 
and Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry, Inc.73 established the doctrine 
of implied jurisdiction in two stages.  First, Porter held that if a statutory 
scheme provided for injunctive relief, a district court is presumed to 
have jurisdiction for the full range of equitable relief in the absence of 
preclusive language in the statutes.74  Second, Mitchell held that a 
statutory scheme did not need to provide for any equitable remedies; 
Congress presumptively implied the full range of equitable remedies in 
the absence of preclusive language.75
The Court’s opinion in Hecht,76 which preceded Porter, provides 
necessary background.  Like Porter the opinion in Hecht addressed the 
powers of the Price Administrator under the Emergency Price Control 
Act of 1942.  The “Price Administrator” sought for the court to enjoin 
the store’s charging excessive prices and to order restitution of the 
store’s unjust enrichment.  Section 205(a) of that Act provided 
jurisdiction for the Price Administrator to obtain injunctive relief and the 
Act was later amended to provide penalty provisions under Section 
205(e).  No mention is made in either section of other equitable 
monetary remedies. 
The holding in Hecht confirmed a court’s equitable discretion to 
deny any relief, even if the defendant has violated the statute, when the 
court believes that rules of fairness or equity preclude such relief.77  
 72. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
 73. 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960). 
 74. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398 (“Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable 
jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative 
command.”). 
 75. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291-92 (1960) (“When Congress entrusts to an equity 
court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be 
taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief 
in light of the statutory purposes.”). 
 76. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 330. 
 77. Id. 
We do not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition as is here 
proposed should be lightly implied.  We do not think the history or language of § 205 
(a) compel it.  It should be noted, moreover, that § 205 (a) governs the procedure in 
both federal and state courts.  For § 205 (c) gives the state courts concurrent 
jurisdiction with federal district courts of civil enforcement proceedings.  It is 
therefore even more compelling to conclude that, if Congress desired to make such an 
abrupt departure from traditional equity practice as is suggested, it would have made 
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Specifically, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding that 
the defendant’s violations were technicalities, inadvertent and 
adequately resolved by the defendant’s remedial measures.  The Court 
stated that a district court that hears a case based on implied jurisdiction 
presides as a court in equity and operates in the manner of a traditional 
court in equity.  The traditional equitable discretion of a judge sitting in 
equity was sufficient authority for the Hecht opinion to deny the remedy 
claimed by the Price Administrator. 
The Court’s opinions in Porter and Mitchell share circumstances 
that have confused subsequent opinions regarding implied jurisdiction 
and equitable remedies.  First, neither opinion held that the monetary 
remedies at issue were remedies in equity.  Both opinions state that the 
proposed remedies may better resemble remedies at law, but that the 
remedies were sufficiently ancillary to legitimate claims for injunctive 
relief.  This ‘clean-up’ doctrine, or doctrine of complete relief, precluded 
the need to evaluate the proposed remedies.78
The second common characteristic relates to a coincidence in the 
calculation of monetary remedies.  For both back pay and excess rents, 
the plaintiffs’ loss was equal to the defendants’ benefit.  Furthermore, in 
both cases the defendants’ net benefit was equal to its gross benefit 
because neither defendant incurred any additional expenses to produce 
the unjust benefits.  The result is that both cases can be held out to 
support a claim for the plaintiffs’ losses, the defendants’ gross benefit 
(which is otherwise known as revenue disgorgement) or the defendant’s 
net benefit.79
At times, the Court’s opinion in Porter has been misinterpreted to 
stand for the assertion that the restoration of the plaintiff to his ex ante 
position by refund or reimbursement provides a remedy in restitution, 
presumably even an equitable remedy in restitution.  Restitution is 
its desire plain. 
Id. 
 78. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399. 
It may be considered as an equitable adjunct to an injunction decree.  Nothing is more 
clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an injunction than the recovery of that 
which has been illegally acquired and which has given rise to the necessity for 
injunctive relief.  To be sure, such a recovery could not be obtained through an 
independent suit in equity if an adequate legal remedy were available. 
Id. 
 79. According to the Seventh Circuit, however, Porter holds for profits 
disgorgement. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992). 
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limited to “restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which 
rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.”80  The context of the 
essential Porter quote was that the Court was distinguishing the 
proposed restitutionary remedy from the damage provisions in Section 
205(e) to show why that subsection did not exclude the remedy of 
restitution.81  As Professor Murphy points out, restoring the plaintiff to 
status quo and compensating damages have a great deal in common.82
B. Limits for Implied Equitable Remedies 
While some courts have recognized limits or boundaries to the 
range of appropriate remedies applicable to implied jurisdiction, most of 
the heavy lifting in this area has been undertaken by the Supreme Court 
in its opinions on general jurisdiction in equity and under ERISA.83  
Combined, the opinions in Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. 
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.84 and Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance 
Co. v. Knudson,85 tend to emphasize the traditional limits to the Court’s 
holding in Mitchell which states that in the absence of any relevant 
language in the statutory scheme, a district court is free to infer the full 
extent of traditional authority and jurisdiction in equity.  The Court’s 
opinion in Grupo shows how a district court should determine the full 
range of traditional jurisdiction in equity and the Court’s opinion in 
 
 80. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1987) (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 
402). 
 81. See Murphy, supra note 27, at 1610. 
Later decisions have read the Porter language of ‘restoring the status quo and 
ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant’ as a 
definition that distinguishes restitution from compensatory damages.  Such an 
interpretation pulls the language out of context.  The Court in Porter had no occasion 
to distinguish compensatory damages from restitution, but rather was faced with 
deciding whether monetary relief incidental to an injunction could be awarded without 
circumventing the scheme of treble damages and attorney’s fees set forth in section 
205(e).  Furthermore, ‘restoration of a loss to the plaintiff’ does not distinguish 
restitution from compensation or damages when the loss is that of money.  The 
Court’s language should not be read as providing a meaningful distinction between 
restitution and compensation. 
Id. 
 82. See Murphy, supra note 27. 
 83. See Murphy, supra note 27, at 1619.  Judge Posner’s opinions, especially that 
in Reich, appear to have greatly influenced some of Justice Scalia’s more recent 
opinions; Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). 
 84. 527 U.S. 308 (1999). 
 85. 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
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Great-West provides (1) some needed guidelines on the distinctions 
between remedies in equity and remedies at law and (2) an example of 
how relevant language limits the range of available remedies for 
statutory claims in ERISA. 
The test for whether a remedy is a traditional remedy in equity86 
was confirmed by Justice Scalia’s opinion in Grupo,87 in which he 
shows that the remedy must have been in general practice in the courts 
in equity in England in 1789.  The specific issue in that case was 
whether a district court has the authority to issue a preliminary 
injunction to freeze some or all of the defendant’s assets. 
Substantially, then, the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the 
jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in 
England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the 
enactment of the original Judiciary Act. . . . We must ask, therefore, 
whether the relief respondents requested here was traditionally 
accorded by courts of equity.88
While this conceptually-simple test reflects many previous Supreme 
Court opinions,89  the dissenting opinions in Great-West decry the 
difficulty of determining the typical practice of courts in equity in 
eighteenth century England.  Indeed, such objections and complaints of 
needless inflexibility for such a “static”90 standard were raised by other 
justices in their dissent.91
 86. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2002) 
(“Deciding whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim for equitable relief requires 
an examination, in accordance with Grupo Mexicano, of the equitable claims 
historically available.”). 
 87. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 318-19. 
 88. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 89. See Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. 481 (1859); Root v. Ry Co., 105 U.S. 189, 212 
(1881). 
This firm and indisputable doctrine of the English chancery has been recognized and 
declared by this [C]ourt, in Hipp v. Babin (19 How. 271), to be part of the system of 
equity jurisprudence administered by the courts of the United States, founded not only 
upon the legislative declaration in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ‘that suits in equity shall 
not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case where plain, 
adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law,’ but also upon the intrinsic 
distinctions between the different jurisdictions of law and equity. 
Id. 
 90. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 91. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221-34 
(2002) (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
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The Court’s opinion in Great-West92 related to a claim by an 
insurance company under ERISA93 against a beneficiary.  The 
beneficiary suffered a severe auto accident, which required extended 
medical care.  Prior to the personal injury litigation filed by the 
beneficiary, the insurance company funded all of the victim’s medical 
expenses, but then sued the beneficiary for reimbursement after she 
settled her personal injury claim.  The key problem for the insurance 
company was that the proceeds of the settlement were paid directly into 
a trust for the future medical care of the beneficiary.  The key issue for 
the Supreme Court was whether the insurance company’s claim against 
the beneficiary was permitted under the ERISA statutory scheme which 
restricts civil claims under ERISA to equitable remedies.94
Some circuit courts have previously assumed that remedies based 
on either unjust enrichment, restitution, or both, were similar to 
remedies in equity.  Thus the Supreme Court was observed to have made 
a change in direction95 in Great-West by holding that restitution can be a 
remedy at law or a remedy in equity.96  Furthermore, there can be at 
least four sources of jurisdiction for a remedy in restitution: as a remedy 
at law for a claim of assumpsit; as a remedy at law for a tort which is 
waived in favor of assumpsit; as a remedy in equity; and as a remedy at 
law that is ancillary to traditional relief in equity.97  Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion emphasized the distinctions between claims for 
remedies that are related to a specific asset or res which are remedies in 
equity98 and cash remedies that better resemble claims in assumpsit 
 92. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 204. 
 93. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). 
 94. See infra note 101 for the statutory language. 
 95. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214-15 (“Admittedly, our cases have not 
previously drawn this fine distinction between restitution at law and restitution in 
equity, but neither have they involved an issue to which the distinction was relevant.”). 
 96. However, this was not the first time that the Supreme Court distinguished 
restitution at law from restitution in equity.  In Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), the Court addressed this issue.  See supra note 
64. 
 97. See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying text for an example of how a claim 
for trespass to minerals has been pled under different sources of jurisdiction.  For 
further explanation of the different sources of jurisdiction for unjust enrichment, see 
George P. Roach, How Restitution/Unjust Enrichment Can Enrich a Corporate Claim 
REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2007). 
 98. Zarycki v. Mount Sinai/NYU Health, 02 Civ. 6236, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28104, at *31-32 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2005). 
Even though the plaintiff in Nechis sought restitution, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
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which are restricted to courts at law.99
This opinion should be viewed from the perspective that it 
perceived the statutory provision under Section 502(a)(3)(B)100 as a 
restriction on the jurisdiction normally accorded matters regarding trusts 
and fiduciary duties.  Historically, such issues were resolved 
predominately by courts in equity as trusts and fiduciaries were regarded 
as creations of courts in equity.  The key logic of the Court’s opinion 
relates to the import of the phrase “to obtain other appropriate equitable 
relief” under Section 502(a)(3)(B).101
As we explained in Mertens, “‘equitable’ relief must mean 
something less than all relief.” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 
248, 258, note 8 (1993).  Thus, in Mertens we rejected a reading of 
the statute that would extend the relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) 
to whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the 
particular case at issue (which could include legal remedies that 
would otherwise be beyond the scope of the equity court’s 
authority).  Such a reading, we said, would “limit the relief not at all” 
and “render the . . . modifier [‘equitable’] superfluous.” Id. at 257-
258.  Instead, we held that the term “equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3) 
must refer to “those categories of relief that were typically available 
in equity . . . .” Id. at 256.102
The Great-West opinion also provides further guidance on the 
district court’s decision to dismiss the claim because the plaintiff could not show that 
the defendant was under an obligation to segregate or that it did in fact segregate the 
funds he was seeking into a separate account. 
Id. (Referring to Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2d Cir. 
2005)). 
 99. Eichorn v. AT&T Corp.,  Civ. No. 96-3587, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29261, at 
*37 (D. N.J. Nov. 22, 2005) 
While plaintiffs disclaim any resort to equitable relief, their purported ‘equitable 
decree’ is on all fours with the type of ‘legal restitution’ that the Great-West case held 
was not recoverable under Section 502(a)(3).  Thus, plaintiffs’ calling the award of 
back pay-type damages an equitable decree will not save their claim. See Mertens v. 
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (holding “although they often dance around the 
word, what petitioners in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory damages. . . .”). 
 100. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 101. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002). 
Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a civil action “by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates . . . the terms of the plan, or (B) to 
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce 
any provisions of . . . the terms of the plan.” 
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994 ED.). 
 102. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis deleted) (internal citations altered). 
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necessary elements to qualify for ancillary jurisdiction for a legal 
remedy in equity.  It reinforces the policy that the injunctive relief that is 
requested by a plaintiff and that is offered as the source of the ancillary 
jurisdiction must conform to traditional standards, that the proposed 
injunction must be scrutinized for mere artful pleading designed to 
bypass the jurisdictional restrictions.  However, the opinion does not 
preclude ancillary jurisdiction nor does it preclude the traditional 
opinion that most matters relating to trusts or fiduciaries have traditional 
jurisdiction in courts in equity.103
C. How Much Authority is Implied? 
Underlying the Supreme Court’s opinions in Grupo and Great-West 
is a concern that traditional or implied authority is subject to abuse and 
needs to be better defined and more clearly limited: 
We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the 
federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad 
boundaries of traditional equitable relief.  To accord a type of relief 
that has never been available before—and especially (as here) a type 
of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by longstanding 
judicial precedent—is to invoke a ‘default rule,’ post, at 342 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), not of flexibility but of omnipotence.  
When there are indeed new conditions that might call for a 
wrenching departure from past practice, Congress is in a much better 
position than we both to perceive them and to design the appropriate 
remedy.104
The Grupo opinion was not focused on implied jurisdiction, but the 
Court’s general intent to restrict jurisdiction in equity is clear.  
Therefore, implied jurisdiction may be just one example of a default rule 
that has been poorly applied. 
One possible explanation for the seeming willingness of some 
courts to accommodate the agencies’ proposed remedies beyond the 
point of traditional remedies in equity is that the courts show great 
sympathy for the goals and responsibilities of the agencies.  Historically, 
a court in equity was expected to solve problems and provide a safety 
 
 103. Both the majority opinion and Ginsburg’s dissent agree that ancillary 
jurisdiction can be appropriate occasionally. See id. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 104. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322 
(1999). 
30 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF [Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
net for problems in the system of courts at law as well as protect the 
public as a whole.  In addition to a court’s equitable discretion, some 
courts appear to infer the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to assist 
the agency and, for example, protect the consuming and investing public 
from crooks, swindlers and other unjustly enriched defendants.  This can 
lead to a court’s justifying its opinion for appropriate remedies on the 
basis of the needs of the agency to function properly. 
These grand aspirations evolved from a humble origin.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit’s statement in FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc. was 
limited to a traditional remedy in equity: 
We hold that Congress, when it gave the district court authority to 
grant a permanent injunction against violations of any provisions of 
law enforced by the Commission, also gave the district court 
authority to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish 
complete justice because it did not limit that traditional equitable 
power explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference.105
This quote has been passed from opinion to opinion, steadily 
veering away from the limit of traditional remedies in equity, and was 
recently repeated as “[t]his grant of permanent injunctive power gives 
the court broad equitable authority to ‘grant any ancillary relief 
necessary to accomplish complete justice.’”106
Other opinions justify the proposed remedy on the basis of the 
agency’s need: 
The deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement action would be greatly 
undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge 
illicit profits.  As Judge Waterman said in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971): “It would severely defeat 
the purposes of the Act if a violator of Rule 10b-5 were allowed to 
retain the profits from his violation.” Accord, SEC v. Giaconda 
 105. 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982).  See id. at 1111. 
It is clear that, because the district court has the power to issue a permanent injunction 
to enjoin acts or practices that violate the law enforced by the Commission, it also has 
authority to grant whatever preliminary injunctions are justified by the usual equitable 
standards and are sought in accordance with Rule 65(a). 
Id. 
 106. FTC v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(quoting H.N. Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113 (9th Cir. 1982). See also FTC v. World Travel 
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1024-26 (7th Cir. 1988); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas 
Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1433-34 (11th Cir. 1984); but see FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 
F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 973 (1982). 
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Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259 (S.D.N.Y.1971).  We hold that it 
was appropriate for the district court to order appellants to disgorge 
the proceeds received in connection with the Manor offering.107
Recently, the justification of the agency’s need has evolved into the need 
to improve consumer confidence:108
Restitution that reimburses consumers who paid for unapproved 
drugs, and may have been defrauded or deceived about their 
effectiveness, restores aggrieved parties to the same economic 
position they enjoyed before the Act was violated.  This strengthens 
the financial protection offered to the public by the FDCA and 
enhances consumer confidence in the drug market.  Whether or not 
Congress specifically contemplated restitution under the FDCA, the 
ability to order this remedy is within the broad equitable power 
granted to the district courts to further the economic protection 
purposes of the statute.109
The Third Circuit misses the point: the key issue is whether ‘restitution 
that reimburses consumers’ is a traditional remedy in equity.  Congress’ 
contemplations can only restrict the range of traditional remedies in 
equity applicable to implied jurisidiction. 
Comments similar to that of the Third Circuit rarely attract a 
response.  To be fair, some of this language can be attributed to a court’s 
need to confirm that the claim is compatible with the purpose of the 
statutory scheme.  However, in light of the courts’ expansive measure of 
an agency’s remedy as compared to traditional remedies in equity, the 
courts’ justification on the basis of their seeming enthusiasm for the 
goals of the agencies seems misplaced and irrelevant.110
 107. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972).  See 
also SEC v. Sekhri, 98 Civ. 2320, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13289 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 
2002); Crude Co. v. FERC, 923 F. Supp. 222 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d 135 F.3d 1445 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998); and United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 
683 F. Supp. 1411, 1447-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 879 F.2d 20 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
 108. Wright v. Scotton, 121 A. 69 (Del. Ch. 1923). See also Weatherford Oil Tool 
Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1960). 
 109. United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 229 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 110. See SEC v. Unioil, 951 F.2d 1304, 1306 (D.D.C. 1991). 
Since disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may 
exercise its equitable power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing. 
The remedy may well be a key to the SEC’s efforts to deter others from violating the 
securities laws, but disgorgement may not be used punitively. Therefore, the SEC 
generally must distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits. 
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D. Four Limiting Issues for Implied Jurisdiction 
Following the opinions in Porter and Hecht, four substantial issues 
have developed to limit the nature of remedies that are appropriate under 
implied jurisdiction: the applicability of the clean-up doctrine; the nature 
of traditional remedies in equity; the punitive nature of the proposed 
remedy and personal liability of the defendant. 
1. Clean-Up Doctrine 
To apply the clean-up doctrine, a court needs to confirm that: 
(1) The injunctive relief sought is traditional injunctive relief; 
(2) That the relationship between the injunctive relief and the 
proposed ancillary monetary relief is appropriate; and 
(3) That there is no other alternative legal relief which could 
otherwise resolve the plaintiff’s claim.111
A substantial portion of the case law on the clean-up doctrine 
relates to the right to a jury trial.  In 1962, the Supreme Court held that 
the clean-up doctrine was not applicable to jury trial issues, i.e. that a 
party’s right to a jury trial must not be overridden by the doctrine.112  At 
the same time, the Court did not preclude other applications of the 
doctrine and therefore case law regarding the right to jury trials may not 
be directly applicable to the doctrine for non-jury issues. 
 
Id.; and CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 1993). 
On the other hand, an award of damages in the amount of investor losses may go 
beyond the scope of a Commodity Exchange Act enforcement proceeding. Absent a 
hearing to calculate ill-gotten gains, the disgorgement ordered in an amount equal to 
investor losses could be a penalty assessment.  If investors wish to seek recovery of 
their losses as a remedy, they are free to do so in an independent civil action against 
defendants. The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as an excuse 
to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls outside that 
remedy’s recognized parameters. 
Id. 
 111. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987). 
Finally, the Government was free to seek an equitable remedy in addition to, or 
independent of, legal relief.  Section 1319 does not intertwine equitable relief with the 
imposition of civil penalties.  Instead each kind of relief is separately authorized in a 
separate and distinct statutory provision.  Subsection (b), providing injunctive relief, is 
independent of Subsection (d), which provides only for civil penalties.  In such a 
situation, if a “legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on 
the legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact.” 
Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.11 (1974). 
 112. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
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Second, the necessary or appropriate relationship between the 
injunctive relief and monetary remedy may vary by jurisdiction as that 
jurisdiction’s interpretation of the clean-up doctrine varies.  A Delaware 
Chancery Court has the discretion to hear such a claim in equity with 
ancillary relief at law.113  The necessary relationship in the Seventh 
Circuit114 is that the equitable nature of the overall claim must be ‘non-
inconsiderable’ while the First and Second Circuits115 require the 
equitable relief to dominate the claim.  Much of the recent opinions from 
the Supreme Court has related to their rejection of the plaintiff’s 
injunctive relief because the relief was either not traditional injunctive 
relief or the remedy at law was determined to be the dominant issue in 
the case,116 perhaps reflecting the Supreme Court’s preference for the 
“dominant” criterion rather than the “non-inconsiderable” criterion of 
the Seventh Circuit.117
Third, the Supreme Court requires that the injunctive relief conform 
to traditional relief in equity: 
We turn, therefore, to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that 
respondent’s claim was not to be judged according to traditional 
equitable principles, and that the bare fact that petitioner violated the 
Williams Act justified entry of an injunction against him.  This 
position would seem to be foreclosed by Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 
 113. Wright, 121 A. at 76. See also Weatherford Oil Tool, 340 S.W.2d at 954. 
 114. Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 725 F.2d 440, 442-43 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(According to Judge Posner,  a “good case in equity is required” but a court has the 
discretion to reject the application of the doctrine if the claim in equity is only 
‘incidental’ to the remedy at law). 
 115. USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, Ltd., 574 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1978); Schine v. 
Schine, 367 F.2d 685, 688-70 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring). 
So long as Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 55 S. Ct. 310, 79 L. Ed. 
440 (1935), and Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188, 63 S. Ct. 163, 
87 L. Ed. 176 (1942) stand, federal appellate courts will necessarily have difficulty in 
determining whether an appeal is attracted by the rule of those cases or the contrary 
one of City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd., 337 U.S. 254, 69 S. Ct. 1067, 93 
L. Ed. 1347 (1949) and Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 182-
185, 75 S. Ct. 249, 99 L. Ed. 233 (1955), when a complaint seeks both legal and 
equitable relief.  The best solution of an essentially insolvable problem appears to be 
the dominant purpose test, with any fair doubt being resolved against the claim that 
the action was predominantly one at law. 
Id. 
 116. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424-25. 
 117. Medtronic, 725 F.2d at 442-43. 
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U.S. 321 (1944).118
Subsequently, the Court rejected the claim for implied jurisdiction in 
Tull due to the facts that the defendant had stopped the activities that led 
to the complaint and that the EPA’s claim for $22 million of penalties 
dominated the claim.119  In Grupo, the plaintiff’s claim for temporary 
injunctive relief was rejected based on the conclusion that such a form of 
relief was not awarded in the English courts of equity in the late 
eighteenth century.120  Finally, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Great-
West held that the injunctive relief claimed by the plaintiff amounted to 
a court order to the defendant to comply with contract payment 
provisions and was not a traditional form of injunctive relief.121
A seasoned opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court provides some 
historical background on the clean-up doctrine which indicates that the 
clean-up doctrine may have been practiced in the Courts of Chancery 
before 1789 and before the Lord Cairns Act was passed in 1858:  
Before the passage of that act, it was held in numerous cases that 
such power existed in Courts of Chancery, and would be exercised if the 
peculiar or particular circumstances of the case required it to do full 
justice.  The following cases may be mentioned: Jesus College v. 
Bloom, (1745) 3 Atk. 262, 26 Eng. Rep. 953; Louden v. Nash, (1747) 3 
Atk. 512, 26 Eng. Rep. 1095; _______ v. White, (1818) 4 Swanst. 107, 
Eng. Reprint. 792; Ferguson v. Tadman, (1877) 1 Sim. 530, 57 Eng. 
676; Nelson v. Bridges, (1838) 2 Beav. 239; Prothers v. Phelps, (1855) 7 
Deg. M. & G. 734.122
 118. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). 
 119. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424-25 (“A potential penalty of $22 million hardly can be 
considered incidental to the modest equitable relief sought in this case.”). 
 120. Based on the Judiciary Act of 1789, the United States formally adopted the 
courts in equity as they existed at that time.  Justice Scalia’s opinion in Grupo 
Mexicano, as an extension of several earlier Supreme Court opinions, held that the 
proponent must prove that the claimed relief was traditionally awarded by English 
courts in equity in 1789.  See also Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 207-15 (1882); Fenn 
v. Holme, 62 U.S. 481 (1859); Hipp v. Babin, 60 U.S. 271 (1857). 
 121. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211 (2002); see 
also Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21007, p*21 (S.D. TX  
2005) (“This request for an injunction is simply an indirect attempt to recover from 
Defendants what she cannot recover directly--the value of the life insurance proceeds.  
Plaintiff cannot obtain the relief she seeks under ERISA § 502(a)(3), and her 
§ 502(a)(3) claim must therefore be dismissed.”).  See also Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 
392 F.3d 401 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 122. Wright v. Scotton, 121 A. 69, 76 (Del. Ch. 1923). 
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From 1850 to 1880, the clean-up doctrine, as applied to patent 
claims for injunctive relief and an accounting in equity, was frequently 
discussed in Supreme Court opinions.  These opinions, as well as other 
lower court opinions, analyzed the impact on implied jurisdiction for an 
accounting in equity when the injunctive relief claimed for a violation of 
a patent was denied.  Does the denial of the injunctive relief necessarily 
dictate that the case be transferred to a court at law?123  What if the 
plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief was reasonable on the date of claim 
but subsequent events warranted the denial of the injunction?124
An opinion from the Seventh Circuit in 1932 provides a useful 
summary of these opinions.  The court breaks the analysis down into 
three parts: when the patent has already expired before the claim is filed 
and no injunctive relief can be afforded the court has no jurisdiction;125 
when there is a small amount of time remaining on the patent after the 
claim is filed, jurisdiction is discretionary with the court;126 and when 
the claim for injunctive relief is a subterfuge to gain jurisdiction in 
equity, the court should transfer the case to a court at law.127  The key 
concept appears to be that under most circumstances, the plaintiff’s 
jurisdiction is discretionary with the court.128
Professor Murphy’s article makes a case that the irreparable injury 
doctrine applies in the area of the clean-up doctrine.  She notes that there 
are exceptions to this conclusion, especially relating to claims on trusts 
or fiduciary duties129 but she has assembled impressive support from 
 123. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102-03 (2d Cir. 
1978) (holding that the denial of an injunction does not preclude the remedy at law). 
 124. Busch v. Jones, 184 U.S. 598, 599 (1902) (holding that equitable jurisdiction 
must be determined by the conditions existing at the time the bill is filed, and not by 
conditions which come into existence after the commencement of the suit). 
 125. King Mechanism & Eng’g Co. v. W. Wheeled Scrapper Co., 59 F.2d 546, 547 
(7th Cir. 1932); Root, 105 U.S. at 189; Bourne v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 811 (1869); Le 
Roy v. De Vry Corp., 16 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1926); Wright’s Automatic Tobacco Packing 
Mach. Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 220 F. 163 (D.C. Va. 1915). 
 126. King Mechanism & Eng’g Co. at 547; See also Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322 
(1886); Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509 (1929); Le Roy, 16 F.2d at 18; 
W.W. Sly Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Iron Works, 201 F. 683 (7th Cir. 1912). 
 127. Id. at 548 citing Root, supra note 120; Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U.S. 672 
(1883); Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primos Chem. Co., 216 F. 382 (D. Pa. 1914); 
Diamond Stone-Sawing Mach. Co. v. Seus, 159 F. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1908). 
 128. Root, 105 U.S. at 215-16. 
 129. Murphy, supra note 27, at n.124; see 1 John N. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity 
Jurisprudence 181, at 257 (5th ED. 1941). 
Hence, there developed the practice that claims against fiduciaries, including claims 
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many of the traditional experts on the topic.130  For example, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg131 states that 
“even if the checks respondent seeks to recover lay untouched in 
petitioners’ offices, legal remedies would apparently have sufficed.”132  
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Tull echoed the Court’s opinion in Dairy 
Queen and rejected the use of the clean-up doctrine to impinge on the 
right to a jury.133  In addition, Root v. Ry. Co.134 reviews many of the 
Supreme Court opinions in the nineteenth century that analyzed the 
application of the clean-up doctrine to patent claims and strongly 
supports Murphy’s assertion that the clean-up doctrine was not intended 
to be applied if there existed a sufficient alternative remedy at law. 
However, current case law regarding the FTC would seem to 
contradict this position.  The FTC statute has two specific provisions 
that provide jurisdiction for the agency’s claims.  Section 13(b) provides 
for injunctive relief and Section 19 provides for specific remedies.  The 
more specific provision for jurisdiction has been held to neither constrict 
nor preclude the FTC’s jurisdiction because the statute specifically says 
that Section 19 was not intended to limit any other jurisdiction that the 
FTC might have under any other sections.135
The irreparable injury rule seems unreliable in light of the facts that 
(a) the holding in Tull related to the defendant’s right to a jury, (b) the 
isolated nature of the cases that actually dismissed cases because an 
for restitution, were asserted in equity. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, 160 cmt. e, 
at 645 (“Even though what is transferred is money . . . the payor or transferor is 
entitled to maintain a proceeding in equity for specific restitution if the payment or 
transfer was procured by an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relation.”). 
Id. 
 130. Murphy, supra note 27, at 1603 n. 126. 
 131. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1987). 
 132. Id. at 49 n. 7; See also Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478 (“The necessary 
prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable accounting, like all other 
equitable remedies, is, as we pointed out in Beacon Theatres, the absence of an 
adequate remedy at law.”). 
 133. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 229 (2002). 
 134. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 212 (1881). 
 135. FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982). 
However, § 19(e) provides: Remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law.  
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission 
under any other provision of law.  Thus, there is no necessary or inescapable 
inference, or, indeed, any inference, that Congress intended to restrict the broad 
equitable jurisdiction apparently granted to the district court by § 13(b). 
Id. 
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adequate legal remedy exists, and (c) the lasting impression of Professor 
Laycock’s conclusion that the irreparable injury rule is mainly applied as 
an excuse for some other unspoken issue.136  Though strongly supported 
by legal theory and 19th century case law, the irreparable injury rule a 
valid cause for today’s courts to deny jurisdiction, but not predictably so 
and it therefore remains an additional source of the heightened 
variability of remedies in equity.   
2. Identifiable Assets or Funds Traceable to the Defendant 
Many of the remedies for unjust enrichment that force a defendant 
to disgorge her benefit or unjust profit are actually claims in assumpsit, 
which are claims at law.  “However, not all relief falling under the rubric 
of restitution is available in equity. In the days of the divided bench, 
restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain others in 
equity.”137  A verdict of a court in equity was accompanied by an order 
from the court to transfer title to a specific asset or surrender control of a 
segregated account or trust. 
Actual possession of the relevant property was one of the key 
determinants of the Great-West opinion: 
In cases in which the plaintiff ‘could not assert title or right to 
possession of particular property, but in which nevertheless he might 
be able to show just grounds for recovering money to pay for some 
benefit the defendant had received from him,’ the plaintiff had a 
right to restitution at law through an action derived from the 
common law writ of assumpsit.  Dobbs, Law of Remedies, Damages, 
Equity, Restitution § 4.2(1), at 571; see also Dana M. Muir, ERISA 
Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 Iow L. rev. 
1, 37 (1995).  In such cases, the plaintiff’s claim was considered 
legal because he sought ‘to obtain a judgment imposing a merely 
personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money.’ 
Restatement (First) of Restitution § 160, cmt. A (1937).  Such claims 
were viewed essentially as actions at law for breach of contract 
(whether the contract was actual or implied).138
. . . . 
 
 136. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 687 (1990). 
 137. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212. 
 138. Id. at 213 (internal citations edited). 
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But where ‘the property [sought to be recovered] or its proceeds 
have been dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff’s] 
claim is only that of a general creditor,’ and the plaintiff ‘cannot 
enforce a constructive trust of or an equitable lien upon other 
property of the [defendant].’  Restatement (First) of Restitution, 
supra, § 215, cmt. a (1937).  Thus, for restitution to lie in equity, the 
action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the 
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property 
in the defendant’s possession.139
To secure jurisdiction on the basis of the clean-up doctrine, the 
plaintiff attempted to disguise his claim within the language of a claim 
for injunctive relief to order the insurance beneficiary to pay the contract 
obligation.  The artful pleading for injunctive relief failed: 
The basis for petitioner’s claim is not that respondents hold 
particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to petitioners, but 
that petitioners are contractually entitled to some funds for benefits 
that they conferred.  The kind of restitution that petitioners seek, 
therefore, is not equitable—the imposition of a constructive trust or 
equitable lien on particular property—but legal—the imposition of 
personal liability for the benefits that they conferred upon 
respondents.140
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg makes a valid point about the 
importance of possession of the relevant assets.  She asserts that if the 
insurance company chose to sue the needs trust rather than the 
beneficiary of the trust, the logic of the majority opinion would demand 
that such a claim be deemed a claim in equity.141  To generalize a 
statement by Professor Dobbs on constructive trusts, courts in equity 
 139. Id. at 213-14 (alterations to internal citations added) (textual alterations in 
original). 
 140. Id., see Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 577-78 (7th Cir. 
2004); See supra text accompanying note 65. 
 141. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
That Congress did not intend to strap § 502(a)(3) with the anachronistic rules on 
which the majority relies is corroborated by the anomalous results to which the 
supposed legislative ‘choice’ leads.  Although the Court recognizes that it need not 
decide the issue . . . its opinion surely contemplates that a constructive trust claim 
would lie; hence, the outcome of this case would be different if Great-West had sued 
the trustee of the Special Needs Trust, who has ‘possession’ of the requested funds, 
instead of the Knudsons, who do not. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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focus more on assets than liability.142
Chief Justice Roberts recently handed down a unanimous opinion 
that succeeds Great-West and emphasizes Justice Ginsburg’s point.143  
In that case, the defendant agreed with the plaintiff to segregate the 
funds in dispute.  Under those circumstances the court affirmed the 
Fourth Circuit and the district court in their holding that such a claim for 
a particular fund could proceed.144
Interestingly, however, this unanimous opinion either made a 
mistake or has introduced a substantial change in the analysis detailed in 
Grupo and endorsed in Great-West.  To distinguish between remedies at 
law and remedies in equity, Chief Justice Roberts states that “we 
examined cases and secondary legal materials to determine if the relief 
would have been equitable ‘in the days of the divided bench.’”145  Given 
the pinpoint cite, Chief Justice Roberts is referring to the statement in 
Great-West that “[i]n the day of the divided bench, restitution was 
available in certain cases at law, and in certain others in equity.”146  
Later in the Great-West opinion, Justice Scalia stated the reference point 
for distinguishing remedies in equity from remedies at law: 
Rarely will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry’ . . . than 
consulting, as we have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, 
Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, which make the answer clear.  
It is an inquiry, moreover, that we are accustomed to pursuing, and 
will always have to pursue, in other contexts. See, e.g., Grupo 
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 
308, 318 (1999) (discussing the powers of federal courts under the 
Judiciary Act’s grant of jurisdiction over “all . . . suits in equity”); 
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (discussing the scope of 
the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial “in suits at common 
law”).147
The cite to Grupo is a reference to the inquiry of whether the equitable 
remedy was within implied jurisdiction in equity or whether the remedy 
 142. See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 
251 (2000) (“See e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION ch. 7, Introductory Note, p. 522 
(1937)”); Dobbs, supra note 6, at 597 (“The constructive trust is based on property, not 
wrongs.”). 
 143. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869, 1874 (2006). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Sereboff, at 1874 (quoting Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212). 
 146. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212. 
 147. Id. at 217 (internal citation omitted) (alterations to internal citations added). 
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had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of 
Chancery at the time of the separation of the American colonies and 
England.148
In subsequent cases relating to ERISA claims, the Supreme Court’s 
opinion was followed closely by most lower courts.  Some of the Circuit 
Courts have acknowledged the need to revise prior opinions that were 
not in agreement with the Great-West opinion, indicating the 
significance of the Supreme Court’s ‘revision.’149  In Scholastic Corp. v. 
Najah Kassem,150 the Connecticut district court states that the Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits largely follow the same basic test: 
These circuits apply a three-part test for determining whether a 
remedy sought by a plan, and labeled as a constructive trust or 
equitable lien, is typically equitable.  Though first developed by the 
Seventh Circuit in Administrative Committee of Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 686-88 (7th Cir. 2003), the three-part 
test was succinctly summarized by the Fifth Circuit in Bombardier 
Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer as follows: 
“Does the Plan seek to recover funds (1) that are specifically 
identifiable, (2) that belong in good conscience to the Plan, and (3) 
that are within the possession and control of the defendant 
beneficiary?”151
The Second Circuit may be applying the Great-West opinion further 
than intended.152  The case facts relate to claims against the officers and 
directors of a financially distressed corporation for breaches of fiduciary 
duty unrelated to ERISA.  The Second Circuit acknowledges the fact 
that Great-West overturned its opinion in Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & 
Co., 202 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999): 
On appeal, defendants challenge the court’s characterization of the 
relief as equitable.  They emphasize that, because they never 
possessed the funds in question and thus were not unjustly enriched, 
the remedy sought against them cannot be considered equitable.  
Rather, according to defendants, the remedy sought was legal and 
 148. See Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 
318 (2002). 
 149. See, e.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 340 (2d Cir. 2005); Coop. Benefit 
Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 150. Scholastic Corp. v. Kassem, 389 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D. Conn. 2005). 
 151. Id. at 408 (quoting Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. 
Ferrer, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 152. Pereira, 413 F.3d at 339-40. 
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thus they were entitled to a jury trial.  We agree. 
We have to concede that our decision in [Strom], points to a contrary 
result.  In Strom, we characterized as equitable the monetary relief 
sought by plaintiff for defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty 
even though the defendant did not actually possess the funds in 
question. Id. at 144.153
The standard in Great-West is directly applicable to the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Strom154 as both cases relate to ERISA claims, but 
the standard for the claim in Periera, relating to corporate governance, 
could still allow for the clean-up doctrine.  Furthermore, if the claim in 
Periera is one for breach of fiduciary duty, a claim for a remedy at law 
unaccompanied by injunctive relief might lie in a court in equity, which 
was the traditional jurisdiction for claims of breach of fiduciary duty.155  
Of course, in the absence of other considerations, the Court’s 
distinctions between remedies at law and in equity would be directly 
applicable in the review of a claim that was neither ancillary to 
appropriate injunctive relief nor was otherwise subject to special 
consideration as a traditional claim in the courts in equity.  For example, 
jurisdictional disputes relating to relief or nominal defendants should be 
guided by the Great-West standard. 
As a final note on the possession of assets, it may be useful to point 
out that the relevant assets in the defendant’s possession does not 
include the economist’s figurative asset of opportunity cost or otherwise 
what might have been an asset to the plaintiff.  Basically, economic 
concepts of opportunity cost do not apply or, perhaps more 
appropriately, can not be used to bootstrap a plaintiff’s loss or damage 
 153. Id. at 339. 
 154. See Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., Civil Action No. H-02-4836, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21007, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005). 
Thus, Plaintiff argues, the term “equitable relief” includes “the recovery from a 
fiduciary of any direct monetary losses caused by the fiduciary’s breach of its duties”.  
This is precisely the argument that the United States Secretary of Labor advanced, and 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected, in Callery v. United States Life Ins. Co., 
392 F.3d 401 (10th Cir. 2004). 
Id. (internal citations omitted); Callery v. United States Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401, 409 
(10th Cir. 2004) (stating that, “though the issue is close, we must adhere to the Supreme 
Court’s rather emphatic guidance and therefore conclude that in a suit by a beneficiary 
against a fiduciary, the beneficiary may not be awarded compensatory damages as 
‘appropriate equitable relief’ under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA.”). 
 155. SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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into an identifiable asset.  “Callery is persuasive for the proposition that 
monetary damages equal to the benefits a beneficiary would have 
received but for the fiduciary’s breach do not constitute ‘equitable relief’ 
and are therefore unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3).”156
3. Is the Remedy Punitive? 
Traditional remedies in equity do not include punitive damages.  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice White’s dissenting opinion 
in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates seem to agree on this point.157  Justice 
Scalia further points out, however, that exceptions have begun to appear 
in the last twenty years.158
Many cases state that a remedy in excess of profits is punitive.  The 
Second Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. is a 
good example:  
Having held that ordering the refunding of the proceeds was a proper 
exercise of the district court’s equity powers, we hold that the court 
erred in ordering appellants to transfer to the trustee all the profits 
and income earned on such proceeds.  As we noted in SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., supra, 446 F.2d at 1308, the SEC may seek relief 
other than injunctive relief, “so long as such relief is remedial relief 
and is not a penalty assessment.”159
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that in some fact patterns, the 
failure to offset certain expenses would be punitive: “Disgorgement is 
 
 156. Amschwand, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21007, at *20 (citing Callery v. United 
States Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 157. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 n. 5, 259 n. 7 (1993); see also 
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 587 (1990) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 423 n.7 (1987); 
Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1855); Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. 
546, 559-60 (1854); Beals v. Wash. Int’l, Inc., 386 A.2d 1156, 1158 (Del. Ch. 1978). 
In order to determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to award punitive damages, 
therefore, it is first necessary to ascertain whether the high court of chancery in 
England had such jurisdiction in 1776.  Defendants rely heavily on Colburn v. Simms, 
2 Hare 543, 67 Eng.Rep. 224 (1843) where the Court held that the high court of 
chancery in England did not have jurisdiction to order penalties or forfeitures. 
Id. 
 158. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 259 n.7 (citing Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law 
of Remedies, § 3.9, at 211 (1973)). 
 159. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972); see also 
CFTC v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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remedial and not punitive.  The court’s power to order disgorgement 
extends only to the amount with interest by which the defendant profited 
from his wrongdoing.  Any further sum would constitute a penalty 
assessment.”160  Equally relevant are the securities cases that have held 
that equitable rescission cannot restore the plaintiff to a better position 
than she would have had before the unjust act.161
The remedy of restitution can punish in one of two ways: the 
remedy can include statutory or discretionary penalties or it can deny a 
party’s access to offsets or counter-restitution.  Professor Kull recently 
explored the latter concept in a recent article about “Restitution’s 
Outlaws”: “[R]estitution does not punish, but it punishes negatively: not 
by imposing liability on disfavored parties, nor by enhancing the 
liability to which disfavored parties are subject, but by denying a 
restitutionary claim (or counterclaim) to which the disfavored party 
would otherwise be entitled.”162  Kull describes a group of plaintiffs 
with unclean hands who violated the spirit or the letter of the legal 
system but, when their schemes failed, they were surprised to discover 
that the law rejects their claims in equity to salvage anything out of their 
unjust schemes.  Thus a party that bribes a judge should not expect a 
court to order the judge to return the bribe money; the bribing party has 
unclean hands and will be denied access to a court in equity.163  
Similarly, the willful trespasser to another’s minerals or timber is denied 
counter-restitution or offsets for their expenditures. 
Revenue disgorgement is far more punitive than profit 
disgorgement; without a specific finding, it denies the possibility that the 
victim received anything of value from the defendant.  As penalties or 
disguised fines, disgorgement orders are not part of traditional equitable 
remedies and the federal district courts have no jurisdiction to hear 
 160. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325,1335 (5th Cir. 1978); see also SEC v. Thomas 
James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
The SEC further argues, however, that the amount to be disgorged by defendants is 
the entire amount of excessive markups, because the measure of disgorgement is the 
injury to the market, and because only the gross profits, unadjusted for expenses, 
adequately reflect such injury.  The SEC’s argument simply misconstrues both the 
nature and extent of the equitable power of the Court to order disgorgement. 
Id. 
 161. See Smith v. Fahnestock & Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3411, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 28, 2002) (quoting Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 50 n. 22 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 162. Andrew Kull, Symposium: Private Law, Punishment and Disgorgement: 
Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 18 (2003). 
 163. See Womack v. Maner, 301 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Ark. 1957). 
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claims for such remedies.164  Originally, the Supreme Court in Porter 
justified jurisdiction for a restitutionary claim on the basis that the 
proposed remedy was not a damage award or penalty and would merely 
restore the parties to their original position.  Orders for the disgorgement 
of revenue rarely restore any parties to their original position and the 
plaintiff may be restored to a position superior to ex ante, especially if 
the plaintiff received some services or was allowed to retain an asset of 
some significant value without offset or counter-restitution. 
4. Personal Liability 
There are few examples of specific holdings against a remedy on 
the basis of personal liability.165  In holding that Great-West sought legal 
restitution, the majority contrasted imposition of personal liability on the 
defendant, which it said was more typical of a legal remedy, with 
imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular property 
held by the defendant, which it said was an equitable remedy.166
According to Great-West, a restitution claim was considered legal 
when a plaintiff “could not assert title or right to possession of particular 
property, but in which nevertheless he might be able to show just 
grounds for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant had 
received from him.”167  In such a case, the plaintiff sought “to obtain a 
 
 164. See Kull, supra note 162, at 29 (“The result of this approach is that the claimant 
obtains profits without deduction of the expense of producing them, and the defendant 
is liable in excess of net enrichment. Such an outcome is punitive.”). 
 165. But see Coop. Benefit Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
As noted, CBA’s complaint alleged two alternative bases for jurisdiction: (1) a 
statutory claim for equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), and (2) a federal common law 
claim of unjust enrichment.  As CBA conceded that it could not maintain its claim for 
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), we need not address it except to note that, in 
seeking to impose personal liability on Ogden to enforce her ‘contractual 
reimbursement obligation under the LTD Plan and the Reimbursement Agreement,’ 
CBA was requesting precisely the kind of ‘legal’ remedy that the Supreme Court has 
held to be beyond § 502(a)(3)’s jurisdictional grant. 
Id. 
 166. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) 
(quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 4.2(1), at 571 (2d ED. 1993)).  This 
position should not be mistaken for the statement that there can be no personal liability 
for a defendant in a claim in equity.  Personal liability for the defendant can arise from a 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty vis-à-vis an express or constructive trust. 
 167. Id. 
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judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay 
a sum of money,” which is “essentially [an] action[] at law for breach of 
contract (whether the contract was actual or implied).”168  Where money 
or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff 
could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s 
possession, however, plaintiff could seek restitution in equity—
ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien. 
In the process of considering the relationship between personal 
liability and a remedy in equity, it may be useful to consider the nature 
of the personal liability that the agencies seek.  The FTC has asserted 
and courts have affirmed that (a) the defendant’s personal liability was 
not dischargeable in bankruptcy169 and (b) personal liability could attach 
to the defendant’s estate and survive his demise.170  The court’s logic in 
the latter case seems particularly strained and at odds with Grupo and 
Great-West: 
In this case, the FTC alleges that Defendants failed to take written 
applications or collect required information, thus making it more 
difficult for it to determine whether Capital City was discriminating 
against credit applicants based on their race, national origin, sex, 
marital status, or age.  By failing to provide credit applicants with 
notice of adverse action and/or by providing inaccurate notices, as 
alleged, Defendants also ensured that rejected loan applicants were 
not properly informed of their rights under the ECOA and did not 
learn which federal agency to contact for assistance if they suspected 
a violation of those rights.  Thus, Defendants’ alleged violations 
clearly present the harm of permitting discriminatory conduct against 
individual consumers to go undetected and unremedied.  Defendants 
should not avoid liability for such violations.  Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the ECOA civil penalties sought by the FTC are 
remedial in nature and thus may be pursued against the Relief 
Defendants. . . . Permitting the beneficiaries of the Nash Estate to 
 168. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Compare RESTATEMENT FIRST: 
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160(i) (1937) (“A constructive trust does not arise 
unless there is property on which the constructive trust can be fastened, and such 
property is held by the person to be charged as constructive trustee.”), and 
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160, at 642 (1937) (noting that the chief difference 
between quasi contract and constructive trust is that, “the plaintiff in bringing an action 
to enforce a quasi-contractual obligation seeks to obtain a judgment imposing a merely 
personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money, whereas the plaintiff in 
bringing a suit to enforce a constructive trust seeks to recover specific property”). 
 169. See FTC v. Porcelli (In re Porcelli), 325 B.R. 868 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 170. FTC v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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retain the profits of Nash’s allegedly illegal activity would “utterly 
frustrate” the purposes of the ECOA.171
In the Capital City Mortgage case, the causal relationship between the 
defendant’s unjust act—failing to comply with various notification 
requirements—and identifiable assets in the defendant’s estate seems 
insufficient to justify a constructive trust.  The defendant did not 
misappropriate any specific assets or segregated cash accounts.  There 
was no evidence presented that the corporation made large cash 
dividends or paid cash bonuses to the defendant.  The mere allegation 
that he may have benefited was deemed sufficient to justify the 
preliminary injunction.  Even though there is no specific proof that the 
defendant’s unjust actions actually resulted in any additional assets in 
the defendant’s estate, the court granted the petition for a preliminary 
petition to freeze the assets of the deceased defendant’s estate pending 
the litigation against the corporate co-defendant and the estate as a co-
defendant.  Without identifiable assets, the presumption of benefit seems 
insufficient to warrant a claim in equity, but none of these issues were 
raised in the opinion.  Also overlooked is the fact that the FTC has no 
claim for injunctive relief against the deceased or his estate relating to 
any future violations of the ECOA, further attenuating the FTC’s claim 
to implied jurisdiction. 
E. Response from Non-ERISA Cases 
Outside of ERISA cases, the court’s opinion in Great-West is 
acknowledged but few opinions attempt to analyze the equitable nature 
of a proposed remedy.  The opinion in SEC v. Buntrock affirmed the 
SEC’s jurisdiction to claim a remedy for disgorgement and specifically 
held that generic ‘disgorgement’ is an equitable remedy.172  The SEC’s 
claims in this case were for the defendants’ ill gotten gains and statutory 
penalties equal to three times those gains. 
Given this analytical framework, we agree with the SEC that the 
disgorgement remedy it seeks is equitable in nature and, therefore, an 
acceptable form of relief.  As the SEC has accurately stated, 
disgorgement has historically been viewed as an equitable remedy 
employed against those who profit by abusing positions of trust.  In 
 
 171. Id. at 23 n. 5 (internal citation omitted). 
 172. SEC v. Buntrock, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495, at *7-9 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 
2004). 
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essence, it deprives a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.  Compensation 
is not an element of the claim.  In fact, the Supreme Court has held, 
in the ERISA context, that disgorgement is a viable equitable remedy 
to recover improperly received profits.173
This and other unjustified, broad statements about disgorgement are 
surprising in light of Buntrock’s acknowledgement not only of the 
Great-West opinion but also of the key concept that remedies can be 
either legal or equitable: 
The key to the Court’s holding was a discussion regarding the legal 
and equitable nature of the restitution remedy.  If the remedy sought 
under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA was one that was traditionally 
available in equity, then it was permissible. Great-W. Life & Annuity 
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).  However, if the 
remedy sought was essentially legal in nature, then it fell outside the 
scope of Section 502(a)(3).174
The best example of the opinion’s tendency to make unjustified 
generalizations is the following: 
Furthermore, virtually every federal court of appeals has recognized 
disgorgement as an appropriate equitable remedy under the securities 
laws. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002); 
SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2000); SEC v. Rind, 
991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., 
Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).175
The Seventh Circuit opinion in Lipson is the most relevant precedent on 
the list as it is the only decision handed down after Great-West.  
Seemingly, Lipson contradicts Buntrock: 
 173. Id. at *7-8. 
 174. Id. at *7 (internal citation edited). 
 175. Id. at *8.  This statement represents semantic juxtaposition that is regrettably 
commonplace in case law relating to restitution and unjust enrichment.  The opinion 
asserts that “disgorgement has historically been viewed as an equitable remedy.” Id. at 
*7.  There are only eleven cases in federal and state case law that were published 
between 1800 and 1960 that use the term ‘disgorgement’ in any context.  Since 
disgorgement can be just another term for restitution, any historical analysis in this case 
was conducted on cases claiming restitution which does have extensive history.  Yet, 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Great-West literally precludes such a blanket statement 
on restitution and requires that a court determine whether the remedy is restitution in 
equity or at law. 
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Disgorgement is another name for restitution, as Judge Friendly 
noted in SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 
(2d Cir. 1978) and restitution, as we have noted in several non-SEC 
cases, is both a legal and an equitable remedy. Clair v. Harris Trust 
& Savings Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1999); Health Cost 
Controls of Illinois, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 
1999); Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 
1994).176
Buntrock ignores the Seventh Circuit’s implied conclusion that, like 
restitution, disgorgement can be either a remedy at law or in equity. 
In essence the Northern District of Illinois identified three different 
types of remedies: restitution in equity, restitution at law and 
disgorgement.  Rather than define the exact nature of disgorgement and 
identify the key characteristics of disgorgement that qualify it as a 
remedy in equity, the opinion attaches a label and effectively assumes 
away the issue.177
The Northern District also leaves the issue of the claimed statutory 
penalties unexplored.  The court’s opinion in Lipson clearly states that it 
is error to hold that civil penalties in SEC cases are not a form of legal 
relief.178  Given that the civil penalties in Buntrock can be as much as 
three times the amount of the disgorgement remedy, the civil penalty is 
directly determined by the amount of the disgorgement remedy, and that 
disgorgement remedies are not necessarily remedies in equity, it would 
seem that the equitable nature of the SEC’s claim would require some 
further explanation and discussion. 
This criticism of the process or substance of the Buntrock opinion 
does not necessarily mean that the final opinion was wrong, only that the 
court failed to undertake the analysis established in Great-West.  Given 
the absence of any significant analysis or discussion of the SEC’s 
proposed disgorgement and of any explanation of why the legal claim 
for statutory penalties does not overwhelm the claim for disgorgement, 
one is left with the impression that the opinion is based on generalized 
notions of the remedies and fails to examine the substance underneath 
the labels, flouting the Supreme Court’s message in Great-West. 
 176. SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citation edited). 
 177. See Buntrock, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495. 
 178. Lipson, 278 F.3d  at 662 (“SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1990), 
assumed, but without discussion, and we think erroneously, that civil penalties in SEC 
cases are not a form of legal relief.”). 
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VI. WHICH DISGORGEMENT? 
“Restitution does not generally impose forfeitures.”179
 
At most, the term ‘disgorgement’ is a synonym for the civil remedy 
of restitution.  While it adds little to the analysis of restitution, it could 
perform a useful role if it helps avoid the mistaken juxtaposition of civil 
and criminal restitution.  So far, however, the synonym has increased, 
rather than reduced, confusion because some courts have been misled to 
conclude that disgorgement is somehow different from that of civil 
restitution. 
As applied in any context, ‘disgorgement’ was used in less than a 
dozen federal or state case opinions from 1800 to 1960.  Perhaps more 
startling is the fact that the term was used so often between 1960 and 
2000 even though the first proposed definitions only began to appear 
around 2000.  The term was not used or defined in the Restatement First 
and was only defined in a draft of the Restatement Third as of 2000.  
Black’s Law Dictionary only offered a definition after 2000 and, while 
many of the foundation articles on restitutionary remedies have 
mentioned the term, few ascribe any consensus to its meaning. 
Presumably, the term evolved from the verb form which has been 
used in American case law for the last 100 years as an alternative 
superior to ‘make restitution,’’give up,’ and, especially, to ‘cough up.’  
Increasingly after 1960, courts began to refer to disgorgement as the 
object of the verb: literally, disgorgement was what was disgorged.  So 
far, however, the term has not added any additional or new meaning to 
the body of law of restitution or unjust enrichment. 
None of this necessarily means that the term is meaningless.  
‘Disgorgement’ is simply a new name for an old remedy but, until 
 179. Kull, supra note 162, at 27. 
Restitution does not generally impose forfeitures.  Even within the context of 
restitution for wrongs - where the defendants are malefactors by definition - standard 
remedies in restitution devote considerable effort to measuring the extent of the 
defendant’s enrichment at the claimant’s expense.  Where the defendant’s enrichment 
derives from multiple sources - partly from an unlicensed interference with the 
claimant’s interests, partly from the defendant’s own contributions - the ordinary 
methods of restitution include an accounting designed to identify that portion of the 
disputed assets constituting net unjust enrichment.  An accounting that omitted an 
item from the defendant’s side of the ledger would overstate net enrichment, resulting 
in a liability that, to the extent of the excess, might fairly be described as punitive. 
Id. 
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recently, no one has offered to say which old remedy.  The Restatement 
Third defines disgorgement as a specific kind of restitution: “a remedy 
against a willful or knowing defendant whose benefit or advantage 
exceeds the plaintiff’s loss or damages.”180  Many authorities such as 
Judge Posner181 and Professor Murphy182 equate it to restitution. 
Disgorgement is currently being used in at least five different 
contexts: 
(1) Disgorgement of profits;183
(2) Disgorgement of legal fees;184
(3) Disgorgement of revenues;185
 180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 3 cmt. b 
(Discussion Draft 2000). (The discussion draft defines disgorgement: 
Where the defendant has acted in conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, the whole 
of any resulting gain is treated as unjust enrichment, even though the defendant’s gain 
may exceed both (i) the measurable injury to the plaintiff, and (ii) the reasonable value 
of a license authorizing the defendant’s conduct. 
Id. 
 181. Lipson, 278 F.3d at 663. 
 182. Murphy, supra note 27, at 1625. 
 183. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424  (1987). 
 184. Brown v. Luker (In re Zepecki), 277 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 329, 
to act sua sponte to take jurisdiction to order disgorgement of attorney’s fees and did 
not abuse its discretion by ordering disgorgement of portion of fees). 
 185. See Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987); 
A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554 (1977).  In addition, a number of 
agency cases hold that disgorgement of revenues is a remedy in equity. See Buntrock, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495 at *7-9 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think 
Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019  (N.D. Ind. 2000) (“In determining the 
amount of equitable monetary relief, the amount of restitution equals the amount paid 
by the consumer victims of an illegal scheme, less any amounts previously returned to 
the victims.”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Magui Publishers, Inc., No. 89-3818 RSWL(GX), 
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20452 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Silueta 
Distribs., Inc., No. C 93-4141 SBA, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22254, at *17-18 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (“Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, plaintiff requests a permanent injunction, 
restitution and disgorgement.  With regard to the amount of restitution, plaintiff 
requests $169,339.35, as 3,853 consumers paid $43.95 for the product.”); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Peoples Credit First, LLC, No. 8:03-cv-2353-T-TBM, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38545 at *28 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
Although Section 13(b) does not expressly authorize courts to award monetary 
equitable relief, the unqualified grant of statutory authority to issue an injunction 
thereunder carries with it the full range of equitable remedies, including the power to 
order equitable monetary relief for redress through remedies such as restitution or 
disgorgement. 
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(4) Restitutional disgorgement under Section 17203 of the 
California Business and Professional Code;186 and 
(5) Generic disgorgement (and any or all of the above). 
In the context of revenue disgorgement and generic disgorgement, 
the term ‘disgorgement’ adds the most confusion.  The generic term as a 
noun causes confusion when it misleads a court into believing that 
revenue disgorgement is as customary and traditional a remedy as profit 
disgorgement because in both contexts, the practice is just referred to as 
‘disgorgement.’ 
Revenue disgorgement is somewhat more complicated because 
revenue disgorgement is not a traditional remedy in equity.187  The 
award of revenue disgorgement is the same as for the award of 
restitution or unjust enrichment when the award is made without 
crediting the defendant for any normal offsets or other forms of counter-
restitution.  There are some isolated causes of action or specific 
circumstances that justify such a harsh remedy but most of them relate to 
courts at law rather than courts in equity.  However, there are a limited 
number of scenarios in which the net effect of a restitutionary remedy 
might give the appearance of revenue disgorgement.  These 
circumstances can be grouped into five categories: 
CATEGORY I: Specific Restitution.  This group includes claims in 
which the plaintiff seeks the return of his real assets or personal property 
Id. (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 
1996)); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 335 F. Supp. 2d 479, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“The appropriate monetary relief is the full amount lost by consumers.  The FTC 
seeks disgorgement from defendants in the amount of $16 million for payments made 
during the AT&T Period.”); see also United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 
219, 229 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The court went on to find that ‘even accepting the references 
to legislative concerns . . . these concerns are far from a clear statement of Congress’s 
intent to exclude restitution, recalls, disgorgement, or any other traditional form of 
equitable relief.’” (quoting United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., 191 F.3d 750, 762 
(6th Cir. 1999))). 
 186. Watson Lab., Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 
1121 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 187. According to Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages–Equity–
Restitution, § 4.1(4), at 379-80 (2d ED. 1993), there are five main options for the 
measurement of the defendant’s benefit in unjust enrichment, none of which approach 
restitution of revenues: (1) the defendant’s increased assets; (2) the market value of 
goods or services provided to the defendant; (3) the use value of goods or services 
provided to the defendant; (4) the gains realized by the defendant upon sale of an asset 
received by the defendant; or (5) collateral or secondary profits earned by the defendant 
from the use of the plaintiff’s asset. 
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(including detachable minerals) and pursuant to which the knowing or 
willful defendant may be denied counter-restitution against the rightful 
owner of land or minerals for improvements or operating costs.188  In 
none of these cases does the case law call for the per se revenue 
disgorgement of the defendant. 
CATEGORY II: Unjust Enrichment of Fiduciaries.  This group 
includes cases in which a fiduciary is required to disgorge all of his fees 
and compensation without any credit or offset for individual 
contribution or incidental expenses.  A special type of this general case 
includes the disgorgement required of public officials for accepting 
bribes.  Frequently this type of remedy is unrelated to the plaintiff’s loss 
or damages, if any. 
CATEGORY III: Revenue Disgorgement By Procedural Default.  
This category includes those cases in which the defendant fails or 
refuses to meet her burden of proof to substantiate appropriate offsets or 
apportionments.  In such circumstances, the court has authority to deny 
any offsets.189  Some courts have also awarded revenue disgorgement 
against a defendant that violates a court order, although many courts 
have held that such a sanction should include only profits, but the great 
weight of case law opinion limits sanctions to the disgorgement of 
profits.190  Restitution’s ‘Outlaws,’ as defined by Kull,191 could also be 
included in this category as well as some miscellaneous holdings that 
awarded restitution of revenues as sanctions. 
CATEGORY IV: Government Disgorgement Orders.  These 
government claims depend on the federal jurisdiction attributed to 
traditional equitable remedies.  The government claims, frequently 
referred to as disgorgement orders, sometimes specifically assert the 
right to revenue disgorgement directly (like the SEC) or indirectly (like 
 188. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 158 cmts. b 
and c (1937). 
 189. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
 190. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 765 (10th Cir. 2004); 
Bailey v. Outdoor Media Group, No. E030836, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 11364, at *20 
(2002). But see Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 456 (1932) 
(holding that a remedy measured in the form of unjust enrichment of profits is 
appropriate in a court in equity as an alternative to a sanction); Manhattan Indus., Inc. v. 
Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 885 F.2d 1, 15 (2d Cir. 1989); Connolly v. J.T. Ventures, 
851 F.2d 930, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1988); Lindy Pen Co., v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 
1407 (9th Cir. 1993); Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 
1990); and Nat’l Merch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771, 775-76 (Mass. 1976). 
 191. Kull, supra note 161. 
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the FTC).  The FTC’s claims for disgorgement based on fraud frequently 
exclude any consideration for any value of the subject product. 
CATEGORY V: Exceptional or Outlying Cases.  This group of state 
cases, though few in number, is frequently cited as justification for the 
existence of revenue disgorgement.  By and large, they are justified with 
Category I cases which are applied well outside of any comparable 
substantive law.  It would also be fair to observe that in each of the two 
principal cases in this category, the court appears to have been upset 
about the defendant’s litigation tactics and demeanor and wanted to 
apply an additional degree of deterrence on the defendant. 
 
CATEGORY I 
 
Category I includes three separate areas of substantive law: 
mistaken improvements, conversion of personal property, trespass to 
minerals and some miscellaneous cases. 
 
MISTAKEN IMPROVEMENTS.  It is a traditional remedy of courts in 
equity to order the transfer of title as well as, or in addition to, control of 
real property to its rightful owner.192  If the defendant has made 
improvements to the land when she was aware or should have been 
aware that someone else was the rightful owner of the land, the 
defendant can be denied the right to receive or even seek compensation 
or restitution for the expenditures that contributed to the improvements.  
Subject to the specific provisions of various state ‘betterment’ statutes, 
however, the defendant is normally entitled to reimbursement or 
restitution for reasonable repairs and tax payments made on the 
property.193
If the plaintiff has retained legal title to the real property, she could 
alternatively sue in a court at law for ejectment.  Mr. McCorkle’s treatise 
on mistaken improvements concludes that the defendant is more likely 
to be awarded offset or counter-restitution in an action in equity as 
compared to an action at law.  Subject to a number of qualifications and 
conditions, he compares the two sources of relief: 
 
 192. C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Compensation For Improvements Made or 
Placed On Premises of Another by Mistake, 57 A.L.R.2d 263 (1958). 
 193. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 158, cmts. b 
and c (1937). 
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At common law, emphasis is placed upon the right of the owner of 
land to control and use it as he sees fit, and it is considered that he is 
under no obligation, either legal or moral, to pay for improvements 
made or placed thereon without his knowledge or consent, even 
though he may derive benefit therefrom [versus] [i]n equity, the 
mistaken improver may be entitled to relief by way of compensation 
under the rule or maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity, or 
under the doctrines of unjust enrichment or estoppel.194
CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.  According to property law, 
the tortious conversion of personal property does not transfer title either 
to the tortfeasor or any subsequent transferees.  Hence, the remedy for 
such a tort does not allow for any offsets or counter-restitution on either 
or both of the following: the basis that the defendant has no right to the 
property or the defendant has unclean hands and therefore the court has 
no jurisdiction to hear his claim.  If the property has been sold and is not 
available for specific restitution, the tortfeasor or a subsequent transferee 
with knowledge is generally held liable for the greater of the value of 
property at the time of the conversion or upon the sale even if the 
property has been improved by the tortfeasor.195  The result is the same 
under Section 40 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust 
Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 8, 2005).  Subsection (2)(a), 
“Trespass and Conversion,” states that “A conscious wrongdoer, or one 
who acts despite a known risk that the conduct in question violates the 
rights of the claimant, will be required to disgorge all gains (including 
consequential gains) derived from the wrongful transaction.”196  
Similarly, Section 128 of the Restatement (First) of Restitution, 
“Conversion and Other Tortious Dealings with Chattels,” shows that the 
same approximate results occur under either actions at law for assumpsit 
or actions in equity for a constructive trust.  Remedies for specific 
 194. McCorkle, supra note 192, at *2. 
 195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927(2)(a) (1979).  See also id. cmt. b. 
The rule stated in this Section applies in all actions at law, whether the action is one 
primarily seeking damages, as the action for trespass or conversion, or is one that 
primarily seeks a return of the subject matter, as the actions of replevin or detinue, if 
damages are given as an alternative to specific restitution.  It also applies to 
proceedings in equity in which damages are given in lieu of specific restitution. 
Id. 
 196. For an example of a result that resembles revenue disgorgement, see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40, cmt. d, illus. 11 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (noting that illustration 11 is based on Welch v. Kosasky, 
24 Mass. App. Ct. 402 (1987)). 
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restitution or approximating specific restitution have evolved from 
property law, tort law and the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.  
Those remedies resemble the same effect as revenue disgorgement. 
 
TRESPASS TO MINERALS.  One explanation for the remedy for 
trespass to minerals traces the remedy to claims in equity for stolen 
goods.  The Supreme Court’s 1882 opinion in Wooden-Ware, a 
landmark opinion with respect to willful trespass to minerals, justifies its 
holding by referring to English case law: 
The doctrine of the English courts on this subject is probably as well 
stated by Lord Hatherley in the House of Lords, in the case of 
Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25, as anywhere 
else.  He said: “There is no doubt that if a man furtively, and in bad 
faith, robs his neighbor of his property, and because it is 
underground is probably for some little time not detected, the court 
of equity in this country will struggle, or, I would rather say, will 
assert its authority to punish the fraud by fixing the person with the 
value of the whole of the property which he has so furtively taken, 
and making him no allowance in respect of what he has so done, as 
would have been justly made to him if the parties had been working 
by agreement.”197
Based on this and similar rationale, state courts have ordered defendants 
to disgorge any minerals that the defendant knowingly misappropriated 
from the rightful owner as a form of specific restitution.  The exact 
definition of the applicable minerals can vary by state but it generally 
includes oil, natural gas, timber, coal and sometimes other mineral 
deposits like gravel and topsoil.  The defendant is generally ordered to 
disgorge the actual minerals or their monetary equivalent value at a 
 197. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434 (1882) (citing 
Livingstone v. Raywards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25 (1880)).  See also United States v. 
Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 458 (1946). 
An agreed premise is found in the rule that one who ‘willfully’ or ‘in bad faith’ 
trespasses on the land of another, and removes minerals, is liable to the owner for 
their full value computed as of the time the trespasser converted them to his own use, 
by sale or otherwise, but that an ‘innocent’ trespasser, who has acted ‘in good faith,’ 
may deduct from such value the expenses of extraction.  It is also clear that when suit 
is brought for the value of minerals wrongfully removed from the plaintiff’s land, and 
the trespass and conversion are established, the burden of pleading and proving good 
faith is on the defendant.  The ‘good faith’ contemplated by these rules is something 
more than the trespasser’s assertion of a colorable claim to the converted minerals. 
Id. (Citations omitted) 
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specified point in the production or refining process that varies by state 
and can include the time when the minerals are brought to surface, when 
the minerals are sold or when the minerals are consumed for the 
defendant’s own use.198  If the defendant’s trespass is conducted with 
knowledge, she is generally not entitled to any offsetting credits for the 
costs of developing, marketing or shipping the minerals.  If the 
defendant acted without knowledge, the defendant is generally entitled 
to some form of offsetting credit or the remedy is limited to the value of 
the minerals in situ (still in the ground).  From the perspective of the 
knowing defendant that has sold the minerals, the value of the minerals 
as assets and the revenues from their sale will generally be 
approximately the same amount.  Confusing the specific restitution of 
the assets with perceived disgorgement of revenue has lead some courts 
to justify applying the remedy in such non-similar cases as 
misappropriation of intellectual property or minority shareholder 
oppression. 
Attempts have been made to compare this remedy to claims relating 
to misappropriation or conversion of property, especially intangibles.  
Such analyses suffer from the fact that the common law does not 
generally treat tangible and intangible property in a similar manner.199  
Furthermore, the remedy for trespass to minerals is strongly rooted in 
property law which frequently leads the common law to hold that 
trespass to the landholder’s precious minerals like coal, oil or timber 
warrant a different measure of remedy than the same trespass to one’s 
gravel, top-soil or other less detachable mineral.200
The claim for intentional trespass to minerals also suffers as a 
 198. R. A. Vinluan, Measure of Damages For Wrongful Removal of Earth, Sand, or 
Gravel From Land, 1 A.L.R.3d 801; V. Woerner, Right of Trespasser to Credit for 
Expenditures in Producing, As Against His Liability For Value of , Oil or Minerals, 21 
A.L.R.2d 380. 
 199. HM A-G v. Blake, [2000] E.M.L.R. 949 (H.L.). Lord Nicholls concluded that 
the difference in remedies for intellectual property and tangible property is a 
happenstance of history: 
Considered as a matter of principle, it is difficult to see why equity required the 
wrongdoer to account for all his profits in these cases, whereas the common law’s 
response was to require a wrongdoer merely to pay a reasonable fee for use of 
another’s land or goods.  In all these cases rights of property were infringed.  This 
difference in remedial response appears to have arisen simply as an accident of 
history. 
Id. at 960. 
 200. See generally 53A Am. Jur. 2d § 7 Mines & Minerals (2006). 
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precedent for traditional equitable remedies because the nature of the 
unjust enrichment remedy can vary with the source of that cause of 
action’s source of jurisdiction.  A successful plaintiff can be awarded 
unjust enrichment by at least five different routes:201 by statute;202 a 
cause in action for assumpsit;203 a cause in action for the tort of 
conversion or trespass but in which the plaintiff waives the tort and sues 
in assumpsit;204 ancillary jurisdiction for a matter that justifies 
jurisdiction in a court of equity under the clean-up doctrine;205 and a 
cause of action for conversion (among other causes of action) in a court 
sitting in equity.206  Of all five options, only those opinions from the 
fifth option necessarily reflect remedies in equity while opinions from 
the fourth option may reflect remedies at law or in equity. 
 
CATEGORY II 
 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.207  Many state courts hold that the 
 201. Woerner, supra note 197, at 1.
The question dealt with in this annotation has arisen in actions for ejectment, of 
trespass to try title, for conversion of minerals produced by the trespasser, for an 
injunction to restrain continuing trespass and production of minerals in connection 
with which an accounting was sought for the value of minerals previously produced, 
and in separate actions for an accounting for the value of such minerals produced by 
trespasser, in addition to actions in trespass. 
Id. 
 202. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 21 F. Supp. 645 (D. Cal. 1937); Strathmore 
Coal Mining Co. v. Bayard Coal & Coke Co., 116 A. 570 (Md. 1921).
 203. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 128 cmt. 1 (1937).
 204. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1957) (relating 
to geophysical data).
 205. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 558 (1923).
 206. Pan Am. Petroleum and Transp. Co. v. U.S., 273 U.S. 456, 506 (1927); See 
also United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 440 (1947). 
 207. Frank Snepp, Irreparable Harm 357 (U. Kan. Press) (1999).  At times the 
Snepp case is treated as an outlier or even as an ‘outlaw’ type of case, more suitable for 
Category V, because it is said that Frank Snepp was forced to disgorge all of his book 
royalties for his breach of fiduciary duty.  In fact, the Supreme Court remanded the case 
to the district court to supervise a constructive trust.  In his book on the litigation, Snepp 
reveals that the district court did allow him to offset his federal income taxes 
(approximately $56,000 of the $200,000 in total royalties) which is unusual given that 
that expense is generally the most likely expense for a defendant to lose as an offset.  
See United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978); aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979); rev’d, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that state taxes 
and expenses were not allowed to be offset).  Accounting for a defendant’s unjust 
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remedy against an unfaithful or disloyal fiduciary agent is for the agent 
to disgorge all agency fees received since the agent betrayed her duty.  
The order for an agent to disgorge her fees can be mistaken for revenue 
disgorgement.208  However, the Restatement First has many provisions 
which ensure that even a disloyal agent is reimbursed for necessary 
expenditures.  An agent who buys an asset in violation of the agent’s 
duty to buy the asset on behalf of her principal is specifically allowed 
reimbursement for purchase of the asset.209  An agent that usurps a 
corporate opportunity and leases an asset for herself is specifically 
allowed reimbursement for her lease payment.210
In addition, there are two corollaries to this doctrine that have been 
misunderstood and misstated.  The Second Circuit’s opinion in Sheldon 
v. Metro-Goldwyn, a highly regarded foundation case for calculating 
unjust enrichment remedies, states that comment d to Section 158 of the 
Restatement (First) of Restitution shows that a willful tortfeasor, as 
constructive trustee, is often denied credit for his expenses. 
Indeed a constructive trustee, who consciously misappropriates the 
property of another, is often refused allowance even of his actual 
expenses and although this harsh rule, which would charge the 
defendants with the whole gross receipts, has been softened, a 
plagiarist may not charge for his labor in exploiting what he has 
taken.  A fortiori he should not be allowed for the currency which his 
enrichment presents a court with an interesting conundrum when the plaintiff is the U.S. 
government, i.e., representing itself.  Against any other plaintiff, the court might refuse 
to offset the income tax payments on the basis that the plaintiff did not necessarily 
benefit from the defendant’s expenditures.  In the unusual case of the U.S. government 
as plaintiff, the plaintiff in its IRS persona received the tax payments directly from the 
defendant and therefore the defendant has a strong argument that he was not unjustly 
enriched by the income tax payment.  This may or may not have been the logic of the 
district court’s decision in allowing Snepp’s federal income tax payments for offset but 
denying offset for state income taxes paid. 
 208. Ellison v. Alley, 842 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1992); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 
229, 238 (Tex. 1999) (“It is the agent’s disloyalty, not any resulting harm, that violates 
the fiduciary relationship and thus impairs the basis for compensation.”). But see 
Boston Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Bernardo Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429, 435 (1st. 
Cir. 1996) (noting that courts have the discretion to allow the agent to retain a portion of 
her compensation if the agent can show that their conduct was not egregious and they 
have met their burden of establishing the value of the agent’s services rendered). 
 209. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 194 cmt. b (1937).   
 210. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 195 cmt. e (1937). 
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reputation may have given to the combined product.211
On the other hand, comment d to Section 158, “Improvements and 
Additions,” states: 
The common law rules with reference to the conversion of chattels, 
however, made no allowance to the willful converter for additions 
made, while protecting the innocent converter.  Where the conduct of 
the recipient was tortious although not intentionally wrongful, 
normally would be entitled to restitution of his expenditures to the 
extent that they increased the value of the subject matter if this is 
land. 
The Second Circuit opinion confuses expenditures with expenses.  
Comments b and c of this section of the Restatement First state that even 
an intentionally fraudulent defendant is entitled to compensation for 
payment of real estate taxes and necessary repairs except under 
extraordinary circumstances that ‘require the imposition of a penalty.’  
Therefore, even the intentional defendant is entitled to credit for his 
necessary expenses unless the court wishes to impose a penalty that case 
law and statutes generally forbid as a part of remedies in equity.212  By 
confusing operating expenses with expenditures for improvements, the 
Second Circuit strengthened the myth that revenue disgorgement is 
some times applicable as a remedy in equity. 
On the other hand, there is a provision in the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency that specifically provides for the disgorgement of a 
defendant’s revenues which most courts have chosen to ignore.213  
Section 403, comment c, provides that a disloyal agent who profits 
improperly may not deduct the amount of any expenses that the agent 
 211. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939) aff’d, 
309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940).  See Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Commc’ns, 891 
F. Supp. 935, 941-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 
1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1984); ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1169 
(W.D. Wash. 1999); and Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 
(Okla. 1987) (“A constructive trustee who consciously misappropriates the property of 
another is often refused allowance even of his actual expenses.”) (quoting misstatement 
favorably).
 212. Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. 1998) (“[T]he remedy of 
disgorgement, much like that of a constructive trust, is meant ‘to provide just 
compensation for the wrong, not to impose a penalty.’” (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940)). 
 213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 cmt. c (1958).
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incurred in acquiring the profit: 
An agent who receives a bribe or otherwise profits improperly 
cannot, in an action by the principal to recover it or its value, deduct 
the amount of expense to which he has been put in acquiring it . . . 
[l]ikewise, if an agent is one of a group of conspirators which 
receives a profit as a result of a violation of the agent’s duty of 
loyalty, he is subject to liability for the entire amount although he 
receives none or only a portion of it. 
This suggested rule has been widely followed in bribery cases, 
particularly the bribery of government officials.214  Otherwise, most 
courts have chosen to allow offsets because revenue disgorgement 
appears too harsh and a penalty rather than an equitable remedy: 
But we think that save in exceptional cases such a rule is top harsh: it 
imposes a naked penalty, based more on retribution than on the 
equities of the situation.  Stern though the law is in requiring an 
agent to repay secret profits, it is not as harsh as to say that a 
principal may recover more than the agent has profited.  This is the 
reasoning of a number of cases which declare that the net rather than 
the gross profit realized by an agent should be the measure of 
recovery.  That is the reasoning we think we should adopt here.215
CATEGORY III 
 
Courts commonly hold that, in a claim for restitution or unjust 
enrichment, the plaintiff has the duty to establish the defendant’s benefit 
 214. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201 (N.J. 1952), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); S. T. Grand, Inc. v. New York, 298 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 
1973).  But see Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th. Cir. 
2004) (“The victim of commercial bribery can obtain either his damages or the profits 
that the bribe yielded.  The total profits equal the amount of the bribe plus the revenues 
generated by the bribe minus the cost of goods sold any other variable costs incurred in 
making the sales.”).
 215. Jay v. Gen. Realties Co., 49 A.2d 752, 755 (D.C. 1946) (citing Anderson 
Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 20 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1942); Sawyer v. Issenhuth, 141 
N.W. 378 (S.D. 1913); Willis v. Van Woy, 20 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1945); Schwarting v. 
Artel, 105 P.2d 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940); Dutton v. Willner, 52 N.Y. 312 (N.Y. 1873); 
Judevine v. Hardwick, 49 Vt. 180 (Vt. 1876); see also United States v. Wight, 839 F.2d 
193, 197 (4th Cir. 1987); Burg v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 
192 (Wis. 1983).  But see Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Surety Co., 290 N.W. 
231 (Minn. 1940) (agreeing with Restatement (First) of Agency and disallowing truck 
operating costs but allowing the cost of grain in grain sale revenue).
2007] A DEFAULT RULE OF OMNIPOTENCE 61 
 
or revenues related to the unjust act and the defendant must at least 
initially carry the burden of establishing either apportionment, offsetting 
expenses that should be debited against the revenue credits, or, if 
applicable, both.  Federal statutes relating to misappropriation or misuse 
of copyrights or trademarks specifically maintain this schema for the 
burden of proof. 
Should the defendant fail to meet this burden, the court is entitled to 
deny the defendant any offsets against the revenues established by the 
plaintiff.  Only the Second Circuit has specifically held that even when 
the defendant fails to meet her burden of proof, the court should still 
attempt to estimate the defendant’s costs of goods sold to reduce the 
revenues.216  Out of approximately 116 opinions, the court held the 
defendant in default and ordered her to disgorge her revenues in 73 
opinions.217  In the remaining 43 opinions,218 the court acknowledged 
the default rule but approved an alternative estimate or rule of thumb to 
establish the defendant’s benefit, generally measured by an estimate of 
the defendant’s gross profit. 
Category III can also include Professor Kull’s Restitution 
Outlaws—generally defendants with unclean hands who have no right 
for offsets or counter-restitution.  In some cases, the net effect of the 
monetary equivalent of rescission could also resemble revenue 
disgorgement.  In a fact situation wherein the defendant has fraudulently 
sold a worthless product or service, the process of equitable rescission 
would resemble that of a mass refund or revenue disgorgement.  As the 
asset is worthless and the plaintiff received no benefit, the plaintiff owes 
no counter-restitution to the defendant and a defendant is not allowed to 
offset any of her expenses of production against the sales revenues. 
 
 
 
 216. Murphy Door Bed Co. Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 
1989).
 217. Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Am. 
Honda Motor Co. v. Two Wheel Corp., 918 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1990); Alameda Films 
v. Authors Rights Restoration Corp., 331 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2003) (These cases are 
examples of typical federal appellate court opinions.). 
 218. Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341 (1st Cir. 1942); Murphy Door Bed Co. 
Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. 
Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d Cir., 2005) (typical opinions from federal appellate courts).
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CATEGORY IV 
 
Disgorgement orders will be addressed in Part VII. 
 
CATEGORY V 
 
This group of case opinions is a group of disparate claims decided 
generally in state courts.  At times, discussion of the two principal cases 
of Warren v. Century Bankcorporation and A & M Records is 
accompanied by discussion of Berg Lumber.219  Of the three cases, only 
A & M Records has spawned a line of related cases (state claims for 
misappropriation of intellectual property). 
Part of the unusual nature of these cases may be due to the court’s 
clear disapproval of the defendant’s actions.  The court in A & M 
Records condemns some of the defendant’s trial tactics and his repeated 
breach of the court’s injunction; the language in Berg Lumber 
approaches the level of bombast220 and the calculation of the remedy 
represents double and possibly triple counting for measuring 
damages.221  The court in Warren v. Century Bankcorporation also 
seems offended by the defendant’s underlying acts. 222
Warren was a derivative action by minority shareholders for breach 
of fiduciary duty and shareholder oppression.  The opinion states in bold 
capitalized capital letters that “[t]he award of damages in an amount 
equal to ‘all income’ from the diverted loan business was neither clearly 
contrary to the weight of the evidence nor to the applicable principles of 
 219. Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922 (Wyo. 2000).
 220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40, illus. 15 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“Measurement of the grader’s use value at $75,000 is a 
response to egregious misconduct; a more restricted measure of use value would be 
appropriate against a less culpable defendant.”).
 221. Cross, 7 P.3d at 935-36 (quoting Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 
P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987)) (“The remedy in restitution rests on the ancient principle of 
disgorgement.  Beneath the cloak of restitution lies the dagger that compels the 
conscious wrongdoer to ‘disgorge’ his gains.”).  The remedy included applying a high 
monthly rental rate for an extended period of twenty-seven months for a road grader.  
The road grader was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff and all deferred maintenance 
was to be funded by the defendant despite the high monthly rate that generally included 
wear and tear.  In all, the defendant paid $78,800 of unjust enrichment and returned the 
road grader when the court acknowledged that the machine was initially purchased for 
$19,700. 
 222. Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987).
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equity jurisprudence.”223  Thus the award of revenue disgorgement was 
intentional but ill-conceived as the court stated that the object of 
restitution “is to put the parties back into the position in which they were 
before the tainted transaction occurred.”224  After this remedy, the 
position of the plaintiffs was enhanced and the position of the 
defendants was clearly inferior to its position ex ante.225
Warren cites a number of authorities which are either not on point 
or whose support is equivocal.  For example, the opinion in Tull 
supports disgorgement of profits, not revenues.226  Similarly, the support 
from Porter is equivocal as the excess rents were not identified as the 
defendant’s revenues.227  The Oklahoma Supreme Court also repeats the 
error made in the Second Circuit’s opinion in Sheldon regarding Section 
158 of Restatement (First) of Restitution that has been previously 
discussed.  The Warren opinion also cites the bribery case opinion of 
Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co.228
Perhaps the weakest part of the Warren opinion occurred when the 
court stated that “[t]his is not an action at law for conversion.  Rather, it 
was an equity suit for restitution to minority shareholders who sought 
‘disgorgement’ of their ill-gotten gains made through the diverted loan 
business.”229  The opinion then proceeds to mix up its discussion of 
disgorgement of profits with disgorgement of revenues.  The court’s 
most important justification appears to be that “[w]here a wrongdoer is 
shown to have been a conscious, deliberate misappropriator of another’s 
commercial values, gross profits are recoverable through a restitutionary 
remedy.”230  This rationale has two deficiencies: generally defendants do 
not even disgorge their profits unless the plaintiff can prove that the 
defendant’s acts were willful and intentional.231  The consciousness or 
 223. Id. at 851. 
 224. Id. at 852. 
 225. Id. at 851-52.
 226. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 423 (1987), rev’g, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 
1985).
 227. See infra Part V.A. 
 228. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 233-34 (N.J. 1952).
 229. Warren, 741 P.2d at 852. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2, 
cmt. d (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000) (“Restitution in a proper case may strip a 
defendant of all profits gained in a transaction with the plaintiff . . . . Such a result is 
permissible only against a defendant whom the law treats as a conscious wrongdoer.”); 
Id. at § 3, cmt. c (“Liability to disgorge profits is ordinarily limited to instances of 
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deliberateness of a defendant’s actions does not trigger the right to 
escalate the remedy from restitution of profits to restitution of revenue.  
Second, the misappropriation of some forms of real property may be 
afforded the extra deterrence of denying the defendant any offsets or 
counter-restitution, an historical oddity that does not necessarily apply to 
commercial intangible assets. 
The Oklahoma court’s discussion of case law regarding intentional 
trespass to minerals is accurate: 
When a bad-faith trespasser enters upon the land of another in the 
willful disregard of the rights of others and produces and takes oil 
and gas from the premises, the measure of damage is the full value of 
the property at the time of the conversion without deduction for the 
cost of drilling and development.232
The intentional trespass to minerals, largely remedied with specific 
restitution for converted property, is not relevant to a claim for 
shareholder oppression. 
The opinion in A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman233 was also cited in 
Warren v. Century Bankcorporation.  The defendant and his company 
sold more than $4.3 million worth of tapes that were copied from pirated 
recorded performances.  It was established that the unauthorized copies 
generated at least $729,337 in revenue attributable to performances 
pirated from A & M Records. 
The claim was brought for conversion in a state court because the 
copyright act did not apply to these particular recordings.  The plaintiff’s 
claim of conversion was endorsed by the court, treating the conversion 
of intangible assets as though it were the same as conversion of minerals 
or a knowing improvement to someone else’s land: 
On this basis the trial court entered judgment against Heilman in an 
amount equal to the gross proceeds attributable to the sale of 
recorded performances which were the property of A & M Records.  
One who misappropriates the property of another is not entitled to 
deduct any of the costs of the transactions by which he accomplished 
his wrongful conduct.  When one acquires proceeds from the sale of 
property belonging to another the imposition of a constructive trust 
conscious wrongdoing . . . . As an exception to this general rule, trustees and other 
fiduciaries may be made liable for profits realized even as the result of an unintentional 
breach of fiduciary duty.”).
 232. Warren, 741 P.2d at 846.
 233. A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554 (1977).
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on the proceeds is a proper remedy.234
The opinion’s key assertion is that “[o]ne who misappropriates the 
property of another is not entitled to deduct any of the costs of the 
transactions by which he accomplished his wrongful conduct.”  The 
opinion’s citation to Ward v. Taggert is inapposite since that opinion 
does not stand for disallowing all expenses, but rather only those 
expenses directly related to the illegal or wrongful activity as some 
expenses in that case were disallowed on the basis that the defendant had 
not adequately substantiated the expenditures.235  For example, if the 
defendant violated the plaintiff’s copyright or trademark in a volume of 
the defendant’s magazine, only the costs of actually misappropriating 
the trademark or copyright would be disallowed, not the normal out-of-
pocket expenses of editing, printing and distributing the magazine.236  
The Category I case law to which the opinion loosely refers is also better 
explained by the application of specific restitution or property law rather 
than revenue disgorgement. 
It is problematic that the remedy in Ward was made on the theory 
of quasi-contract.  The plaintiff in that case claimed a tort, but the 
California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s failure to prove 
damages precluded a remedy on that theory.  Then, the Court held that 
on the basis of Section 2224 of the state Civil Code (as well as, or in 
addition to, common law), the defendant would not be allowed to be 
unjustly enriched from his misdeeds.  However structured or 
rationalized, the claim and remedy remained in the court at law. 
In direct contrast, however, A & M Records sought injunctive relief 
and was awarded the remedy of a constructive trust from the trial court 
sitting as a court in equity.  The defendant was found liable for having 
competed unfairly with A & M Records (under Section 3369 of 
 234. Id. at 570 (internal citations omitted). 
 235. Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1959).  The case of Ward v. Taggart 
involves a real estate agent who obtained a secret profit from the sale of his clients’ 
property.  In response to the defendant’s particular concerns about offsetting expenses, 
the court indicated that the defendant had failed to satisfactorily substantiate the need 
for them in the absence of his otherwise fraudulent actions.  Id. 
Since it is entirely speculative whether the commissions paid to Thomsen and Dawson 
and the cost of the second escrow would have been paid by plaintiffs or Sunset had 
the transaction been a legitimate one, it would be inequitable to permit Taggart to 
deduct any of these expenses from plaintiffs’ recovery. 
Id. at 539: 
 236. Id.
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California Civil Code) and was assessed damages.  The court in equity 
measured the constructive trust remedy to include both damages and 
punitive damages.  While it is true that a court in equity has jurisdiction 
to award damages for claims ancillary to injunctive relief, such a remedy 
would not constitute a constructive trust.  Ignoring the issue of the 
constructive trust, however, the opinion—shaky at best—would reflect a 
holding at law on an ancillary matter before a court in equity that relies 
on precedent from opinions of other courts at law. 
This interpretation, which ignores the issue of the constructive trust, 
offers no precedent for remedies in equity.  The specific holding of 
measuring the remedy as the defendant’s revenues without offset for 
expenses is further undercut by the defendant’s failure to meet his 
burden of proof of establishing expenses for offset: 
Since the court found that defendants “failed to carry their burden of 
proof with respect to such costs and expenses,” such costs and 
expenses would be entirely speculative.  It would therefore be 
inequitable on this basis as well to permit Heilman to deduct them 
from A & M Records’ recovery.237
In light of this statement, the holding in A & M Records should be 
restricted to the case facts. 
Citation to the opinion in Church v. Bailey238 also lends little 
support as it largely provided an analysis of the liability of a constructive 
trustee and the consequences of a trustee intermingling his property with 
that of his trust.239  Neither opinion provided any support for the implicit 
theory that the common law treats the misappropriation of intangible 
assets in the same manner as stolen goods or willful trespass to minerals. 
Finally, A & M Records offers no precedential value because of the 
defendant’s litigation tactics.  The opinion mentions that one of the two 
principal reasons for denying the defendant any offsetting credits was 
the defendant’s failure to produce sufficient supporting evidence.240  
Furthermore, the court details the specific violations of the defendant in 
his litigation demeanor: 
The evidence in this case shows a continuous and intentional pattern 
of misappropriation of property owned by others. (Compare Pen. 
 237. A & M Records, 75 Cal. App. 3d. at 569.
 238. Church v. Bailey, 90 Cal. App. 2d 501 (1949).
 239. Id. at 504-05.
 240. A & M Records, 75 Cal. App. 3d. at 570 n.11.
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Code, 653h.) It also shows contempt of court, hindered discovery, 
and an attempt to evade the injunctions of courts of this state as well 
as those issued by courts of Wisconsin.  Under such circumstances a 
grant of punitive damages is clearly proper.241
The award of punitive damages does not necessarily mean that 
revenue disgorgement was awarded as a part of the punitive damages or 
that the two decisions were entirely separate.  However, the defendant’s 
default in failing to produce documents or data and its violations of the 
court’s injunctions are sufficient to eliminate any precedential value for 
this opinion. 
There have been subsequent cases in California state courts and the 
Ninth Circuit that have affirmed the claim of misappropriation of 
intangible assets for intellectual property outside the protection of 
federal statutes, citing A & M Records favorably.  One such subsequent 
case, Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp.,242 granted 
the remedy of revenue disgorgement because the defendant failed to 
contest the remedy.  
VII. AGENCY CLAIMS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
“‘Plaintiff,’ the tobacco companies protested, ‘apparently believes 
that the more confusing he makes the law of restitution and indemnity 
appear, the higher his likelihood of success.’”243
 
The principal focus of this section on agency claims (SEC, CFTC, 
DOE, FTC and FDA) for unjust enrichment is on the issue of whether 
certain items are allowed to be offset.  The article will not specifically 
address issues relating to how the defendant’s revenue or credits should 
be calculated.  Given this distinction, two general issues are prominent. 
 
(1) Inconsistency With Other Remedies In Equity 
 
A district court’s jurisdiction is limited to traditional remedies in 
equity for federal agency claims of unjust enrichment.  Yet when the 
 241. Id. at 571.
 242. Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio, Corp., 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 243. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco 
Settlement, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 868 (1999).
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opinions that discuss how the defendant’s unjust enrichment should be 
measured, there is little to no mention of the abundant case law that is 
available in other areas of the substantive law.  Largely ignored is the 
body of case law for claims relating to trade secrets, breaches of 
fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud and misappropriation that can offer 
helpful analogies for remedies in equity and as well as mixed claims for 
violations of trademarks244 or copyrights.245  Totally ignored is the body 
of case law for claims and remedies at law relating to claims for torts 
and quasi-contrast which offer useful contrasts to analyze whether either 
the claim, remedy, or both, would be more appropriate for a court at law 
or a court in equity. 
Only by ignoring this comparable case law could courts render 
some of the existing opinions on measuring unjust enrichment in equity.  
By restricting their attention only to cases relating to the implied claims 
of federal agencies, some courts now regularly reject any offsets or 
counter-restitution for the defendant when measuring unjust enrichment.  
Other than the AVCO opinion in the Second Circuit and the Southern 
District of New York,246 most of the remaining opinions only grudgingly 
allow the defendant to offset some incidental direct costs to measure the 
defendant’s profit to be disgorged to the agency plaintiff.  
Administrative costs and variable or fixed overhead are not allowed for 
defendants against claims from the SEC and most other agencies.  No 
other body of case law exaggerates unjust enrichment in such a manner, 
especially as interpreted by a court in equity. 
To date, more than 240 federal and state cases (from both courts at 
law and in equity) have been surveyed, comparing case opinions on the 
deductibility of a proposed expense for the measurement of the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment.  Within the total group, 130 cases held 
that one or more type of expense was deductible, 61 cases held that 
 244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3, cmt. d 
(Discussion Draft, Mar. 31. 2000) (offering two illustrations for disgorgement, 
including a copyright case, Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
 245. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (stating clearly that in regards to the violation of 
trademarks the award of profits or damages is “subject to the principles of equity.”  See 
also Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000).  For a 
discussion of equitable foundations of copyright and patent law, see Root v. Ry. Co., 
105 U.S. 189 (1882) and Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 
(1940). 
 246. CFTC v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998).
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certain items were not deductible and 50 cases held that some items 
were deductible and others were not deductible.247
The following three tables confirm that a large body of case 
opinions has accumulated for a variety of jurisdictions and covering a 
variety of issues that allow the deduction or offset of most expenses for 
production and administration.  A significant number of cases have even 
supported the minority position for deducting infringing expenses and 
income taxes. 
 
TABLE 1 
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES RELATING TO OFFSETS FOR DEFENDANT’S 
BENEFIT 
 
COURT DEDUCTIBLE NON-DEDUCTIBLE
1st Circuit 11  5  
2d Circuit 46  32  
3d Circuit 19  14  
4th Circuit 7  3  
5th Circuit 15  3  
6th Circuit 8  6  
7th Circuit 14  8  
8th Circuit 11  6  
9th Circuit 29  20  
10th Circuit 11  7  
11th Circuit 3  5  
Fed. Circuit 4  4  
Supreme Court 7  5  
Total 185  118  
 
 
 247. At best the sampling methods were informal.  No claim is made that the group 
of cases is necessarily representative of any particular group or sub-group. 
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Table 2 shows the distribution of cases that allow or reject the 
deduction of various types of expenses by category of expense: 
 
TABLE 2 
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES THAT ALLOW OR REJECT DEDUCTION OF 
EXPENSES 
 
CATEGORY OF EXPENSE DEDUCTIBLE NON-DEDUCTIBLE
Administrative 38  17  
Bad Debt 7  8  
Depreciation 11  6  
Distribution 2  10  
Infringing 13  22  
Interest 22  3  
Losses 6  11  
Overhead 63  50  
Production 97  19  
Income Tax 31  24  
 
Finally, Table 3 summarizes the number of state and federal cases 
in the geographical confines of the Second Circuit that have approved or 
rejected the deduction of various categories of expense.  A second data 
field shows the year of the most recent opinion in that group: 
 
TABLE 3 
FEDERAL & STATE CASES IN THE 2D CIRCUIT THAT APPROVE OR REJECT 
EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 
 
CATEGORY  
OF EXPENSE DEDUCTIBLE DEDUCTIBLE 
NON- 
DEDUCTIBLE 
NON- 
DEDUCTIBLE 
 Last Opinion Opinions Last Opinion Opinions
Administrative 2003 16  1985 3  
Bad Debt 1987 2  1949 2  
Depreciation 1944 2  1985 1  
Infringing 1981 2  1996 8  
Interest 1944 4  1944 2  
Overhead 2003 26  1995 16  
Production 1998 18  1990 3  
Income Tax 1994 9  1989 7  
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At present, most opinions that address the issue of measuring the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment approve the deduction of all direct or 
variable costs that are related to the relevant revenue.  There are 
disagreements among some courts and the federal circuits are somewhat 
split over whether (a) fixed overhead can be allocated, (b) both willful 
and non-willful defendants can offset some form of overhead or 
administrative costs, and (c) the defendant’s income taxes should be 
deductible.  The overall point, of course, is that most courts, including 
the same courts that have heard most of the relevant federal agency 
cases, permit the deduction of most of the defendant’s operating 
expenses in measuring a defendant’s unjust enrichment. 
For example, the Second Circuit is among the most liberal circuits 
in allowing expenses to be deducted to measure unjust enrichment.  The 
Second Circuit has been a leading advocate of the deductibility of 
income taxes248 and of allocating fixed overhead.249  The Second Circuit 
is unique among the circuits in advocating that a court should estimate 
the defendant’s gross profit if the defendant fails or is unable to produce 
relevant accounting data rather than hold the defendant in default and 
award the defendant’s revenues as unjust enrichment.250  Yet the Second 
 248. For cases affirming the deduction of the defendant’s income taxes, see 
Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Zenith Detroit Corp., 73 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.1934), 
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674, 678-79 (C.D.N.Y. 1952), W.E. 
Bassett Co v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970), Murphy Door Bed Co. Inc. v. 
Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989), and In Design v. K Mart 
Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994).  For opinions denying the deduction of 
the defendant’s income taxes, see Harris v. Miller, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 103 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943), John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 58 F. Supp 586, 592 (C.D.N.Y. 
1944), McNamara v. Powell, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 515 (Sup. 1944), Alfred Bell & Co. v. 
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951), Stuart v. Collins, 489 F. Supp. 
827 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and Mfr. Tech., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 75, 84 (D. Conn. 
1989). 
 249. Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Sheldon’s approach 
has been consistently applied by this Court.  In subsequent cases, we have assumed that 
general overhead expenses were deductible and reviewed only the sufficiency of the 
nexus between the expense and the infringing product . . . .”); U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde 
Entm’t, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10985, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Fixed and other 
overhead may be counted as a deductible expense provided that it ‘actually contributed 
to’ supplying the product, even if the expense would still have been borne by the 
defendant absent the infringement.”).
 250. See Murphy Door Bed, 874 F.2d at 103 (“Even if Zarcone does not offer 
evidence of his costs (as he has not heretofore), the court should estimate them based on 
the evidence before it.”). 
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Circuit denies these deductions to defendants for agency claims over the 
same time period according to traditional remedies in equity. 
State court opinions also have precedential or persuasive authority.  
In a case filed by the Consumer Protection Division of Maryland against 
three individuals, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held the following: 
The Division also should deduct the payments Shpritz made to the 
purchasers, albeit those payments were not in accordance with the 
law.  In so ruling, we do not condone the unlawful transactions, but 
instead apply the rules for restitution rather than impose civil or 
criminal penalties.  By seeking to compel Shpritz to pay these 
amounts again, the Division forsakes unjust enrichment for what are 
in effect punitive damages . . . [a]ccordingly, the Division must 
recalculate its restitution order to exclude the actual costs incurred by 
Shpritz.251
Agency remedies are also inconsistent between the different 
agencies.  The five agencies can be sorted into two groups: claims 
against one or a series of transactions and claims against an ongoing 
business operation. 
The transactional group includes claims made by the SEC, CFTC 
and Department of Energy that various defendants engaged in 
transactions or a series of transactions that violated their statutes.  With a 
minimum of dispute all such agencies allow the most important offset: 
the purchase price of the securities, commodity investment or 
hydrocarbon that the defendant resold in an unjust manner.  It is a given 
that the agencies seek at most the defendants’ gross profit, not their 
literal revenue or cash inflow.  Various defendants sought to offset 
smaller, related transaction costs and various forms of administrative 
expenses but were generally denied all but some ancillary transactional 
costs.  In contrast, agencies like the FTC and the FDA generally seek the 
equivalent of the defendants’ gross revenue and oppose any proposed 
offsets requested by the defendants. 
One possible explanation for the differences among agencies is that 
the case law for each agency may follow a form of a ‘learning curve.’  
Thus it appears that courts begin to narrow the definition of the 
plaintiff’s remedy only after a significant number of cases have passed 
that establish the agency’s basic right to implied jurisdiction.  This may 
be true for the legal staff of the agency and even for the firms that 
represent various defendants against the agencies but a court’s 
 251. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 171 (Ct. App. Md. 2005).
2007] A DEFAULT RULE OF OMNIPOTENCE 73 
experience in one area of the substantive law should be cumulative with 
the rest.  The overall explanation may also lie with the fact that as long 
as the defendant disputes the agency’s fundamental right to a claim for 
implied jurisdiction, the court and the process is distracted from the 
cumulative case law.  Defense counsel has limited time and credibility 
with the court; if counsel pursues the basic jurisdiction for the agency 
(which in the last five years has been a consistently losing position 
except in relation to RICO and RCRA), she may have insufficient time 
or credibility to dispute the agency’s measure of restitution. 
 
(2) Jurisdiction in Equity 
 
The court sits in equity to hear an agency’s claim, but it appears 
that sometime during the trial, the agency enlists the aide and sympathy 
of the court to join the agency in achieving the goals of the agency’s 
statutory scheme.  Reading the case opinions in the FTC and FDA cases 
seem to indicate an increasing inclination of the court to devise 
remedies, equitable or not, that will help the deceived consumer the 
most. 
The main purpose of the agency’s statutes in implied jurisdiction is 
to determine whether Congress limited the agency’s implied jurisdiction 
to only certain remedies and to provide a basis to determine whether the 
defendant’s enrichment was unjust. 
The essential contradiction in most of the case law relating to 
implied jurisdiction is that the agencies opt for the advantages of 
jurisdiction in equity, but resist the concomitant obligation to conform 
their remedies to traditional remedies in equity.  In their discussion of 
the appropriate measure of a defendant’s benefit or profit, the courts 
frequently forget that a plaintiff is not even entitled to a defendant’s 
unjust enrichment unless the plaintiff can establish that the unjust acts 
were conducted willfully or knowingly.  In the absence of establishing 
such intent, the plaintiff would be entitled to, at most, a market rate of 
rent or interest for the use of her asset.  Similarly, the right of the 
defendant to offset expenses or to claim counter-restitution is not 
conditioned by the nature of the defendant’s unjust actions. 
Perhaps the increasing awareness of the need to distinguish 
restitution at law from restitution in equity will reverse this pattern as 
courts are forced to conform to the Supreme Court’s opinions in Grupo 
and Great-West.  Claims filed by the SEC, CFTC and the DOE largely 
seek disgorgement of un-segregated cash; these claims are increasingly 
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likely to be challenged for failing to meet the standard set in Great-West 
for identifiable or segregated assets or funds of cash.  Furthermore, the 
agency’s claim will be evaluated as a whole such that if the agency 
seeks personal liability for the defendant or proposes to calculate the 
restitution in a manner suggesting punitive relief, the claim is even less 
likely to found compatible with traditional restitution in equity. 
The agencies can still claim that their claims are merely ancillary to 
the requested injunctive relief and that the clean-up doctrine would 
allow jurisdictions to provide complete relief.  However, the previous 
parts of the article have shown that courts are increasingly willing to 
challenge the appropriateness of the injunctive relief and increasingly 
unwilling to accept the labels asserted for causes of action at face value.  
Another key issue will relate to the Supreme Court’s holding in Tull that 
a claim for $22 million and other injunctive relief should be viewed as a 
remedy at law for $22 million with the injunctive relief added merely for 
cover.252
Agencies like the FTC and FDA largely seek a different type of 
remedy and they are likely to experience a similar but less intense set of 
problems.  While the FTC and FDA use a number of different labels for 
their proposed remedies, they seek rescission which is less at odds with 
the standard for equitable relief in Great-West.  However, the FTC and 
FDA have sought a version of rescission that omits the counter-
restitution that is normally required in equitable rescission. 
Implied jurisdiction claims do have some significantly positive 
attributes.  They offer class-action type relief that could take less time 
and provide greater efficiency for consumers and investors who would 
otherwise find little recourse for their legitimate claims of fraud and 
misrepresentation.  Over time, it will be interesting to see if agency 
lawyers avoid the inherent dangers of conflicts-of-interest in such a 
setting or if they just end up straddling other types of conflicts between 
the interest of the consumer and the interest of the government or 
agency. 
A. Securities and Exchange Commission 
While the courts probably consider as many or more ERISA cases 
than SEC cases, the SEC seems to be regarded as the “trail blazer” for 
 
 252. See also King Mechanism & Eng’g Co. v. W. Wheeled Scrapper Co., 59 F.2d 
546, 547 (7th Cir. 1932).
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agencies in the area of implied jurisdiction.253  Much of this image may 
be owed to the early SEC cases relating to Texas Gulf Sulphur and its 
progeny that first established a federal district court’s jurisdiction for 
securities claims.254  Cases relating to implied jurisdiction for the SEC 
have frequently been cited for other agencies. 
The SEC is a powerful advocate for its view of the law in equity as 
it ‘prosecutes’ a large number of cases each year that relate to 
restitution/unjust enrichment.  Given the confusion that prevails about 
the subject, this voice is likely to gain influence, regardless of the 
accuracy of its message.  Consider the following description of the 
SEC’s litigation tactics from the Securities Enforcement Manual from 
the A.B.A. Business Law Section that was quoted by the Southern 
District of New York: 
The SEC often takes a broad view as to what constitutes illicit 
profits.  Thus, in negotiating a disgorgement remedy with the staff, 
counsel may find that the staff argues for a very broad loss causation 
concept, refuses to recognize the fairness of netting profits and losses 
from allegedly illegal transactions, and resists the deductibility of 
various expenses.  In contrast, the courts tend to take a more realistic 
approach as to what constitutes ‘illegal’ profits, and have accepted 
the propriety of netting gains against losses.255 
 253. CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, n.9 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act grants the courts equitable powers to 
enforce that Act.  Though the Commodity Exchange Act has no provision similar to 
Section 27, courts have found support for disgorgement in CFTC actions by relying 
on the general equity power of the federal courts.  Moreover, the rationale supporting 
disgorgement in actions under the securities laws - that allowing a violator to retain 
the profits from his violations would frustrate the purposes of the regulatory scheme, 
see e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971)—holds true in the context of the Commodity Exchange 
Act. 
Id. 
 254. Texas Gulf Sulpher, 446 F.2d at 1307  (“[E]ven though no specific statutory 
authority exists” which granted the SEC the power to authorize the appointment of 
receivers under the Exchange Act, the courts of appeals have nonetheless upheld the 
exercise of such equity power by the district courts.”).  See also SEC v. Dibella, 409 F. 
Supp. 2d. 122, 130-31 (2d. Cir. 2006) (noting that despite amending the securities laws 
significantly in 1995 and 2002, Congress nevertheless declined to limit or eliminate the 
SEC’s exercise of implied jurisdiction in seeking and obtaining disgorgement orders.  In 
fact, Congress recognized the practice as both necessary and important.) 
 255. SEC v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *24 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(citing The Securities Enforcement Manual, A.B.A. Business Law Section at 197 
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Like the CFTC and the DOE, the SEC generally does not claim 
revenue disgorgement as it measures the defendant’s benefit or profit net 
of the cost of the securities sold.  For example, suppose a defendant 
bought 1,000 shares of stock for $10 per share and thereafter committed 
acts that violated the securities statutes which resulted in the sale of 
those same shares for $50 per share or $50,000.  The SEC would claim 
unjust profits of about $40,000, not $50,000. 
In 1990, the Western District of New York’s opinion in SEC v. 
Thomas James Associates, Inc. attempted to clarify the central issue of 
the limits to the court’s jurisdiction or authority: 
In fixing the measure and amount of disgorgement, I may not invoke 
the equitable power of the court in order to inflict a penalty or effect 
forfeiture; the amount to be disgorged must be “causally related to 
the wrongdoing.”  Such amount, however, need not be figured with 
perfect precision; “disgorgement need only be a reasonable 
approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.”256
The SEC further argues, however, that the amount to be disgorged 
by defendants is the entire amount of excessive markups, because the 
measure of disgorgement is the injury to the market, and because 
only the gross profits, unadjusted for expenses, adequately reflect 
such injury.  The SEC’s argument simply misconstrues both the 
nature and extent of the equitable power of the Court to order 
disgorgement.257
The court held that it has the discretion to allow some types of 
expenses to be deducted or offset in the unjust enrichment calculation.  
Compared to the Second Circuit’s holding in Murphy Door Bed, this 
(1997)). 
 256. 738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (quoting SEC v. First City Financial Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 
1230 (1989)). 
 257. In re Alpha Telecom, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at *26-27 (D. Or. 
2004) (citing Thomas James, 738 F. Supp. at 92-94 (“Disgorgement may not 
exceed the amount by which the agent was unjustly enriched, plus interest.”)); 
Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 
846, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Any further sum would constitute a penalty 
assessment.”); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“To the extent an 
agent necessarily and reasonably incurred expenses to earn the commissions he 
must now disgorge, a setoff may be appropriate in some instances.  Otherwise, 
disgorgement might exceed the amount by which the agent was unjustly 
enriched.”). 
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opinion seems a tame statement of the law.258
Perhaps with the encouragement of the SEC, a couple of subsequent 
opinions took strong objection to the Southern District’s statement: 
In support of this proposition, Defendants rely primarily on SEC v. 
Thomas James Associates, Inc., in which the court held that a court 
ordering disgorgement “may consider as an offset the expenses 
incurred by defendant in garnering such unjust enrichment.”  The 
Court agrees with the SEC that this case does not reflect the 
“overwhelming weight of authority holding that securities law 
violators may not offset their disgorgement liability with business 
expenses.”259
Even though the SEC gained the support of the District Court of the 
District of Columbia and the Fifth Circuit260 for the position that no 
direct incidental expense should offset the measure of defendant’s 
profits, it appears that the trend has turned against the view recently.  In 
2002, the Southern District handed down two opinions that may settle 
this.  First, the Southern District disputed the SEC’s assertion about the 
“overwhelming weight of authority,” at least within the Southern 
District, as “[c]ourts in this Circuit consistently hold that a court may, in 
its discretion, deduct from the disgorgement amount any direct 
transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions that plainly reduce the 
wrongdoer’s actual profit.”261  Later in 2002, the SEC conceded that its 
authority is not overwhelming.  Seemingly in response to the 
defendant’s claims for a larger number of offsets, the SEC claimed that 
it was widely acknowledged that only certain kinds of expenses could be 
offset, as “[t]he SEC cit[ed] a number of cases for the proposition that in 
disgorgement cases (as opposed to civil penalty cases) only certain 
expenses, such as brokerage commissions, may be deducted from the 
amount to be disgorged.”262
The impact of this opinion still only relates to direct incidental 
expenses and specifically proscribes administrative expenses or any 
 258. Murphy Door Bed Co. Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
 259. SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 1998) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 260. SEC v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 88 Fed. Appx. 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 261. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *14. 
 262. SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
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allocations of overhead.  This position of the Southern District is at odds 
with other Southern District opinions for other areas of the law that 
litigate the definition of “profit” for the purposes of calculating unjust 
enrichment.263  Only two years later, the same jurisdiction ruled that the 
CFTC’s measure of the defendant’s unjust enrichment should include 
administrative and overhead expenses.264
As plaintiffs for unjust enrichment, the agencies, especially the 
SEC, FTC and FDA, secure profit definitions that are much more 
favorable to the plaintiff than would be found in other areas of the 
substantive law.  Three main issues, however, remain to restrain the 
agencies’ restrictive measures: 
(1) The district courts enjoy wide discretion in how unjust 
enrichment or benefits or profits should be defined;265
(2) Courts acknowledge the need to distinguish between legally 
and illegally obtained profits;266
(3) Disgorgement awards should not be punitive.267
 263. Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1999). 
Sheldon’s approach has been consistently applied by this Court.  In subsequent cases, 
we have assumed that general overhead expenses were deductible and reviewed only 
the sufficiency of the nexus between the expense and the infringing product . . . . In 
Design v. K Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994), for example, 
concerned a copyright holder’s challenge to the district court’s conclusion that certain 
overhead expenses (including rent, advertising, payroll, shipping, and store supplies) 
were deductible from gross profits.”). 
Id. (internal citations added). 
 264. CFTC v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998).
 265. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 812 (1997) (“The district court has broad discretion not only in determining 
whether or not to order disgorgement but also in calculating the amount to be 
disgorged.”). 
 266. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Since 
disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may exercise its 
equitable power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing.”); SEC v. 
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 
1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D.D.C. 1993) (“‘The 
court may exercise its equitable power only over property causally related to the 
wrongdoing.’ First City Fin., 890 F.2d at 1231.  As such, ‘the loss complained of must 
proceed directly and proximately from the violation claimed and not be attributable to 
some supervening cause.’”); SEC v. Sekhri, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13289 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
 267. First City Fin., 890 F.2d at 1230 (“In fixing the measure and amount of 
disgorgement, I may not invoke the equitable power of the court in order to inflict a 
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For cases of implied jurisdiction, the offsets that the SEC has 
objected to on an individual basis include the following: 
(1) TRANSACTION COSTS.  Until recently, the SEC objected to 
even incidental transaction costs underlying the unjust 
activities, including broker fees and transfer taxes.  In 
disputes, this item is the most likely for courts to approve as 
an offset.268
penalty or effect a forfeiture; the amount to be disgorged must be ‘causally related to 
the wrongdoing.’”); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Disgorgement 
is remedial and not punitive.  The court’s power to order disgorgement extends only to 
the amount with interest by which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing.  Any 
further sum would constitute a penalty assessment.”); SEC v. World Gambling Corp., 
555 F. Supp. 930, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
Sroka properly argues that disgorgement serves somewhat different purposes from 
those served by joint-tortfeasor liability.  While disgorgement functions primarily to 
prevent a party’s unjust enrichment and thereby to deter improper conduct, joint 
liability serves primarily to make whole the injured party, and in the process to punish 
if necessary any one legally responsible.  To the extent that joint liability requires 
payment of a sum greater than the profits unlawfully gained by the fraudulent 
transactions, it is a penalty and is therefore improper. 
Id.; See also Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992); SEC v. Shah, 
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
Allowing a deduction for reasonable brokers’ commissions incurred in making insider 
trades is consistent with the view in the Second Circuit that disgorgement is not a 
penalty assessment, but merely a means of divesting a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.  
[Defendant] has already paid the commissions to his broker.  Requiring him now to 
disgorge an amount equal to those commissions would penalize him by compelling 
him to pay the commissions twice. 
Id. 
 268. Herrmann v. Steinberg, 812 F.2d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that incidental 
transaction expenses incurred in purchasing stock are deductible from defendant’s 
disgorgement of short-swing profits under Section 16(b)); Oliff v.  Exch. Int’l Corp., 
669 F.2d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 915 (1981); SEC v. 
Alliance Leasing Corp., 28 Fed. App’x 648 (9th Cir. 2001); Litton Indus., 734 F. Supp. 
at 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992) (“To 
require disgorgement of all fees and commissions without permitting a reduction for 
associate expenses and costs constitutes a penalty assessment and goes beyond the 
restitutionary purpose of the disgorgement doctrine.”); Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10347, at *14; SEC v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *14 (“Courts in this 
Circuit consistently hold that a court may, in its discretion, deduct from the 
disgorgement amount any direct transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions, that 
plainly reduce the wrongdoer’s actual profit.”); SEC v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 
738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); Alpha Telcom, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20002, at *18 (D. Or. 2002). But see SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp. 
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(2) OTHER DIRECT EXPENSES.  This category is meant to include 
other direct costs of production underlying the unjust 
activities.  The SEC continues to object to these expenses 
generally on the basis that they should be regarded as 
infringing expenditures and as such should not be offset as a 
matter of public policy.269
(3) INFRINGING EXPENSES.  While there is a line of cases that 
hold that certain items of infringing expenses should not be 
offset against revenues, that distinction has generally been 
narrowly drawn and largely restricted to the compensation 
of the business owners.  To date, the agencies have 
convinced the courts to broaden this category to most or all 
of the proposed offsets in any one case.270
(4) GENERAL BUSINESS EXPENSES.  This category includes direct 
or variable administrative expenses and allocated overhead.  
Most courts do not measure profit in SEC cases by 
deducting expenses for variable administrative expenses to 
calculate unjust enrichment for other areas of the law and 
some permit allocated overhead.271
211, 214-15 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (rejecting deductions from the disgorgement amount for 
overhead, commissions, and other expenses).
 269. SEC v. Rosenfeld, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A 
court may in its discretion, deduct from the gross profits certain expenses incurred 
while garnering the illegal profits, including correspondence and related expenses and 
transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions.”); SEC v. Bocchino, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22047, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that the court has discretion to deduct 
certain expenses incurred while garnering the illegal profits, including correspondence 
and related expenses, and transaction costs such as brokerage commissions).
 270. SEC v. TLC Inv. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting 
that defendant is not entitled to offset expenses in carrying out a fraudulent scheme); 
SEC v. Cavanagh, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13372, at *102 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“Defendants are not entitled to deduct costs associated with committing their illegal 
acts.”).
 271. SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214-15 (E.D. Mich. 1991) 
(rejecting deductions from the disgorgement amount for overhead, commissions, and 
other expenses; criticizing Thomas James for equating disgorgement with restitution); 
SEC v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *16 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 
(“Commissions should be distinguished from general business expenses, such as 
overhead expenses, which should not reduce the disgorgement amount.”); SEC v. 
World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (offsetting “transfer 
taxes” but not overhead costs), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1112 (1984); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *8 
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(5) INCOME TAXES.  Most courts do not permit this expense to be 
offset.  Outside of implied jurisdiction, the circuits have 
split over this issue although recently the Federal Appeals 
Circuit handed down an opinion against offsetting income 
taxes that may resolve some of the dispute.272
(6) SETTLEMENTS WITH OTHER PARTIES.  Other than the purchase 
price of stock sold, settlements with other parties may be the 
largest single potential offset for any one case.  The issue 
can sometimes be confused with the fact question of 
whether the proposed offset represents a settlement on the 
existing unjust act or practice.  Assuming that the settlement 
is related, the majority opinion is that settlements can be 
offset. 273
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2002) (“Moreover, general business expenses may not be subtracted 
from the amount to be disgorged.”). 
 272. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 
2002) (“Brandon finally argues that the $254,523.35 figure should be reduced by 
$84,180.85 paid in taxes.  This argument ignores the clear dictate of the statute that the 
gross amount of pecuniary gain be paid and thus must be rejected.”); Alpha Telcom, 
Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at *31 (“The agents request a setoff for taxes paid 
on the income they are now being required to disgorge.  That request is denied.  It is a 
matter between the agents and the IRS (or state officials).  The court will not 
interfere.”); see also Nike Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 138 F.3d 1437, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (citing Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1169-71 (6th Cir. 
1980)).
 273. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1450 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 812 (1997) (holding that a settlement in separate class action is offset for 
calculation of unjust enrichment.); SEC v. Chem. Trust, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19786, 
at *34  (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“Likewise, funds that the FBI seized from ACC, $26,940.28, 
pursuant to a seizure warrant issued in a parallel criminal investigation may inure at a 
later time to the benefit of the defrauded investors herein.  To the extent those funds do 
inure to the benefit of investors, they should be credited against ACC’s accounting.”); 
Alpha Telcom, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at*32-33 (“Many agents say they 
are being sued by former clients, and contend they should not also be liable for 
disgorgement.  I disagree.  The injuries sustained by the former clients are entirely 
distinct from the commissions that the agent received.  The agent can be liable for 
both.”).  But see Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1993). (“Appellants should 
not be allowed to keep ill-gotten gains merely because the investors recovered some of 
the money from Alliance in the bankruptcy proceeding.”); SEC v. Alliance Leasing 
Corp., 28 Fed. App’x 648, 652 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Appellants argue that the district court 
should have reduced the disgorgement by the amounts investors recovered from 
Alliance in the bankruptcy proceeding.  Disgorgement prevents unjust enrichment, 
requires return of ill-gotten gains and is independent of other remedies.”); SEC v. Penn 
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(7) UNPROVEN EXPENSES. Throughout litigation on remedies in 
equity, there is almost unanimous agreement that the 
plaintiff must carry the burden of proving the defendant’s 
revenues (subject to the willingness of the defendant to 
produce internal financial statements) and that the defendant 
must first carry the burden of proving suitable offsets and 
apportionments.  Should the defendant default and fail to 
substantiate the offsets, most jurisdictions award the 
defendant’s revenues by default.  Recently, the Second 
Circuit has suggested a departure from this tradition to the 
effect that the Court should still try to estimate the 
defendant’s costs of goods sold.  However, that remains a 
minority position.274
A number of precedents can be cited to support the view that 
infringing expenditures should not be offset.  One of the earlier opinions 
in this area was in the Supreme Court opinion in Callaghan v. Myers,275 
in which the court held that the salaries of the two owners of the 
company infringing a copyright should not be offset because of their 
infringing activities. It should be noted that the opinion did not hold that 
all salaries, or even all executive salaries, were ineligible.  In other areas 
Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (“It is analogous to a malpractice 
claim against a surgeon.  He may be required to refund the amount paid for the surgery 
and also be liable for any injury sustained by the patient.”). 
 274. SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 122 n.16 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Defendant has 
merely asserted a bald figure and has made no attempt to substantiate it.”); SEC v. 
Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that a CEO who fraudulently 
diverted corporate funds for personal use was ordered to disgorge the money he stole.  
The court denied a setoff for expenses incurred in perpetrating the fraud, such as 
payments made to co-conspirators.  The CEO also argued that he should be required to 
return only the money still in his possession; he had donated some to his favorite 
charities, and spent some to expand his stamp collection.  The court understandably 
denied that request.); SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12580, at *78 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Such compensation is more appropriately considered as a general 
business expense, than an indirect transactional expense incurred in connection with the 
trading of USE securities.”  The court also refused deduction of expenses insufficiently 
substantiated); SEC v. Breed, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7336 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that 
a court has discretion to deduct certain business expenses but the defendant in that case 
failed to provide sufficient substantiation of the expenses under consideration).
 275. 128 U.S. 617, 663-64 (1888); see also City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson 
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139 (1877) (showing that the case stands on a different 
footing from that of the salaries of the managing officers of a corporation, as in Rubber 
Company v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788 (1869)). 
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of the substantive law, courts continue to deny infringing activities for 
offset, but the infringing activities are generally defined narrowly and 
largely relate to salaries for the key offending parties or the owners of 
the defendant business.276
For example, if a magazine violates the copyright by including a 
protected photograph or series of photographs in a small portion of one 
issue, not all production costs of that issue are regarded as infringing 
activities.  In one such case, Sygma Photo News, Inc. v High Society 
Magazine, Inc., the Second Circuit held that only the costs of making the 
copyright violation more difficult to discover should be disallowed as an 
infringing expense. 277  
 276. For a case that approved the deduction of some or all of the defendant’s 
infringing expenses, see Rubber Co., 76 U.S. at 803-804.  See also Sammons v. Larkin, 
38 F. Supp. 649  (C.D. Mass. 1940); John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 58 
F. Supp. 586 (C.D.N.Y. 1944); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674, 
678-79 (C.D.N.Y. 1952); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981); East & 
West Coast Serv. Corp. v. Papahagis, 344 Pa. 183 (1942); Stromberg Motor Devices 
Co. v. Detroit Trust Co., 44 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1930); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp 
Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941); McGaffee v. McGaffee, 58 N.W.2d. 357 (Iowa 
1953); Health Indus., Inc. v. European Health Spas, 489 F. Supp. 860, 869 (D.S.D. 
1980); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P. C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 
(C.D. Neb. 1982); Luce v. Hanrahan, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 2775 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); 
and Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983).  But see City of 
Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 142 (1877); Callaghan v. 
Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Sammons v. Larkin, 38 F. Supp. 649 (C.D. Mass. 1940); 
Harris v. Miller, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); McNamara v. Powell, 52 
N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674 
(C.D.N.Y. 1952); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970); 
Elnicky Entert., Inc. v. Spotlight Presents, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 955 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982); Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 778 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 
1985); Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Project 
Strategies Corp. v. Nat’l Commc’ns Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156. (E.D.N.Y. 
1997); Duro Co. of Ohio v. Duro Co. of New Jersey, 56 F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1932); 
Dickinson v. O. & W. Thum Co., 8 F.2d 570. (6th Cir. 1925); Ellison v. Alley, 842 
S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1992); Durbin Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. 
Mo. 1982); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959); S. C. Johnson & 
Son, Inc. v. Drop Dead Co., 210 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Aalba-Dent, Inc. v. 
Certified Alloy Prods, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 326 (N.D. Cal 1979); Frank Music 
Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985); Julius Hyman & 
Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 233 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1951).
 277. Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 778 F.2d 89, 93-94 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (noting that the Second Circuit held that the trial court properly allowed an 
expense deduction for the entire $42,882 spent on photograph separations).  The court 
said that of this amount, $1,280 was attributable to the cost of readying the infringing 
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Overall, while there have been some opinions adverse to the court’s 
discretion to allow deductions and those that have rejected proposed 
deductions because of the particular nature of the expense,278 the 
majority of the opinions appear to be divided between those that hold 
that the court has the discretion to allow deductions or that the court 
must allow appropriate deductions.279
Some cases have also allowed deductions or offsets for certain 
other types of expenditures or payments.  Most important to the 
defendant is the issue of credit for payments or settlements made on the 
same issue.  Most disgorgement orders provide credit for payments or 
reimbursements.  While the District Court in Oregon did affirm similar 
credit, it stated that such payments should generally be considered 
separate from a calculation for unjust enrichment: 
 
cover photo for publication in the infringer’s sex-oriented magazine, but that a similar 
amount would have to have been spent to prepare any cover photo for reproduction.  
The Second Circuit further held that the trial court erred in not allowing a deduction for 
any portion of the retouching expenses, which totaled $20,266 for the entire magazine.  
The court said that expenses incurred in order to make an infringement more difficult to 
discover—as opposed to those that the infringer incurs in altering an original for some 
other purpose but that have the incidental effect of concealing—are not reasonable 
expenses and are therefore not deductible.  Noting that the trial court apparently found 
that the infringers retouched the background of the copyrighted photograph in order to 
defeat the copyright owner’s rights, and that the record indicated that this was a finding 
to which it was appropriate to defer, the appellate court concluded that it was therefore 
proper to disallow 20% of retouching expenses. Id. 
 278. SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that in 
Benson, a CEO who fraudulently diverted corporate funds for personal use was ordered 
to disgorge the money he stole.)  The court denied a setoff for expenses incurred in 
perpetrating the fraud, such as payments made to co-conspirators.  The CEO also 
argued that he should be required to return only the money still in his possession; he 
had donated some to his favorite charities, and spent some to expand his stamp 
collection.  The court understandably denied that request. Id.  See also SEC v. 
Cavanagh, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13372, at *102 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Defendants are 
not entitled to deduct costs associated with committing their illegal acts.”); SEC v. TLC 
Inv. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that defendant was 
not entitled to offset expenses in carrying out a fraudulent scheme); Bilzerian, 814 F. 
Supp. at 122 n.16 (“Defendant has merely asserted a bald figure and has made no 
attempt to substantiate it.”).
 279. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); SEC v. Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v. 
McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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Many agents say they are being sued by former clients, and contend 
they should not also be liable for disgorgement.  I disagree.  The 
injuries sustained by the former clients are entirely distinct from the 
commissions that the agent received.  The agent can be liable for 
both.  It is analogous to a malpractice claim against a surgeon.  He 
may be required to refund the amount paid for the surgery, and also 
be liable for any injury sustained by the patient.280
The court’s point that a plaintiff’s damages and payments made to others 
by the defendant are separate is sound, but disgorgement is not based on 
damages, rather it is based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment. 
There are numerous examples in which the Southern District of 
New York makes different holdings in implied jurisdiction cases than it 
has in most other opinions relating to equitable remedies.  It has held 
that income taxes would not be an appropriate offset281 in implied 
jurisdiction (contradicting its position in copyright or trademark 
cases282), and the McCaskey opinion distinguished transactional 
expenses which were appropriate for deduction and general business 
expenses, like overhead, which were not allowed283 (contradicting its 
 280. In re Alpha Telcom, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at *33 (D. Or. 2002) 
(internal citations omitted).
 281. SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 29, 2002). 
 282. For a case approving the deduction of the defendant’s income taxes, see 
Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Zenith Detroit Corp., 73 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1934).  
See also Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674, 678-79 (C.D.N.Y. 
1952); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970); Murphy Door 
Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); In Design v. K 
Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Macbeth Evans Glass Co. 
v. L.E. Smith Glass Co., 23 F.2d 459, 463 (3d Cir. 1927); Harris v. Miller, 57 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Stetson Co., 58 F. Supp. at 592; McNamara v. Powell, 52 
N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1944 ); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 
99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951); Stuart v. Collins, 489 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mfrs. 
Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 75, 84 (D. Conn. 1989). 
 283. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *16 n.6 (“Commissions should be 
distinguished from general business expenses, such as overhead expenses, which should 
not reduce the disgorgement amount.”).  See, e.g., SEC v. Rosenfeld, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1133-34; SEC v. World 
Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984) (offsetting “transfer taxes” but not 
overhead costs); Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *8 (“Moreover, 
general business expenses may not be subtracted from the amount to be disgorged.”); 
SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12580, at *78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Such 
compensation is more appropriately considered as a general business expense, than an 
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position on allocating overhead as an offset for copyright or trademark 
calculations for unjust enrichment).284  The Southern District even 
established a new form of expense or offset; the Court in SEC v. Credit 
Bancorp, Ltd. distinguished expenditures and “pass throughs” which it 
approved for deduction.285
B. Department of Energy 
Perhaps forgotten is the considerable success that the Department of 
Energy enjoyed in asserting claims for unjust enrichment relating to 
violations of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.  In fact, the very 
success of that campaign has lead to its greatest problem: how to 
distribute the large amount of awards and settlements that the defendants 
disgorged.  The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (“ESA”) authorized 
the President to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries, and to 
establish priorities for use and allocation of petroleum products.286  
Pursuant to this Act, the executive branch established a multi-tiered 
structure for the pricing of oil, which provided a much higher price for 
newly discovered oil than for proven reserves.  The gap between the two 
prices provided sufficient incentive for substantial cheating by 
petroleum opportunists who increased the value of their holdings by 
‘converting’ cheaper old oil into new oil. 
The problem was that the litigation gained more in awards than 
could be reasonably distributed in restitution to the consumers who 
could be identified as deserving re-payment.  First, Congress passed the 
“Warner Amendment”287 which gave the DOE authority to disburse 
unclaimed funds to various state agencies.  Thereafter, in 1986, 
Congress passed another statute to distribute the excess accumulation: 
 
indirect transactional expense incurred in connection with the trading of USE 
securities.”). The . . . court also refused the deduction of expenses that were not 
sufficiently substantiated. Id.
 284. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
 285. Credit Bancorp, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *6-7. 
The other funds were never intended to pay Brandon, nor did he have any control over 
those funds.  He did not choose whether to pay the CBL employee’s salary, the CBL 
rent or the expenses.  Instead, CBL made those decisions and Brandon was a mere 
conduit for paying CBL’s bills. As a result, these three categories cannot contribute to 
Brandon’s gross pecuniary gain. 
Id. 
 286. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970).
 287. Warner Amendment of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 155, 96 Stat. 1830 (1982).
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Reflecting the increasing accumulation of escrow funds, the Warner 
Amendment was superseded by the Petroleum Overcharge 
Distribution and Restitution Act of 1986 (“PODRA”).  In enacting 
PODRA, Congress referred to the billions of dollars that had 
accumulated and for which restitution to the persons injured was not 
possible.  PODRA requires the DOE to reserve sufficient funds to 
make restitution to those who suffered the actual losses, and to pay 
the excess to federal and state treasuries “as indirect restitution”.288
In turn, this led to the situation that a government agency was 
collecting billions of dollars in unjust enrichment awards against 
defendant oil companies even though less than twenty percent of the 
awards were actually paid in restitution to the victims of the unjust acts. 
The case of Texas American Oil Corp. v. United States Department 
of Energy289 involved a defendant that was found unjustly enriched for 
having violated the pricing structure but that filed for bankruptcy 
protection before the government was able to collect the award.  The 
specific case related to the priority of the unjust enrichment award in 
relation to the debtor’s other creditors.  The Federal Circuit held that any 
form of restitution that either exceeds the plaintiff’s losses, flows to the 
government rather than the victims of the unjust act, or does both, is 
considered a penalty, not an equitable remedy, and therefore deserves a 
lower priority in bankruptcy than the claims of creditors that actually 
lost money.290
This opinion is based on the fundamental and mistaken assumption 
that the ‘restitution’ provided for in Section 209 of ESA was the same as 
that for criminal restitution or compensating damages.291  It contradicts 
the definition stated by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: 
“The central purpose of restitution is to determine the amount by which 
the wrongdoer has been unjustly enriched and then to make him 
disgorge that amount.  No proof is required that the plaintiff was 
damaged, much less the amount of any damage.”292
 288. Tex. Am. Oil Corp. v. U.S. DOE, 44 F.3d 1557, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal 
citations omitted).
 289. Id.
 290. Id. at 1571. 
 291. Id. at 1569. (“Restitution is an equitable remedy whereby the wrongdoer is 
required to restore the injured person to the situation that prevailed before the wrong 
was committed.  There must be some relationship between the person injured and the 
recipient of the recovery.”) (citations omitted). 
 292. United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 854 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 773 
F.2d 1240 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. 
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In passing, it is interesting to note the opinions in two cases on this 
form of revenue disgorgement.  First, unjust enrichment was calculated 
on the basis of the defendant’s gross profit: revenues less the purchase 
price for the oil.  In a related area of natural gas regulation, the Fifth 
Circuit held that disgorgement without offsetting the purchase price of 
the natural gas sold would be an intolerable penalty: 
We can see no way to characterize the “disgorgement” remedy in the 
present case as anything other than a penalty.  Refunding to FGT all 
of the revenues from Coastal’s intrastate sales exceeds both the 
injury to FGT’s interstate customers and the unjust enrichment of 
Coastal.  Coastal not only forfeits all of its profits, but it is also 
denied any payment whatsoever for the gas, including the 
recoupment of costs.293
The second case relates to whether the DOE’s claim against the 
defendant should be $711,352,450.17 or $210,736,532.92 and which 
method of calculation would be appropriate:294
As a result of the defendants’ crude oil purchase and sale policies 
and practices of miscertification, profits were realized by the 
defendants of $210,736,532.92.  This sum of $210,736,532.92 
allows the defendants credit for sales of uncontrolled (stripper or 
foreign) crude oil as well as some other crude oil which defendants 
sold for substantially less per barrel price than it paid, which was 
brought about principally by the tier price averaging scheme . . . .295
For the defendant Robert Sutton, who owned and controlled the 
company, the bad news of the opinion was in the second issue of the 
case, wherein he was held personally liable. 
Congress passed additional legislation to create the Department of 
Energy, which now specifically provides for the agency to file civil 
actions for the defendants to make restitution.  A recent case 
demonstrates that confusion over the term ‘restitution’ allows the DOE 
to combine the advantages of restitution at law and restitution in equity.  
In Houston Oil & Refining, Inc. v. United States Federal Energy 
Edwards, 669 F.2d 717, 722 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 293. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 782 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986).  See 
also Cox v. FERC, 581 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1978); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 294. United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986). 
 295. Id. at 1062-63. 
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Regulatory Commission,296 the Federal Circuit, sitting in place of the 
defunct TECA, ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial 
because restitution is an equitable remedy.  The statute does not specify 
whether the agency is entitled to claim restitution at law or in equity, but 
restitution in equity is probably most compatible with the other relief 
authorized for the DOE.  Yet the same court contradicted traditional case 
law in equity by ruling that the DOE did not need to prove the specific 
causation between the company’s alleged unjust enrichment and that of 
the company’s owner and CEO to establish the personal liability of the 
owner.  The DOE claimed that the causation was self evident given the 
defendant’s ownership of the co-defendant company.  The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the DOE’s assertion that the defendant owner had to 
carry the burden of proof to show that the unjust enrichment that reached 
the company did not enrich him.297  This holding contradicts the Great-
West opinion that eschews personal liability and requires identifiable 
funds or assets for remedies in equity. 
One aspect of the DOE that has not received much attention is the 
issue of the applicability of the clean-up doctrine.  According to the 
background provided by the Federal Circuit, the President’s authority 
under the EPAA expired on September 30, 1981 although “savings 
provision in the EPAA provided that expiration of the President’s 
authority did not affect pending enforcement proceedings or 
enforcement proceedings, such as in the present case, based upon acts 
committed or liability incurred prior to the expiration date.”298  It 
therefore seems unlikely that any claim for injunctive relief would be 
relevant unless that claim were filed prior to September 30, 1981.  In 
such event, the clean-up doctrine would not apply and any such claim by 
the DOE would have to comply with the statutory provision for 
 296. Houston Oil & Ref., Inc. v. FERC, 95 F.3d 1126, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 297. Id. at 1138. 
In sum, Imparato’s solely owned corporation collected almost $58 million in 
overcharges, and there is no evidence as to where those funds went.  The inescapable 
inference is that Imparato personally benefited from the overcharges.  If the 
overcharges remained in the accounts of his wholly owned corporation, Imparato 
would have directly benefited by the increased value of the corporation.  On the other 
hand, if the funds were distributed as salary or dividends to the sole shareholder, 
Imparato also would have directly benefited.  In the event that Imparato otherwise 
distributed the funds, for example by directing them to other corporate employees in 
the form of increased compensation or perhaps by making corporate charitable 
contributions, Imparato would still have benefited, albeit indirectly. 
Id. 
 298. Id. at 1130. 
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‘restitution’ or as a remedy in equity according to Great-West.299
C. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
On the whole, case opinions relating to claims from the CFTC best 
approximate the existing practice of measuring unjust enrichment.  For 
example, the opinion in CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., the Third 
Circuit concluded that the majority position held that profits, not 
proceeds, of the defendant should be disgorged.300  In that opinion, the 
Third Circuit remanded the case because the trial court awarded 
customer losses as a proxy for the defendant’s unjust enrichment without 
holding a hearing to determine the ease with which the defendant’s 
profits might be calculated or compared to the customer losses: 
Until the amount of unjust enrichment has been established by a 
hearing, there will have been no showing of the relationship of all 
the defendants’ gains to investor losses.  The reason why this 
relationship has to be established is because . . . in designing 
remedies under the Commodity Exchange Act or the Securities 
Exchange Act, the courts have considered disgorgement to serve 
primarily to prevent unjust enrichment.  For this reason a “court may 
exercise its equitable power only over the property causally related 
to the wrongdoing.” SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 
1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  In First City, the court pointed out that this 
rule required the SEC to distinguish between “legally and illegally 
obtained profits.” Id.  We conclude this rule would similarly require 
a correlation between investor losses and unlawful gains as long as 
the former is to be used as the measure for disgorgement.  This 
determination is consistent with the concept that “disgorgement may 
not be used punitively.”301
The key point is that it is beyond the district court’s equitable powers to 
award more than the defendants’ unjust profits. 
The court re-emphasizes the distinction between cases in which the 
losses are greater than or less than the defendant’s unjust enrichment: 
 
 299. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text. 
 300. CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Appellant argues that the measure of disgorgement should be unlawful ‘profits.’  
Appellees argue that the measure should be unlawful ‘proceeds.’  The term most 
frequently used in reported decisions appears to be ‘profits.’”).  See, e.g., CFTC v. 
Am. Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242, 1252 (2d Cir. 1986); SEC v. First City Fin. 
Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 301. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d at 79. 
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On remand, the district court, in reconsidering disgorgement, should 
also keep in mind that any reliance on the decision in Am. Bd. of 
Trade, ordering disgorgement in the full amount of the investors’ 
losses, may present a problem in the present case which did not arise 
in Am. Bd. of Trade.  There, the customers’ losses were less than one 
third of the CFTC’s “conservative” analysis of the defendants’ 
profits.  Therefore, the amount of disgorgement measured by 
investor profits did not exceed the amount of unlawful gains.  Here, 
however, according to the appellant’s calculations, the total losses 
may be twenty times or more the amount of Maxwell’s unlawful 
gains.  Moreover, there is no indication in the record of the amount 
of the unlawful gains of the other defendants nor is there any 
indication that the district court considered whether there would be 
difficulty in establishing that amount.  Maxwell argues that 
computing the unjust enrichment is a prerequisite of any 
disgorgement order.  We agree that the district court must hold a 
hearing either to determine the amount of unjust enrichment or to 
establish that that amount cannot be reasonably approximated.302
It was standard practice for the SEC or CFTC to use the victim’s losses 
as a proxy for the defendant’s unjust enrichment in the absence of the 
agency’s ability to reasonably estimate the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment.  In the opinion quoted above, the Third Circuit is only 
saying that the district court erred by allowing the use of the victim’s 
losses before the agency established its inability to measure the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment.  Therefore, the agencies may have been 
entitled to implied jurisdiction but the disgorgement remedy, based on 
losses, better resembles compensating damages and not a remedy in 
equity. 
In a separate case, the Southern District of New York opined that it 
was more appropriate to order only the disgorgement of the defendant’s 
profits, allowing various business expenses, including overhead, to be 
offset: 
While AVCO’s gross sales revenue from the Recurrence program 
was $4,148,572, the evidence at trial indicated that AVCO incurred 
substantial expense to generate the gross sales revenues.  Those 
expenses included large amounts of money in advertising, as well as 
substantial overhead costs for rent, utilities, telephone systems, 
postage, etc.  AVCO’s and Vartuli’s 1993-1997 tax returns indicate 
that combining AVCO’s taxable income with Vartuli’s taxable 
income from AVCO shows that the cumulative profit generated by 
 302. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
92 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF [Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
AVCO over the period was $701,534 . . . . Accordingly, keeping in 
mind that disgorgement is a nonpunitive equitable remedy meant to 
deprive wrongdoers of “ill-gotten gains,” the Court reduces the 
amount of disgorgement for which Vartuli and AVCO are jointly and 
severally liable to $701,534.303
It remains unexplained why the Southern District would go so far in 
allowing offsets for a claim of the CFTC but not for claims by the SEC. 
D. Federal Trade Commission 
“The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as an 
excuse to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of 
relief falls outside that remedies recognized parameters.”304
 
The FTC’s application of implied jurisdiction is unusual for the 
breadth of cases that it reaches.  For example, even though the Federal 
Reserve is considered the governing body for the Truth in Lending Act 
(“TILA”), the FTC is free to enforce those regulations under the FTC 
umbrella.  Perhaps because of this breadth of coverage, the FTC uses a 
wider range of labels for its remedies against unjust enrichment: 
consumer redress, reimbursement, refund, restitution and disgorgement. 
The analysis of FTC disgorgement claims is complicated by the fact 
that the FTC’s statutes include two key applicable provisions that have 
been used to justify claims for disgorgement.  Section 13(b) provides the 
FTC with authority to secure injunctions and therefore relies on the 
district court’s implied jurisdiction for traditional remedies in equity.  
Section 19 authorizes the FTC to make more specific remedial claims, 
including claims based on damages to the victims or customers of the 
defendants.  It appears that the FTC makes claims under Section 13(b) 
more frequently and even for cases that would clearly relate to the 
specific remedial system envisioned in Section 19.305  Peter Ward makes 
 
 303. CFTC v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 20, 1998). 
 304. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71. 
 305. Inexplicably, a number of opinions about the FTC’s claims under Section 13(b) 
are justified in part by citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in FTC v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d 
595 (9th Cir. 1993), which was a case based on jurisdiction under Section 19.  See FTC 
v. Munoz, 17 Fed. App’x 624, 626 (9th Cir. 2001); FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6192, at *38 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2004); FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 
373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 564 (D. Md. 2005); FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. 
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a case that the FTC’s access to the full range of equitable remedies, as 
implied by Section 13(b)’s authority to seek preliminary and permanent 
injunctions, is limited and may be precluded by Section 19, which 
resembles a Congressional remedial structure for the FTC and does not 
include restitution.306  This argument has been litigated and all courts 
have found that specific exculpatory language in Section 19 avoids that 
necessary conclusion.307
Ward points out that claims under Section 13(b) are easier to make 
because, otherwise, Section 19 would require the FTC to complete 
administrative proceedings before initiating civil litigation and provide 
the FTC with larger claims that it would otherwise be able to make 
under Section 19 as a result of that section’s three year statute of 
limitations.  More importantly, Section 19 provides jurisdiction for the 
FTC to seek remedies not otherwise available under the constraints of 
traditional remedies in equity.  Of course, the result has been for the 
FTC to prefer litigation under Section 13(b) than a combination of 
administrative law and litigation under Section 19.  According to a FTC 
statement on its website, most of the FTC’s consumer protection 
enforcement activities are conducted in litigation rather than 
administrative proceedings.308
Preliminary data show that the FTC filed an average of roughly one 
hundred new claims each year from 2001 to 2005 as compared with an 
Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 2000); FTC v. Commonwealth Mktg. Group, Inc., 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 530, 544 (W.D. Pa. 1999) and FTC v. Cyberspace.com, L.L.C., 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25565 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2002). 
 306. Peter C. Ward, Restitution For Consumers Under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 
1139, 1191-92 (1992). 
 307. FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982). 
However, § 19(e) provides: Remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law.  
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission 
under any other provision of law.  Thus, there is no necessary or inescapable 
inference, or, indeed, any inference, that Congress intended to restrict the broad 
equitable jurisdiction apparently granted to the district court by § 13(b). 
Id. 
 308. FTC, Office of the Gen. Counsel, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (2002), 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.htm (last visited December 10, 2006) (“The courts 
have uniformly accepted the Commission’s construction of Section 13(b), with the 
result that most consumer protection enforcement is now conducted directly in court 
under Section 13(b), rather than by means of administrative adjudication.”). 
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average of about fifty between 1990 and 1995.  Total new civil claims 
filed in federal district courts increased 12.8% over the same period.  
Interestingly, the pattern of FTC filings among the various federal 
district courts offer some support for the theory that the FTC may be 
selecting in which district court to file its complaints in a deliberate 
manner  (see the description of the preliminary data in Appendix B). 
FTC cases mainly relate to claims of fraud.309  After liability is 
established, the key issue in such cases is whether the measure of the 
remedy should include any of the defendant’s reasonable product 
expenses and any credit for the asset or use value that the consumer 
gained by using or owning the product.  The FTC strongly urges a court 
to award a refund of the purchase amount without offset or counter-
restitution.  Despite the FTC’s claim that such an approach is the only 
appropriate measure for a claim of unjust enrichment, there is a 
significant body of case law that requires counter-restitution. 
The case law can be sorted into four groups of case circumstances 
and actions of the court that affect this issue: 
(1) The court grants an offset or allows for counter-restitution in 
the amount of the approximate value of the consideration 
received by the plaintiff;310
 309. Under the Act the FTC must establish that a “person, partnership, or 
corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive 
act or practice in or affecting commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). 
 310. See FTC v. Solomon Trading Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19696, at *16-17 (D. 
Ariz. June 28, 1994); FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 572 n.7 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
It was unclear how many customers who actually took trips were dissatisfied with 
their vacations.  The difficulties involved in determining how much relief should be 
given to dissatisfied customers prompted the magistrate to limit the relief to those 
customers who received nothing of value for the price of the vacation passport.  
Customers, satisfied or unsatisfied, who took trips were excluded from the 
computation of relief and that decision is not at issue on this appeal. 
Id.  See also FTC v. Renaissance Fine Arts, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21040 (N.D. Ohio 
Aug. 10, 1995); FTC v. Spectrum Res. Group, Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4077, at *5-
6 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1997); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16137, 
at *65 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 1987). 
Also, the Court determines that the amounts invested by customers who won one or 
more leases through the companies should be deducted from the companies’ liability, 
since these customers realized returns on their investments through assets obtained 
directly through success in the lottery, whether through lease sales or warranty 
payment from the companies. 
Id.  FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991). 
The monetary equivalent of rescission is the difference between the amount paid for 
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(2) The court provides discussion that concludes that the 
consideration received by the plaintiffs was worthless;311
(3) Defendants procedurally default in their obligations to 
produce evidence or to respond to filings made by the FTC 
and the court finds the FTC’s evidence uncontroverted;312
(4) The court makes no finding about the consideration received 
by the plaintiff but orders the defendant to make payment in 
the amount of the payment made by the plaintiff, i.e., a full 
refund.313
The key opinions in the group of cases that fully support the FTC 
position include Febre314 and Gem315 that sometimes are cited alone as 
sufficient justification for calculating disgorgement/restitution as 
customer losses.316  First, it is clear that none of these cases comply with 
the process envisioned in Grupo or Great-West.  No attempt is made to 
determine if the proposed remedies are traditional remedies in equity 
and no attempt is made to determine whether the proposed restitution is 
at law or in equity.  Whether the remedy is labeled as restitution,317 
disgorgement,318 consumer redress,319 refund,320 or reimbursement,321 
the property and its current market value.  To adhere to the model of true rescission, 
where the property is returned on the judgment date, the monetary value of the 
property should be determined as of the judgment date or the date of the disclosure of 
the fraud. 
Id. 
 311. See Amy Travel Service, 875 F.2d at 570. 
 312. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 536 (7th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Silueta Distribs., 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22254, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995). 
 313. See FTC v. Slimamerica, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 1999); FTC 
v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 314. Febre, 128 F.3d 530. 
 315. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 316. FTC v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
Plaintiff presents the declaration of an accountant indicating that refunds, charge 
backs, and returns have been deducted to obtain the disgorgement amount.  The 
amount represents Medicor’s net sales.  Section 13(b) of the FTC Act permits the 
Court to order disgorgement regardless of the amount of the defendant’s profits. 
Id.  See also FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 (D. Md. 2005); FTC v. 
Citigroup Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2001); and FTC v. Bay Area Bus. 
Council, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6192, at *39 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2004). 
 317. FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Ind. 
2000). 
 318. FTC v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 319. FTC v. Atlantex Ass’n., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10911, at *37 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
The purpose of consumer redress is to remedy the monetary injury to consumers.  It is 
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the remedies remain either restitution of revenues, compensating 
damages, or both.  At most, the cases in this area recite that 
disgorgement or restitution is an equitable remedy and fail to look 
beneath the label. 
The court’s opinion in Febre seems to offer very weak precedential 
value because of the circumstances of the case.  The defendants 
defaulted in their obligations to contest the factual claims of the plaintiff, 
resulting in the Court’s per se acceptance of the FTC’s remedy 
calculations.322
One of the most predominate problems with both opinions is that 
that they juxtapose disgorgement of revenues with disgorgement of 
profits.  In both opinions, the circuit courts defend the decision of the 
district court to equate the remedy to the customer payments for all units 
sold, revenue disgorgement, by discussing characteristics of 
disgorgement of profits and cite cases for support of those statements.  
The majority of the cases cited, however, either awarded a measure of 
disgorgement of profits or equitable rescission.  For example, three cases 
are frequently cited as support for a remedy of revenue disgorgement: 
(1) FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 
1316 (8th Cir. 1991).  This case affirmed an award of the 
monetary equivalent of rescission which credited the 
defendant for the approximate value of the coins remaining 
in the possession of the customers.  For a description of the 
remedy, see FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15958, at *46-47 (D. Minn. 1989). 
(2) FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571-72 (7th 
Cir. 1989).  In this case, the court determined that travel 
certificates that had been used would be excluded from the 
remedy calculation323 but that the remaining unused travel 
certifications were worthless.324  These two key points 
an appropriate remedy authorized by this Court’s equitable powers to require the 
individual and corporate Defendants to pay consumer redress in the form of a cash 
refund measured by amounts previously paid less any amounts returned to consumers 
who invested in the oil and gas partnerships or the Teen Disco partnerships. 
Id. 
 320. FTC v. Int’l Diamond Corp., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15504, at *13-14 (N.D. 
Cal. 1983). 
 321. United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 322. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 323. Id. at n.7. 
 324. Id at 570. 
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effectively transform the remedy from restitution to a 
reasonable approximation of the monetary equivalent of 
rescission. 
(3) SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).  As explained in Part V 
infra, the Supreme Court’s opinions in Porter and Mitchell 
are equivocal between supporting a profits or revenue basis 
for restitution or disgorgement.  According to the Seventh 
Circuit, however, Porter holds for profits disgorgement. 
Otherwise, both opinions relay heavily on cases holding for 
disgorgement of profits to justify statements made about disgorgement 
that are presumably meant to imply statements about revenue 
disgorgement.  A minor example includes this interpretation of the 
Seventh Circuit’s position on burden of proof from the Court’s opinion 
in Febre: “The Commission must show that its calculations reasonably 
approximated the amount of customers’ net losses, and then the burden 
shifts to the defendants to show that those figures were inaccurate.”325  
Both of the cases cited relate to disgorgement of profits and both state 
that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the defendants’ profits.  
Then, the burden shifts to the defendants.  The burden of proving the 
defendant’s profits is based on the requirement that the plaintiff must 
specifically identify the sales of the defendant that generates unjust 
profits, but that since the defendant has the best access to its own 
accounting records, the defendant carries the burden of proof for 
establishing legitimate expenses or adjustments to the plaintiff’s claim.  
This scheme does not operate in reverse, as the defendant has no access 
to information regarding the plaintiff’s losses. 
The Eleventh Circuit also justifies disgorgement of revenues with 
cites from cases that hold for disgorgement of profits: 
Accordingly, disgorgement, the purpose of which “is not to 
compensate the victims of fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his 
ill-gotten gain” is appropriate. SEC v. Blatt;326 see, e.g., SEC v. First 
 325. Id. at 535 (citing SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1996); HUD v. Cost 
Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
 326. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing SEC v. 
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
The trial court acted properly within its equitable powers in ordering Pullman to 
disgorge the profits that he obtained by fraud.  This restitution merely forces the 
defendant to give up to the trustee the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.  
The purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate the victims of the fraud, but to 
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City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (permitting 
disgorgement and observing that “disgorgement is an equitable 
remedy designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment 
and to deter others from violating the securities laws”)327; CFTC v. 
Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(permitting disgorgement and recognizing its deterrent effect).328  
We conclude that section 13(b) permits a district court to order a 
defendant to disgorge illegally obtained funds.329
Inexplicably, each of the three cases cited by the Eleventh Circuit 
held for disgorgement of profits and most of the three cases could well 
be said to oppose disgorgement of an amount greater than profits as 
punitive.  Footnotes with extended quotes from those cases cited are 
provided for individual review. 
The Seventh Circuit’s cite to Rowe v. Maremont in Febre is 
similarly inapposite: “This court has held that disgorgement is designed 
to be remedial and not punitive.”330  Febre’s cite to CFTC v. Hunt is 
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) 
 327. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
Since disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may 
exercise its equitable power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing.  
The remedy may well be a key to the SEC’s efforts to deter others from violating the 
securities laws, but disgorgement may not be used punitively.  Therefore, the SEC 
generally must distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 328. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982). 
We have not previously considered the propriety of ancillary relief under section 6c of 
the Act; The Commodity Exchange Act contains no provision similar to section 27 of 
the Securities Exchange Act, but neither does it have any provision restricting the 
equitable power of the district court.  Porter and Mitchell Indicate that the latter fact is 
a sufficient basis for concluding that a district court possesses the authority to order 
restitution pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act.  Further, as the Second Circuit 
noted in the Securities Exchange Act context, to allow a violator to retain the profits 
from his violations would frustrate the purposes of the regulatory scheme.  Thus we 
conclude that a district court may compel a violator of regulations promulgated under 
the trading limit provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act to disgorge his illegally 
obtained profits. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 329. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 466 (11th Cir. 1996).  
 330. Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1241 (7th Cir. 1988).  
Deterrence is an important consideration in allowing disgorgement, but disgorgement 
is remedial and not punitive.  To make Maremont pay back profits that it would have 
made even if it told the truth is harsh and punitive.  Equity requires only that a 
defendant give up its unjust enrichment.  The district court did not err in rejecting full 
disgorgement as a measure of damages. 
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also irrelevant: “Disgorgement does not penalize, but merely deprives 
wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains.”331
In addition to the problematic research, this opinion hides behind a 
label.  Neither case cited, however, discussed or awarded disgorgement 
of revenue so that the court’s comment is, at best, irrelevant.  Given the 
substance of the case opinions, they appear inapposite. 
But there are more serious errors in both Febre and Gem.  As is true 
of most opinions in this area of the law, both opinions take great pains to 
explain the extensive and seemingly unbounded nature of the district 
court’s authority to formulate remedies.  In support for its assertion of 
authority to formulate remedies, the Eleventh Circuit cites FTC v. Amy 
Travel Service, Inc.;332 FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc;333 and FTC v. 
Southwest Sunsites, Inc.,334 all of which discuss the authority of a district 
court’s jurisdiction within the limits of traditional remedies in equity.  
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 331. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997). 
Disgorgement of illegally obtained profits has been ordered in a number of Securities 
Exchange Commission judicial enforcement proceedings.  In these cases, 
disgorgement was ordered despite the fact that there was no specific, express authority 
for this remedy in the Securities Exchange Act.  Further, the Second Circuit in these 
cases explicitly rejected the objection that disgorgement is a penalizing rather than a 
remedial, equitable device, correctly reasoning that disgorgement does not penalize, 
but merely deprives wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains. 
Id. (citing CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1222 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
 332. FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1989). 
In Singer, the Ninth Circuit found that because section 13(b) gives a court authority to 
grant a permanent injunction, the statute by implication gives authority “to grant any 
ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice because it did not limit that 
traditional equitable power explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference.” 
Id. (quoting FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 333. Singer, 668 F.2d at 1112-13. 
We hold that Congress, when it gave the district court authority to grant a permanent 
injunction against violations of any provisions of law enforced by the Commission, 
also gave the district court authority to grant any ancillary relief necessary to 
accomplish complete justice because it did not limit that traditional equitable power 
explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference.  In particular, Congress thereby 
gave the district court power to order rescission of contracts.  Hence § 13(b) provides 
a basis for an order freezing assets. 
Id. 
 334. FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
456 U.S. 973 (1982) (“Section 13(b) permits courts to exercise full range of traditional 
equitable remedies.  Specifically, we held that a district court may order preliminary 
relief, including an asset freeze, that may be needed to make permanent relief 
possible.”). 
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Then, the opinion fails to show how the proposed remedy in Gem 
complies with this boundary.  Both opinions rely heavily on Porter for 
the often-repeated notion that the district court is allowed to pursue any 
remedy or the full range of remedies to provide complete relief.  In light 
of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Cherif, the court in Febre is 
ignoring a contradictory interpretation: 
Language about the importance of granting complete equitable relief, 
however, must be read in context.  Usually the language advocates 
that all equitable powers residing in the district court be visited upon 
the defendant or violator before the court . . . . Porter, cited by the 
SEC . . . is not dissimilar.  Porter involves a statutory provision in 
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 similar to the remedies 
provision in the Exchange Act.  The Supreme Court wrote broadly 
about the equitable power residing in a district court adjudicating an 
action brought under the Emergency Price Control Act, but it held 
only that disgorgement of illegally obtained profits could be sought 
from a violator.335
Both opinions state that remedies under Section 13(b) are not 
precluded from including elements of punitive or exemplary damages: 
Figgie involved a different statutory provision, Section 19(b) of the 
FTCA, which expressly precluded an award of exemplary or punitive 
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).  In contrast, Section 13(b) has no such 
limitation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45.  Febre’s and Ace’s reliance on 
Figgie is misplaced.336
Even before the opinions in Grupo and Great-West were decided, the 
majority position held that implied jurisdiction must not award remedies 
that include punitive or exemplary damages.337  This basic difference in 
perspective on remedies could easily explain why these opinions support 
revenue disgorgement as opposed to profits disgorgement.  If the two 
opinions applied the position that restitution in excess of the defendant’s 
profits is impermissibly punitive, they would need to withdraw their 
support for the restitution of revenues. 
The Febre opinion makes two other inexplicable statements.  First, 
 335. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 
(1992) (quoting Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1779, n.10 (1976)). 
 336. Febre, 128 F.3d at 537; FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469-70 (11th 
Cir. 1996). 
 337. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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the opinion challenges the defendants’ assertion that profits are the usual 
measure of disgorgement.  Second, the opinion decries the defendants’ 
failure to provide an explanation or support for this statement.  
Hopefully, Judge Bauer is not serious in this assertion.  He cites seven 
cases in his opinion that hold for disgorgement of profits,338 including 
CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp.,339 which held that profits, not 
proceeds, are the majority position for disgorgement.  Discussing the 
appropriateness of eventually disgorging some or all of the remedy to 
the U.S. Treasury, Judge Bauer asserted that “disgorgement to the 
United States Treasury does not transform compensatory damages into 
punitive damages.”340  It seems fair to infer that the remedy in Febre is 
viewed as compensating damages.  Indeed, the single biggest objection 
to the use of customer losses is that it would transform disgorgement 
into a proxy for compensating damages that is not a traditional remedy 
in equity. 
These last points emphasize the issue of how far the clean-up 
doctrine has been stretched to accommodate remedies at law as ancillary 
to injunctive relief for the purposes of qualifying the claim for implied 
jurisdiction.  This doctrine demands that a court that contemplates 
ancillary jurisdiction evaluate the remedy as a whole especially in terms 
of the total dollar amount of the remedy sought and the relative 
importance of the injunctive relief.  Second, the remedy must comply 
with traditional forms of relief in equity.  Opinions like Febre are at 
odds with relief in equity because, as its advocates have openly 
acknowledged, a remedy measured by gross customer expenditures, 
without any offsets or counter-restitution, can be described as any or all 
of the following: 
(1) Is designed to include punitive or exemplary damages; 
(2) Closely resembles compensating damages; 
(3) Cannot be deemed similar to any other comparable remedies 
except for  those awarded to the FTC or FDA. 
F. Food and Drug Administration 
The FDA has big plans for implied jurisdiction.  The FDA intends 
to continue to make claims for restitution against defendants that offer 
 
 338. Febre, 128 F.3d at 536. 
 339. 991 F.2d 71, 77 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
 340. Id. 
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unapproved products as well as seek claims against established 
pharmaceutical companies for “significant violations of current good 
manufacturing practice (“CGMP”) requirements.”341  Given the approval 
that many others have received for their similar claims for implied 
jurisdiction, the FDA’s claims for unapproved products are not 
surprising, but claims and substantial consent decrees (Abbott, $100 
million; Wyeth, $30 million; Schering-Plough, $500 million),342 for 
violation of CGMP seems to advance the application of claims in 
restitution to administrative law to a more ‘intense’ level. 
 
Claims for Unapproved Products 
 
The FDA’s basic claim against Universal Management Services, 
Inc. was: 
As part of their business, Defendants sell and distribute a product 
known as the Stimulator, and also a product that connects to the 
Stimulator known as the Xtender.  The Stimulator is essentially a 
piezo-electric gas grill igniter, marketed as a pain relieving device.  
To produce the Stimulator, Defendants purchase gas grill igniters 
and outfit them with finger grips.  A user then places the tip of the 
Stimulator on his body, presses with his thumb on a plunger, and an 
electric current passes into that part of the body.343
The device was not approved for medical use by the FDA and the 
defendants sold 800,000 units at a retail price of $88.30, while the cost 
of buying the grill igniters was about $1 per unit.344
The district court measured the remedy as total consumer purchases 
less any refunds.  No credit for the value of the device or its use was 
 341. Eric M. Blumberg, Restitution and Disgorgement Find Another Home at the 
Food and Drug Administration, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 170 (2003).  Mr. Blumberg 
offers the following justification of a claim for the violation of CGMP: 
21 U.S.C. §§ 351(a)(2)(B) and 351(h) provide, respectively, that drugs and medical 
devices that have not been manufactured in accordance with CGMP are “deemed” 
adulterated.  To establish a violation of these provisions, FDA need not show that a 
product is in fact deleterious in any respect.  The failure to follow appropriate 
procedures causes the product to be adulterated. 
Id. at n.12 (internal citations omitted). 
 342. Id. at 170. 
 343. United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 974, 976 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997). 
 344. United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
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discussed.  Instead, the court was trying to decide between awarding 
disgorgement and restitution: 
While numerous district courts have ordered the equitable remedy of 
disgorgement in a variety of FTC cases, neither the parties nor the 
court could find an FDA case where disgorgement of profits was 
ordered.  While the lack of previous use of the equitable remedy of 
disgorgement of profits in FDA cases is not necessarily fatal to 
Plaintiff’s request for such a remedy, such non-utilization does cast 
some doubt on the appropriateness of disgorgement in this matter.  
While the court will not order disgorgement of profits in this case, 
the court does find that restitution is both available and appropriate.  
Such remedy will ensure that the public interest is protected by 
providing each person who purchased Defendants’ adulterated 
product the opportunity to receive his money back.345
The district court appears to conclude that either disgorgement of profits 
or restitution of revenues could be an appropriate remedy, but it fails to 
explain why it chose restitution of revenues over disgorgement of 
profits.  In searching for controlling or persuasive precedent, the court 
limits its research regarding ‘disgorgement of profits’ to FDA cases yet 
the court’s precedents for restitution of revenues relies on cases relating 
to the FTC and other agencies.  The large body of cases on traditional 
remedies in equity also remains overlooked. 
On the basis of a quote from Gem346 that refers to Porter, the 
district court ‘borrows’ its key supposition: “As Porter makes clear, 
absent a clear command to the contrary, the district court’s equitable 
powers are extensive.  Among the equitable powers of a court is the 
power to grant restitution and disgorgement.”347  And after confirming 
that the FDCA includes no restrictive language on remedies, the district 
court arrives at its opinion: 
The court is convinced that not only is ordering restitution within its 
power in this matter, but that such remedy is appropriate.  Such a 
remedy will send a message to both Defendants and others engaged 
in similar behavior that if they violate the law, they will not be able 
to keep the proceeds from such illicit activity, but instead will have 
to refund all customers the purchase price of the adulterated 
 345. Universal Mgmt., 999 F. Supp. at 980. 
 346. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 347. Universal Mgmt., 999 F. Supp. at 981 (internal citations omitted). 
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goods.348
The court decided that its overriding purpose is to protect the public 
health and chose a harsh remedy to send a deterring message to all 
would-be infringers of the FDCA. 
The court seems carried away with its ‘authority’ at the expense of 
its responsibility to act within its jurisdiction in equity.  The court does 
not explain how disgorgement and restitution differ or how a refund of 
retail revenues conforms to traditional remedies in equity.  Of the five 
relevant cases cited, only the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Gem awards 
revenue disgorgement, the remaining award profit disgorgement or 
rescission. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit confirmed the demise of a prior 
holding from the Ninth Circuit,349 which held that the FDA did not have 
the jurisdiction for equitable monetary remedies since the FDCA did not 
specifically authorize such remedies.350  The Sixth Circuit rejected the 
Ninth Circuit opinion, i.e., that a district court is free to award remedies 
unless they are precluded by specific language in the applicable statute. 
The Sixth Circuit then tacitly acknowledged that implied 
jurisdiction is limited in part to the traditional forms of equitable relief: 
Moreover, even accepting the references to legislative concerns 
relied upon by the Parkinson and C.E.B. Products line, these 
concerns are far from a clear statement of Congress’s intent to 
exclude restitution, recalls, disgorgement, or any other traditional 
form of equitable relief.  Finally, as DeMario instructs, we must 
presume that Congress is cognizant of the scope of equity, knows 
what it is doing when it provides for general equitable relief in a 
regulatory statute, and can use that knowledge to clearly and 
explicitly limit the scope of a court’s equitable powers under any 
particular regulatory structure in which such an authorization lies.351
Unfortunately, however, the opinion then fails to define what it 
means by restitution, recalls, or disgorgement or how those three 
remedies compare to traditional remedies in equity. 
Given that the district court chose the remedy of restitution 
 348. Id. 
 349. United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956). 
 350. United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 761 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
 351. Id. at 762 (referencing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 292 
(1960)). 
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(although that opinion also failed to define the term) the Sixth Circuit 
defends the district court’s choice: 
To circumvent the law by marketing illegally without approval is to 
deceive the public both as purchasers and users of the device.  In 
such cases, restitution exists to make the consumer whole.  Because 
restitution seeks to remedy the type of economic harm to consumers 
contemplated by the FDCA, it serves goals of the FDCA that are 
encompassed within the section the FDA charges Appellants 
violated.352
Apparently relying on criminal restitution, the court emphasizes that 
restitution exists to make the consumer whole.  Such a remedy is 
therefore based on compensating damages and does not resemble a 
remedy in equity. 
The Sixth Circuit responds to the defendants’ charge that the 
remedy was inappropriately punitive with quotes and cites for the 
proposition that restitution by definition is not punitive and falls into the 
‘label’ trap decried by the Supreme Court in Great-West.  The Circuit 
Court is no more successful at responding to the second charge of the 
defendants: 
Appellants also claim that restitution is punitive because, unlike 
disgorgement which removes ill-gotten gain by forcing surrender of 
profits, restitution requires a return of the entire purchase price, 
included in which are costs and profits. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. 
Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The purpose of 
disgorgement is not to compensate the victims of the fraud, but to 
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain.”).  See also Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d 
Cir. 1978).  Simply because disgorgement and restitution are 
different, however, does not make restitution punitive.  See SEC v. 
World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742 
F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) (“While disgorgement has been said to 
serve more important interests than the compensation of investors, 
that principle is a far cry from the proposition that restitution is an 
improper end.” (internal citation omitted)).  Appellants, who 
disobeyed the law, should not have his expenses covered by 
consumers.  To say that restitution is unavailable is to say that 
consumers must cover the costs of Appellants’ production, 
advertising, and illegal distribution.  Instead, the district court should 
have the discretion in a case such as this to make the consumers 
 352. Id. at 763 (internal citations omitted). 
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whole rather than allow the illegal activities to stand uncorrected to 
the consumer’s detriment.353
By now, the cases cited in the Court’s defense should be easily 
recognized as well as it is easy to recognize that the three cases are 
either irrelevant or inapposite.  It is also difficult to reconcile the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion with a prior opinion in SEC v. Blavin wherein it 
measured an SEC claim for disgorgement in terms of profits, not 
revenue.354
However, the Court has arrived at the true problem in the case: the 
remedy of disgorgement/restitution is not well suited to these particular 
case facts.  The remedy of equitable rescission could have achieved the 
aims of the FDA and it would have provided the defendants an 
opportunity to establish the use value of their device.  The Court could 
have ordered the plaintiff and defendants to return each other’s 
consideration.  In the absence of the customers’ ability to return the 
igniter, the Court could hear testimony as to either the value of the 
igniter, its use value, or both.  Note also that the use of equitable 
rescission would preclude the need for the clean-up doctrine. 
The key problem in these two cases may lie with the two courts’ 
sympathy or willingness to assist the agencies in carrying out their 
responsibilities.  The courts were sitting as courts in equity; otherwise 
the courts would have had no subject jurisdiction.  The basic relevance 
of regulatory statutes is to assist the court in deciding if the defendants’ 
enrichment has been unjust.  When the regulatory and administrative 
law issues are thus reduced to their proper proportion, the courts would 
be free to realize that they are sitting in equity just as they would for any 
other agency claim, most fiduciary or trust claims and closely 
approximating how they sit for most issues of misused or 
misappropriated intellectual property.  Equally important is the 
realization that the relevant statutes cannot add to the possible remedies 
or increase the court’s authority or implied jurisdiction; the statutes can 
only reduce that authority and jurisdiction.  If a court proposes to use a 
‘consumer redress’ remedy that seizes the defendant’s assets or recalls 
the defendant’s products, the court needs to show that comparable 
remedies were awarded in English courts in equity in 1790. 
The defendants in Lane Labs-USA, Inc. are alleged to have acted as 
unjustly as those in Universal.  The FDA alleges that the defendants and 
 353. Id. at 764. 
 354. SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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their company produced health products, including BeneFin, a powder 
that contains shark cartilage that the company marketed and advertised 
as helpful to the cure of medical disorders including cancer. 
Fairly early in the opinion, the Third Circuit applies Porter and 
Mitchell to defeat the defendants’ objection to restitution as a remedy.  
Of course, neither Porter nor Mitchell specifically addressed the remedy 
of revenue disgorgement which is what the Third Circuit refers to as 
“restitution.”  Then the Circuit compounds its semantic confusion by 
citing to the usual collection of cases that affirm profit disgorgement as 
an appropriate remedy. 
See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(finding disgorgement to be appropriate under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and Porter); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 281 U.S. 
App. D.C. 410, 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying on 
Porter to award disgorgement under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. 
Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982) (permitting 
disgorgement under the Commodity Exchange Act); Interstate 
Commerce Comm’n v. B&T Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 
(1st Cir. 1980) (applying Porter and Mitchell to permit restitution 
under the Motor Carrier Act); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that Porter 
authorized disgorgement under the Commodity Exchange Act).355
Regrettably, most of the opinion is spent in response to the 
defendants’ irrelevant arguments.  Clearly, the defendants were trying to 
win the whole case by establishing that the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to award a remedy of restitution.  The defendants first 
argued that restitution “does not further the purpose of the FDCA.”  This 
argument missed its own point that restitution of revenue was 
inappropriate, but restitution of profits was not.  The Third Circuit’s 
response also reveals the close relationship between reimbursement and 
compensating damages: 
Restitution that reimburses consumers who paid for unapproved 
drugs, and may have been defrauded or deceived about their 
effectiveness, restores aggrieved parties to the same economic 
position they enjoyed before the Act was violated.356
 355. United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 356. Id. at 229. 
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Thereafter, the Court wastes its time and the Defendants waste their 
credibility by debating the relevance of Meghrig v. KFC Western, 
Inc.,357 and United States v. Phillip Morris,358 both of which held that 
the relevant claim was not included in implied jurisdiction.  RCRA and 
RICO, the underlying statutory schemes, may be subject to debate but 
the implied jurisdiction of the principal regulatory agencies was settled 
in the SEC and CFTC cases more than ten years ago. 
Eventually, the Third Circuit tries to return to the key issue: 
Also, we view amicus and the commentators as making a 
fundamental error in analyzing whether restitution is available: they 
view this primarily as a question of what remedies are provided by 
the FDCA rather than, as we have emphasized, a question of the 
scope of the express legislative grant of equitable power under 
§ 332(a).  The District Court did not “discover” an implied remedy, 
but rather exercised the equitable power that Congress explicitly 
granted to it under the FDCA.359
The Court hopes to seal the opinion with what is now the classic finish 
for most such opinions that overstates implied jurisdiction: “When 
Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions 
contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted 
cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in 
light of the statutory purposes.”360
The Seventh Circuit (Posner, J.) disputed this interpretation of 
Mitchell in its opinion in SEC v. Cherif,361 relating to the issue of relief 
or nominal defendants.  In response to the SEC’s claims that jurisdiction 
over a non-party to the litigation was “necessary and appropriate 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) because Sanchou’s participation will 
enable the court to grant complete relief,” the opinion states: 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d) and (e) also cannot aid the SEC since the statute 
is not so broadly written as the SEC contends.  The statute has been 
construed to allow the granting of “any form of ancillary relief . . . 
where necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes of the 
statutory scheme.” Language about the importance of granting 
 357. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, (1996). 
 358. United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 359. Lane Labs, 427 F.3d at 235. 
 360. Id. at 235-36 (citing Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 
291-92 (1960)). 
 361. 933 F.2d 403, 414 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992). 
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complete equitable relief, however, must be read in context.  Usually 
the language advocates that all equitable powers residing in the 
district court be visited upon the defendant or violator before the 
court.362
Apparently, in contemplation of a victory lap, the Third Circuit 
opinion then makes a major mistake in the sign off: 
The arguments and analysis of Appellants and the commentators are 
creative and forceful, but, for now, are merely arguments as to why 
the Supreme Court should draw finer lines around a court’s authority 
to fashion specific remedies within a broad statutory grant of 
equitable power.  Until the Court overrules Porter and Mitchell, we 
are bound by the reasoning of those cases.  Given the breadth and 
open-ended nature of § 332(a), and the direct correlation between the 
language of that provision and the directives in Porter and Mitchell, 
we hold that the District Court here did have the power to grant 
restitution.  We will therefore AFFIRM its order.363
Even though this case was argued in June of 2005 and even though 
the opinion makes reference to the Great-West opinion,364 the opinion 
closes with a suggestion for the Supreme Court to provide some finer 
guidelines for the fashioning of remedies in implied jurisdiction.  Yet the 
Third Circuit fails to follow the guidelines in Great-West: it fails to 
show how the remedy in question resembles a traditional remedy in 
equity, it fails to meaningfully distinguish restitution in equity from 
restitution at law, and it fails to suggest how the clean-up doctrine can 
accommodate such a blatant remedy at law (by definition, remedies 
based on the plaintiffs’ loss cannot be remedies in equity except in the 
case of specific restitution which includes identifiable assets and money 
in separated accounts). 
It is also regrettable that the defendants did not ask the Third 
Circuit how it would propose to reconcile its holding in Lane Labs with 
Am. Metal Exch. Corp.365  In the latter opinion, the Third Circuit held 
that: “Appellant argues that the measure of disgorgement should be 
 362. Id. at 413. (internal citations omitted). 
 363. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 403 (1946). 
 364. Lane Labs, 427 F.3d at 231 (“Restitution is properly sought in equity where 
money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could 
clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.” (quoting 
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)). 
 365. CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168 (D.N.J. 1988). 
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unlawful ‘profits.’  Appellees argue that the measure should be unlawful 
‘proceeds.’ The term most frequently used in reported decisions appears 
to be ‘profits.’”366  The Circuit’s earlier opinion holds that customer 
losses are not a standard measure for disgorgement and that they can 
only be used in case it is especially difficult for the plaintiffs to prove 
the defendants’ profits: 
On the other hand, an award of  damages in the amount of investor 
losses may go beyond the scope of a Commodity Exchange Act 
enforcement proceeding.  Absent a hearing to calculate ill gotten 
gains, the disgorgement ordered in an amount equal to investor 
losses could be a penalty assessment.  If investors wish to seek 
recovery of their losses as a remedy, they are free to do so in an 
independent civil action against defendants.  The hardship of 
investor losses should not, however, be used as an excuse to impose 
a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls 
outside that remedy’s recognized parameters.367
All courts need to be held accountable for the fact that their 
opinions in one area of implied jurisdiction are applied to most other 
areas, including non-agency cases relating to remedies in equity.  Until 
then, the case law among the agencies and between implied jurisdiction 
and other areas of remedies in equity will not approach a minimum level 
of consistency. 
The Third Circuit opinion in Amer. Metal Exch. makes it clear that 
a remedy in equity cannot be justified by the need to the agency to grant 
complete relief or even to execute its responsibilities.  This sort of 
jurisdiction by necessity is based on consumer hardship or the court’s 
perception that it needs to assist the agency.  The courts can’t add 
remedies that Congress omitted or remedies incompatible with 
traditional remedies in equity.368
 
Claims for Violation of CGMP 
 
In his article, Blumberg, Deputy Chief Counsel for Litigation of the 
 366. CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 367. Id. at 79. 
 368. Id. at 78 (“The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as 
an excuse to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls 
outside that remedy’s recognized parameters.”). 
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U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)369 informally alludes to 
some strained views of how the FDA may assert its claims for CGMP.  
Most importantly, these views run roughshod over the causation 
standards in litigating claims for restitution.  Seemingly, Blumberg 
agrees with the view that the violation of CGMP is somewhat vague and 
that the calculation of the defendant’s benefit might be difficult, stating 
that “the courts have not been reluctant to order equitable monetary 
awards merely because calculations are extremely difficult” and that a 
“manufacturer that violates the law should not be entitled to any profits 
on illegal products.”370  Eventually, Blumberg suggests that the 
defendant must bear the initial burden of proof when the claim is vague 
and the benefit difficult to prove, stating “[i]f King and Walsh are 
correct and the profits are in fact ‘impossible to quantify’ in CGMP 
cases,371 the companies must bear the risk of imprecision and may well 
be required to forfeit the gross proceeds derived from the sale of 
unlawful, adulterated products.”372
It is clear that if a defendant fails to cooperate in the discovery 
process or, once the plaintiff has established the defendant’s relevant 
revenues, fails to substantiate his claims for offsets, the defendant may 
suffer consequences including, in an extreme case, an order to disgorge 
the applicable revenues.373  At the other extreme lies equitable 
discretion, which holds that not every violation of a statute warrants 
restitution of the defendant’s profits.374  Furthermore, some courts are 
 369. See Blumberg, supra note 341.  In his article, Mr. Blumberg states that the 
article does not represent the views of the FDA.  While there is no reason to doubt his 
assertion, in the absence of a FDA approved position paper, Mr. Blumberg’s article is 
being used as a statement of the FDA on litigating claims for GCMP. 
 370. See Blumberg, supra note 341, at 188. 
 371. Erika King and Elizabeth M. Walsh, The Authority of a Court to Order 
Disgorgement for Violations of the Current Good Manufacturing Practices 
Requirement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 
154 (2003). 
 372. Id. at n.195; see also FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1997). (stating 
that “lawful gains cannot be distinguished from the unlawful without incurring 
inordinate expense, it is well within the district court’s power to rule that the 
measurement of disgorgement will be the more readily measurable amount of losses 
incurred by the defendants’ customers in the unlawful transactions”) (quoting Am. 
Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d at 77 (emphasis added)). 
 373. See supra Part VI, discussion of Category II cases. 
 374. CFTC v. Sidoti, 178 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 1999). 
The CFTC contends Sidoti’s failure to register as a principal of Trinity provides the 
nexus for deeming illegal all profits received by him in connection with Trinity.  
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beginning to demand that the plaintiff show some effort to establish only 
the defendant’s relevant revenues.375
Within the spectrum of claims for restitution, there are a number of 
types of claims that do not generally warrant the full remedy of 
restitution which has resulted in the use of alternative remedies such as 
awarding the defendant’s use value or savings as an attempt to recognize 
that it would be inequitable to award full restitution but that the nature of 
the claim does warrant some measure of benefit.376
Finally, Blumberg and the FDA appear to believe that the only 
appropriate remedy is the restitution or disgorgement of revenues.  In 
relation to the FDA’s claims against unapproved products, especially 
fraudulent or non-functional products, the remedy of revenue 
disgorgement would be approximately realized by a claim for equitable 
rescission.  After proving that the unapproved product had no use or 
asset value to the consumer, the net effect of a claim for the plaintiffs 
would be revenue disgorgement.  Violations of CGMP, however, would 
not appear to warrant the rescission model.  A defendant might be able 
to show that such a claim is unrelated to the defendant’s profits and the 
proceeds of the claim would be paid only to the U.S. Treasury.  
Therefore, such a claim best resembles an administrative fine or penalty, 
which is contrary to the nature of a claim in equity. 
G. Fair Housing Act 
While the Fair Housing Act is not included in the range of statutory 
schemes covered by this article, a claim for restitution under the Fair 
Housing Act provides an example of how far the remedy has been 
 
Sidoti asserts the district court should not have ordered disgorgement from him at all 
because his failure to register as a principal, by itself, does not justify disgorgement.  
We agree. 
Id. 
 375. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983). 
It was not enough to show Meirick’s gross revenues from the sale of everything he 
sold, which is all, really, that Taylor did.  If General Motors were to steal your 
copyright and put it in a sales brochure, you could not just put a copy of General 
Motors’ corporate income tax return in the record and rest your case for an award of 
infringer’s profits. 
Id. 
 376. See Tlighman v. Proctor, 146 S. Ct. 894, 899 (1888); Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced 
Systems, Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1985); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 
652, 654 (Wash. 1946). 
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applied.377  The government’s motion for summary judgment was 
denied378 and there have been no further opinions filed.  The case relates 
to a federal subsidized housing project to provide special housing 
opportunities for an ethnically mixed group of applicants.  The 
government alleged that most or all of the housing was provided to 
white residents, breaching the agreement between the project and the 
government, and betraying the project’s fiduciary duty to the 
government: 
In proposing its constructive trust theory, the government argues 
that federally funded homes that should have been awarded on first 
come first served basis to a mix of applicants that included blacks, 
Hispanics and whites were instead diverted to the pre-selected white 
purchasers.  Accordingly, a constructive trust should be imposed on 
these homes, which the government proposes to provide to minority 
families, as part of the Fair Housing Act remedy in Village.379  No proof 
of wrongdoing is necessary.  An innocent party may be unjustly 
enriched if he holds “property ‘under circumstances that in equity and 
good conscience he ought not to retain . . . .’”380
On the basis of equitable remedies implied merely by the absence 
of Congressional expressed opposition to such remedies, the government 
is claiming the right to take away the houses from the residents whether 
or not those residents were knowing co-conspirators of the developers or 
other parties responsible for the housing project.  The allegations recite a 
terrible injustice being conducted by the housing project and the legal 
concepts mesh as they have been laid out, but the concept seems 
extreme and harsh for the unknowing homeowners. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
“Most generalizations about restitution are trustworthy only so 
long as they are not very meaningful and meaningful only so long as 
they are not very trustworthy.”381
 
 377. United States v. Village of Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id.  See also United States v. Nagelberg, 772 F. Supp. 120, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991) (quoting United States v. Rivieccio, 661 F. Supp. 281, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 380. Island Park, 888 F. Supp. at 455-56 (quoting Nagelberg, 772 F. Supp. at 123 
(quoting Rivieccio, 661 F. Supp. at 292)). 
 381. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1 (2d ED. 1993). 
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Why do federal agencies win revenue disgorgement and other 
remedies based on uniquely favorable measures?  Under implied 
jurisdiction, an agency is entitled only to traditional equitable remedies, 
the same as any other plaintiff in traditional jurisdiction in equity.  
Federal statute may provide separate jurisdiction apart from implied 
jurisdiction, but the statute can only restrict the full implied jurisdiction, 
such as in the Great-West’s holding that ERISA claims are restricted by 
specific statutory language.  Any special need of the agency for non-
traditional remedies are irrelevant under implied jurisdiction, as an 
agency’s needs cannot enlarge a court’s jurisdiction. 
The agencies’ right to revenue disgorgement must therefore rest on 
the fact that the remedy conforms to traditional remedies in equity or on 
the application of the clean-up doctrine.  Revenue disgorgement is not a 
traditional remedy—federal and state case law, authoritative 
commentaries and the Restatement of Restitution support only specific 
restoration or profit restitution for this type of claim.  Depending on the 
facts and circumstances of the case, the clean-up doctrine may allow for 
the occasional award of an ancillary remedy at law.  The applicability of 
the clean-up doctrine, however, needs to include a consideration of 
factors generally overlooked, including personal liability, the punitive 
nature of the remedy and the availability of alternative remedies at law. 
A remaining concern is why it has been so easy for the agencies to 
convince a significant segment of the legal community that the remedy 
of revenue disgorgement should be awarded.  Authorities on restitution, 
such as Professors Dobbs, Laycock and Kull, among others, have 
published warnings for years that the discipline of restitution needs more 
attention from the legal community.  In particular, Kull has warned that 
in the absence of this needed attention, the discipline could devolve from 
a ‘peninsula’ of doctrine into an archipelago of isolated islands of 
specific issues or claims.382
The success of the agencies’ claims and their ability to distort the 
nature of traditional equitable remedies suggests an alternative downside 
 382. Kull, supra note 4 at 1196. 
No legal topic can long survive this degree of professional neglect.  Unless the means 
are found to revive it, restitution in this country may effectively revert to its pre-
Restatement status, in which problems of unjust enrichment were treated in isolation, 
classified only by transactional or remedial setting: Mistake, Indemnity, Trustees, 
Subrogation.  The loss to American law, measured in terms of its ability to yield 
coherent and reasoned adjudication, has already been very great, and the outlook is 
not encouraging. 
Id. 
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scenario.  Without the willingness of the legal community to engage in 
the process suggested by Dobbs383 (to address each form of restitution 
separately) and later prescribed by the Supreme Court in Great-West,  
the agencies will continue to select bits and pieces of the law in equity 
and combine them with incompatible ‘pieces’ from the common law and 
even administrative rulings. 
Absent substantial effort to carefully examine the shaky 
foundations of the agencies’ claims for revenues, it seems inevitable that 
plaintiffs with claims in other areas of substantive law will cite the 
agency case law to justify larger monetary remedies in equity.  Case 
opinions from the Third Circuit in Lane Labs, the Fifth Circuit in United 
Energy Partners, Inc., the Seventh Circuit in Febre, the Eleventh Circuit 
in Gem Merchandising and the D.C. federal district court in Capital City 
Mortgage, among others, could provide substantial precedent for a wide 
range of remedies that do not resemble traditional equitable remedies.  
Absent the willingness of trial courts to improve their overall 
understanding of the law in equity and to reject labels in favor of 
analysis, only the Supreme Court remains to challenge this progression. 
 383. See Dobbs, supra note 381, at § 4.1 (“So restitution today is a general term for 
diverse kinds of recoveries aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of the defendant and 
measured by the defendant’s gains, but it has many specific forms, each of which must 
be addressed separately.”). 
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APPENDIX A: FEDERAL VERSUS STATE OPINIONS REGARDING DEFENDANT 
PROFITS 
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED DATA ON FTC VENUE STATISTICS 
While the preliminary data does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the FTC has engaged in forum shopping, the data does 
suggest some non-random factor may have a significant influence on the 
FTC’s choice of venue.  Two sets of data were generated and compared 
for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 through 2005: FTC filings by district 
and all new claims filed in each district court.  First, the absolute 
numbers show that the FTC filings have increased more rapidly than the 
group of all civil claims in federal district court. 
 
TABLE 1 
NEW FTC AND ALL OTHER CLAIMS FILED IN ALL DISTRICT COURTS 
 
New 
Filings 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
FTC 43 55 123 106 117 103 94 87 
All  
District 
Courts 112,317 129,224 130,805 126,410 147,155 128,319 155,077 132,204 
 
Each district’s share of FTC filings was then compared with the 
share of all new civil claims filed in that district.  The ten district courts 
with the largest average shares for the last five years were California 
(central district); Florida (southern district); Illinois (northern district); 
Washington D.C.; Florida (middle district); Washington (western 
district); Nevada; California (northern district); Arizona; and Georgia 
(northern district).  Note that none of the districts of New York, Texas or 
Pennsylvania are ranked in the top ten.  Equally enigmatic is the fact that 
the eastern district of New York had a larger share than the southern 
district and the western district of Texas had the largest share of FTC 
filings in the state.  Both relationships contradict that state’s relative 
share of claims filed in the federal courts in those states. 
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TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF FTC CLAIMS AND ALL CIVIL CLAIMS BY 
SELECTED DISTRICT384
   (All shares expressed as percentages) 
St. District Filings 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
5 Yr. 
Avg.  
CA Central All Civil 4.2 4.1 6.4 5.6 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.1 
CA Central FTC 7.0 14.5 22.0 11.3 11.1 11.0 16.0 17.2 13.5 
CA Eastern All Civil 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 
CA Eastern FTC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
CA Northern All Civil 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 
CA Northern FTC 4.7 18.2 6.5 3.8 0.9 1.9 0.0 5.7 2.5 
CA Southern All Civil 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 
CA Southern FTC 16.3 0.0 2.4 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.7 
DC  All Civil 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.0 
DC  FTC 11.6 7.3 11.4 5.7 5.1 4.9 5.3 3.4 4.9 
DE  All Civil 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 
DE  FTC 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
FL Middle All Civil 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.6 
FL Middle FTC 14.0 1.8 4.1 1.9 6.0 5.8 5.3 4.6 4.7 
FL Northern All Civil 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 
FL Northern FTC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 0.6 
FL Southern All Civil 2.3 2.1 3.2 3.6 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.8 2.9 
FL Southern FTC 0.0 0.0 6.5 6.6 10.3 7.8 9.6 12.6 9.4 
GA Northern All Civil 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 
GA Northern FTC 2.3 1.8 1.6 4.7 0.9 5.8 3.2 0.0 2.9 
IL Northern All Civil 3.7 3.2 3.4 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.7 
IL Northern FTC 2.3 0.0 1.6 2.8 9.4 11.7 9.6 10.3 8.8 
NV  All Civil 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 
NV  FTC 0.0 1.8 1.6 0.9 6.8 4.9 2.1 4.6 3.9 
NY Eastern All Civil 2.1 2.2 3.3 3.3 2.8 2.7 2.1 2.5 2.7 
NY Eastern FTC 0.0 1.8 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.9 3.2 1.1 2.3 
NY Southern All Civil 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.7 4.5 4.2 3.9 4.5 4.4 
NY Southern FTC 2.3 3.6 4.1 1.9 1.7 2.9 2.1 1.1 2.0 
 
 384. Judicial Facts and Figures, Civil Cases Filed by District, Table 4.2, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table402.pdf.  FTC filings are based on 
data retrieved from a PACER key word search. 
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Table 2 (cont’d) (All shares expressed as percentages) 
St. District Filings 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
5 Yr. 
Avg.  
PA Eastern All Civil 4.1 3.4 3.3 3.0 4.6 4.5 5.4 6.5 4.8 
PA Eastern FTC 2.3 0.0 2.4 3.8 0.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 
TX Eastern All Civil 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 
TX Eastern FTC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.6 
TX Northern All Civil 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.0 
TX Northern FTC 16.3 0.0 4.1 2.8 3.4 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.6 
TX Southern All Civil 2.7 5.1 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.9 
TX Southern FTC 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.9 0.9 2.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 
TX Western All Civil 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.3 
TX Western FTC 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 5.1 3.9 0.0 2.3 2.6 
WA Western All Civil 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 
WA Western FTC 0.0 5.5 4.1 4.7 6.0 3.9 2.1 4.6 4.3 
 
At most, the data raises or justifies some questions.  The data is 
preliminary and reflects none of the adjustments that may be necessary 
to fairly evaluate the entire picture.  The data for northern districts of 
Texas and California is included to acknowledge the fact that the data is 
quite variable and may reflect certain campaigns on the part of the FTC 
unrelated to favorable venues.  On the other hand, it would be equally 
remiss to ignore the fact, perhaps coincidental, that the districts with 
some of the largest shares of recent FTC filings are some of the same 
districts that have published opinions in FTC cases at variance with 
traditional remedies in equity and that have accepted the FTC arguments 
and positions without careful scrutiny or in accordance with the 
standards set or endorsed by the Supreme Court. 
Finally, even if the data conclusively supported the conclusion that 
the FTC actively engages in forum shopping, not everyone would 
condemn such a practice.  Few plaintiff’s attorneys choose the less 
‘friendly’ forum  and many justify thinly disguised forum shopping on 
the basis of wanting to provide the plaintiff with the most experienced 
judge or the expediency of a ‘rocket docket.’  On the other hand, the 
issue of forum shopping in addition to other tactical choices of the FTC 
in litigation, raise the basic issue of accountability.  The FTC was 
created as an administrative agency, not a plaintiff’s attorney.  As such, 
its recent surge of litigation is the result of a manipulated loophole in 
federal case law on jurisdiction, not as the result of explicit 
Congressional authorization. 
